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ABSTRACT
My dissertation addresses the “developmental paradox” of rapid gains in human
development in Bangladesh against the backdrop of a social scientific literature that
portrays two of the country’s endemic features—Islam and illiberal politics—as
inveterate obstacles to their achievement. I use data from household surveys conducted
by the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies in collaboration with the World
Bank in 1991-2 and 1998-9, and identify the distal determinants of the Bangladeshi
mortality decline. I find female education has a linear effect and household income has a
curvilinear effect on infant and child mortality. Why is the relationship between income
and child mortality curvilinear (quadratic)? And why is female education improving in
an allegedly hostile Muslim environment? The survival analysis of infant and child
mortality in Bangladesh finds that the very poor and rich households are relatively more
successful than their middle-income counterparts in suppressing deaths among children.
Results suggest that by targeting transfers of nutrition and health services at very poor
households, state redistributive programs might have offset poverty-induced threats to
human development among beneficiary families but left the non-beneficiaries—many of
whom are still poor—to fend (or in many cases not fend) for themselves. Welfare gains
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from these “pro-poor” redistributive programs are thus ambivalent. Furthermore, the Bivariate Probit analysis of female educational attainment finds that educational attainment
is possible with female educational subsidies as long as the process of attainment delays
but does not deny the importance of marriage and reproduction in Bangladesh’s
pronatalist culture. The impact of educational subsidies is mediated by birth order,
however. While subsidies appear to have little effect upon first-born girls, who face
overwhelming pressure to marry and reproduce at a young age, they seem to have a
profound effect on offspring of later parities, who tend to stay at school while their older
female sibling(s) await marriage—and thereby raise the prospects for human
development down the road. Overall, I conclude that Bangladesh’s gender-sensitive
redistributive development policies have contributed to rapid infant and child mortality
decline. Ultimately, my dissertation reveals that Muslim societies and cultures are more
permeable than the standard portrait allows.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
Despite substantial reductions in child mortality in the late 20th century, infant and child
mortality remains a critical human development challenge for low and middle-income
developing countries. UNICEF, for instance, estimates that globally 9.7 million children
died in 2006 alone, almost all in developing countries (UNICEF, 2007). Nonetheless,
children from developing countries do not all share parallel threats to mortality. Gaps in
mortality prospects are staggering—and widening—among low-income countries as well
as between low- and high-income countries,1 and, worse still, between income-groups
within low-income countries (Victora et al., 2003). A challenge to economic as well as
human development at large, academicians and practitioners debate the alternatives in
order to prevent 120 deaths from diarrhoea, pneumonia, measles, malaria, or HIV/AID
for every 1000 children in low-income countries before their fifth birthday.
Why do poor countries differ in how many infants and children per 1000 live
births they are able to save? For instance, despite seemingly comparable socio-economic
attributes, why does Pakistan fail to save as many children per 1000 live births as
Bangladesh?2 And, why do mortality gaps between children born to rich and poor
households differ among poor countries? Are children from poor households face as
much (low) risks of premature deaths as those from rich households? Scholars identify
different causes, and broadly alternate between economic growth and redistribution of
income with public provisioning of social services being the principal determinant of
child mortality reduction in poor countries.
1

Six and 88 of every 1000 children die in high- and low-income countries respectively before their 5th
birthday. This rate is 120 per 1000 in the world’s poorest countries.
2
In 2004, under-5 child mortality rate (infant mortality rate) is 100.8 (80.2) and 77 (56.4) per 1000 live
births in Pakistan and Bangladesh respectively (WDI, 2004).

1

The market-based, growth-induced accounts for reducing childhood deaths
maintain that rising national income increases private spending on goods and services
that directly or indirectly improve health (McKeown and Record, 1962; McKeown, 1983;
Pritchett and Summers, 1996; Easterly, 1999; Filmer and Pritchett, 1999; Filmer,
Hammer and Pritchett, 2000, 2002; Dollar and Kraay, 2004). Following this view, the
causal implication behind the empirical regularity that children die in higher rates in lowincome countries and lower rates in high-income countries is that economic growth
reduces childhood mortality by increasing individuals’ ability to purchase health inputs—
food, health care, medical services, and basic education. The key policy focus is to
increase individuals’ command over goods and services assuming that greater purchasing
power of health inputs leads to improved health and nutrition, and thereby lowers rates of
childhood mortality. Pritchett and Summers (1996) predict that as many as 33,000 infants
and 53,000 children could be saved if developing countries raised income by 1 percent (p.
844).
Alternatively, others argue that redistribution of income with public provisioning
of health inputs – primary health care, sanitation, clean drinking water, and especially
female education—helps reduce childhood deaths regardless of national economic
prosperity or adversity (Caldwell, 1986; Hill and Pebley, 1989; Anand and Ravallion,
1993; Dreze and Sen, 1991). The growing dissociation between economic growth and
childhood mortality, and the striking success in reducing childhood deaths in low-income
countries, such as, Sri Lanka, Costa Rica, and Kerala of India challenge the marketbased, economic deterministic explanation of childhood deaths, and thereby suggest that
child health can be achieved at a low cost. In fact, scholars in this alternative camp
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maintain that economic growth is instrumental in reducing childhood deaths only when
growth translates into (a) high public expenditures on health and education (Ranis,
Stewart, and Ramirez, 2000), and (b) reduction of poverty (Anand and Ravallion, 1993).
Caldwell (1986) further argued that state’s redistributive policies manifested in public
programs fostered optimal results only when implemented in an egalitarian structural
context that values participation, equity, education, and women’s autonomy. He
maintained that traditional Muslim societies werer ill disposed toward such values and
therefore tended to underperform in terms of human development in general, and child
mortality in particular.
Does economic growth or redistribution of income save infant’s and children’s
lives in Bangladesh? Perhaps not as linearly as either of these paradigms tends to predict.
At the aggregate level, Bangladesh has reduced child mortality despite slow growth and
relatively low levels of redistribution. The country has halved mortality in infancy and
childhood by saving, on average, 5 more lives per 1000 live births than the baseline rate
thirty year ago.3, 4 Since then, infant mortality has dropped from 158 to 66 per 1000 live
births—a 58% reduction in nearly three decades since Bangladesh won independence in
1971. Similarly, child mortality has dropped from 237 to 90 per 1000 lives births—a 62%
reduction during the same time period.
Bangladesh thereby appears as a paradoxical case with regards to the key
alternative explanations of human development. Few countries in the world match the
3

Infant mortality rate (IMR) is defined as the probability of dying within the first year since birth. IMR
refers to the death counts per 1000 live births of under-12 months old babies.
4 Under-five mortality rate (U5MR) is defined as the probability of dying within the first five years since
birth. U5MR refers to the death counts per 1000 live births of under-12 months old babies, 1-4 years old
children, and >4 and <6 years old children.
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pace at which Bangladesh has reduced mortality, and few share the long—often
interrelated—list of cultural, structural, and institutional disadvantages that are the
potential bottlenecks against the country’s adoption and implementation of the human
development policies. The country has reduced mortality despite (a) economic stagnation
of in the 1980s, (b) a high level of absolute poverty, (c) relatively low public investment
in health, (d) low female literacy rates, (e) histories of authoritarian, and fragile
democratic regimes, and (f) unaccountable bureaucracy. And, Bangladesh is a Muslimmajority country with an established patriarchy. In 1988, the country transformed from
secularism to Islam as the state religion, and Bangladesh adheres to Muslim (Sharia) laws
of inheritance, family, marriage, divorce, custody of children, etc.
Why do cultural, structural, and/or institutional disadvantages seem not to be as
binding in child mortality decline in Bangladesh as pertinent literature so vividly
suggests? How has the country managed to reduce mortality despite its inhospitable
political culture?
I consider the micro-implications of some of these macro questions in this
dissertation. I address these questions by using data from household surveys conducted
by the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies in collaboration with the World
Bank in 1991-2 and 1998-9. In essence, I reassess (well-documented) socio-economic
determinants of child mortality in Bangladesh’s “new” developmental context. I find that
gender-sensitive redistributive developmental policies can develop in an inhospitable
culture of Islam and patriarchy and can yield human development payoffs.
My dissertation consists of 5 additional chapters. Chapter 2 identifies, and
elaborates on the Bangladeshi paradox that during the past three decades, Bangladesh has
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been transformed from an international “basket case” into one of the fastest reducers of
infant and child mortality in the world. Chapter 3 uses panel data from household surveys
to identify the distal determinants of the Bangladeshi mortality decline and finds that
female education has a linear effect and household income has a curvilinear effect on
infant and child mortality.
This merely pushes the puzzle back a step, however, so the next two chapters
address the new puzzles I have identified: Why is the relationship between income and
child mortality curvilinear (quadratic)? And why is female education improving in an
allegedly hostile Muslim environment? Chapter 4 addresses the first question by
examining the ambivalent impact of targeted anti-poverty programs (e.g., Food for
Education). By deploying an overly conservative, land-based targeting principle, the
Bangladeshi government is excluding many poor families, and is thereby raising the
likelihood that the very poor—who benefit from the programs—experience lower levels
of infant and child mortality than the everyday poor, who do not qualify for the
subsidies. Chapter 5 addresses the second question by examining the impact of female
educational subsidies and finds that their impact is mediated by birth order. While
subsidies appear to have little effect upon first-born girls, who face overwhelming
pressure to marry and reproduce at a young age, they seem to have a profound effect on
offspring of later parities, who tend to stay in school while their older female sibling(s)
await marriage—and thereby raise the prospects for human development down the
road. Chapter 6 concludes.

5

CHAPTER II: THE BANGLADESHI PUZZLE
Despite a significant reduction in child mortality in recent years, the global account of
child deaths is still high. Every year, more than 10 million children die worldwide before
their fifth birthday (Ahmad et al., 2000; WHO, 2002). There is substantial variation,
however, in child mortality across continents, sub-continents, and countries. While Africa
and Asia account for a large share of child deaths, about 34% of child deaths occur in
South Asia—second only to sub-Saharan Africa’s 41% in 2000 (Black et al., 2003). Only
five countries—2 of them in South Asia—account for 50% of global child deaths in
absolute numbers,5 and Bangladesh along with 41 low- and middle-income developing
countries account for 90% of child deaths worldwide. One in ten children in South Asia
dies from preventable and curable diseases before their fifth birthday (Black et al., 2003).
What explains low-income developing countries’ varied success in reducing
childhood mortality? Is there any uniform way to reach mortality breakthrough? Scholars
disagree, and alternate primarily between two key competing explanations, namely,
economic growth and redistribution of income with public provisioning of social services
accounts. In addition, some other scholars believe economic growth provides only a
partial explanation of cross-national variation in health, and suggest that health
researchers should adopt a social determinants framework.
Proponents of this market-based thesis hold that income growth in households and
the state reduces child mortality, and thus raising per capital incomes ought to be a key
strategy towards child mortality reduction in low-income developing countries
(McKeown and Record, 1962; McKeown, 1983; Pritchett and Summers, 1996; Easterly,
1999; Filmer and Pritchett, 1999; Filmer, Hammer and Pritchett, 2000, 2002; Dollar and
5

These five countries are: India, Nigeria, China, Pakistan, D R Congo, and Ethiopia.
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Kraay, 2004). Child mortality decline, typically viewed as a natural byproduct of
economic growth, decreases with income under the assumption that public and private
spending on health inputs increases with income. In particular, with a rising real national
income per capita the state increases its expenditure on health care and its correlates, and
households are better able to suppress premature deaths by increasing individual
purchases of health inputs, broadly defined to include food, health care, medical services,
and basic education.
The influence of economic conditions on mortality has the oldest legacy among
alternative accounts—dating back to the late 18th century or older. Thomas Malthus
(1798) in An Essay on the Principal of Population proposed a relationship between food
supply and mortality, as mediated by population growth. Malthus argued that the
population grew exponentially until stopped by famine, plague, war, or other forms to
“natural” checks; food supply and the demand for it among people returned to a
reasonable balance as a result. Thomas McKeown, in the post-Malthus era, reconsidered
the relationship, and argued that mortality responded to improved nutrition more than it
did to other correlates of economic growth, such as advancement in medical technologies.
McKeown (1976) in this famous book, The Modern Rise of Population (1976), compared
epidemiological records from England and Wales since the mid-nineteenth century, and
essentially endorsed the Malthusian argument after nearly two centuries.
After nearly 20 years, Pritchett and Summers (1996) revitalized the market-based,
economic deterministic explanation of childhood deaths by expanding the reference base
to developing nations. The authors claimed that “wealthier is (indeed) healthier,” and
invoked causal arguments that rising national income—proxied by GDP per capita—
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increased private and public health inputs spending and suppressed child mortality as a
result. Pritchett and Summers (1996) predicted that as many as 33,000 infants and 53,000
children in developing countries could be saved each year if countries were to raise
income by 1 percent (p. 844). In more recent years, scholars have further shown that
higher economic growth moves countries towards greater income equality and less
poverty, and thereby ousts the structural predicaments against child mortality (Filmer and
Pritchett, 1999; David and Kraay, 2001).
How does the relationship between economic development and child mortality
change, at least in theory, when (a) the economy grows but the absolute poverty does not
improve, i.e., income improves for some but all, the absolute poverty remains the same as
before economic growth, and income-inequality grows, or (b) the economy grows but
income-inequality does not improve, i.e. income grows for all, the absolute poverty
declines, but income-inequality remains the same as before economic growth in that the
relative difference in income between the highest and the lowest economic strata remains
intact. While proponents of the market-based thesis would be concerned only with the
former, some scholars who study the Social Determinants of Health would argue that
child health deteriorates from the relative poverty in the latter as much as it does from the
absolute poverty in the former hypothetical economic context (Marmot 2004, 2005;
Marmot et al., 2006; Wilkinson, 1996, 2005; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009; WHO, 2008).
Despite being low across high-income developed countries, the mortality rate
between the low- and the high-income groups within a developed country varies
substantially. For example, mortality rates at most ages after infancy were higher in
Harlem than those in not only other areas of New York but also rural Bangladesh
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(Wilkinson, 1996). Given the fact that Harlem residents’ income is significantly higher
than rural residents’ income in Bangladesh, the Social Determinants of Health scholars
bring attention to relative and absolute as opposed to only absolute income as a health
determinant. These scholars argue the psychosocial effects from individuals’ relative
economic status influence health in more ways than were previously recognized
especially in high-income developed countries which have attained basic minimum
standards for the vast majority of the population and gone through the epidemiological
transition (infectious diseases give way to cancers and degenerative diseases as the main
causes of death).
Social Determinants of Health scholars talk about health both at the aggregate and
the individual levels. In doing so, these scholars emphasize on the social meanings of
economic status, and identify those as mediating the relationship between individual’s
economic status and health. They argue conditions at home, work, and leisure, access to
health care, education, life in communities, towns, and cities as a set constitute the social
determinants of health (WHO, 2008). As such, scholars talk about social hierarchy and
individual’s position in social hierarchy as the key explanatory variables for the societal
health condition and individuals’ health. And, the casual mechanisms are social
disintegration and social stress.
At the aggregate level, the social determinant scholars argue that population
health is sensitive to the wider social structure and environment (Wilkinson, 2005;
Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). Less hierarchical and more egalitarian—not the richest—
countries have the best health, when we conceptualize health with higher life expectancy.
Income, goods, and services are more equally distributed in egalitarian societies. And,
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low inter- and intra-group income difference paves the way for social capital, cohesion,
inclusion, a strong community life, and high civic engagement in social and voluntary
activities in societies (Wilkinson, 1996, 2005). Conversely, Wilkinson (2005) argues that
greater income inequality promotes competition, dominance, subordination, and
discrimination and leads to greater social distance among groups and poor social
relationships. He further argues that socioeconomic inequalities lead to social prejudice
against and exclusion of racial and ethnic minorities, and health disparities along racial
and ethnic lines emerge as a product of this process. In sum, any form of socioeconomic
inequalities leads to ill-health, and people with more social contacts and involvements in
local activities seem to have better health, even after controlling for a number of other
possibly confounding factors (Wilkinson, 1996).
What is the micro counterpart of the association between egalitarian social
structure and health as mediated by social cohesion? The social determinant scholars look
at (a) his/her absolute social position, and (b) his/her social hierarchical position—how
his/her social position deviates from the positions most members of his/her reference
group maintain. And, they assess individuals’ (c) psychosocial stress from their absolute
as well as relative social positions, and (d) adoption of health-deteriorating behaviors
(smoking, drinking, poor diet, being overweight, etc.) to predict how healthy an
individual is expected to be.
To elaborate, at the individual level, one’s position in social hierarchy determines
how much economic and social stress he/she faces. Those at the bottom of social
hierarchy suffer from not only material deprivation but also social, psychological, and
emotional deprivations. The former often determines the latter forms of deprivation in
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that an individual’s low economic status means that h/she has poor education, works in a
poor working condition, and lives in an unsafe neighborhood (Marmot, 2005). Wilkinson
(1996), for example, cites numerous studies in Europe that have linked low economic
status and health via material deprivation. For example, financial strain was the strongest
mediating factor between unemployment and reported ill health in the UK and USA; and
anticipated financial problems, as well as, loneliness, were found to be major mediating
factors between individual’s unemployed status and reported health problems in both
Dutch men and women.
While material deprivation explains why an unemployed individual is more likely
than his/her employed counterpart to suffer from a poor health or experience premature
mortality, the fact that, in an occupational hierarchy, the high-status individuals are
healthier than their low-status counterparts calls for a more nuance understanding of the
relationship between socio-economic status and health. The Social Determinants of
Health scholars argue that the social organization of work is particularly instructive in
that regard. The social organization of work determines whether one’s occupation
provides him/her with the opportunities for (a) personal growth and development, (b)
gathering positive experiences (self-efficacy and -esteem), and (c) building extra-primary
group social networks (Marmot et al., 2006). And, (a), (b), or (c) has considerable health
implications. First, employees tend to suffer from a poor health when their work is
organized in a way that leaves them with low levels of decision-making and skillutilizing authority and opportunity yet high levels of psychological pressure. Second,
employee-health suffers when a high psychologically-pressured worker works in a static
work environment in that he/she has a limited scope to garner a new set of skills, and for
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professional growth. The employee has limited control over his/her work and feels less
self-efficacious at work and life outside work. Third, employee-health suffers from a
failed social reciprocity in an employment relation. When an employer does not value an
employee’s effort with remunerated and/or non-remunerated rewards, the employee
perceives this as though the employer is breaching trust and expectancy and is likely to
experience strong negative emotions and stress (Marmot et al., 2006). Finally, employeehealth suffers from the lack of social support at work; workers in a high demand yet low
social support employment have worse health than those in a high demand and social
support employment.
Moreover, the Social Determinants of Health scholars argue that both home’s and
neighborhood’s economic, social, and physical conditions influence health in the
following ways (Marmot et al., 2006). First, while bad housing in commonly considered
as being health-deteriorating, a low-quality domestic life maintains greater health illconsequences than low-quality housing. Poor families suffer from a poor domestic life
because they not only worry about money, jobs, and housing but also lack space to
accommodate family needs, activities, etc. This often results in stress, conflicts, and
subsequent health deteriorating behaviors. Second, neighborhood environment moderates
this effect in that health ill-consequences are far reaching when poor families live in a
neighborhood with sparse civic and recreational amenities, and low-level of socialcapital.
Poor employment and housing conditions increase psychosocial stress, and
psychosocial stress affects health by (a) weakening the immune system and thereby
making individuals more susceptible to ill health and/or (b) leading individuals to adopt
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health-damaging behaviors such as smoking, drinking, poor diet, binge eating, etc.
Invoking the incidences of smoking as an indicator of health-damaging behaviors and
increased income inequality in the US between 1976 and 1990, Wilkinson (1996) wrote,
while the individuals from the poorest income quintile continued smoking at the same
rate throughout this period, the individuals from higher income quintiles smoked at the
lower rate than they used to. Wilkinson found a positive correlation between income
inequality and smoking incidences, and argued that as the individuals from the poorest
income quintile had become both absolute and relatively poorer, they smoked as
frequently—if not more—as before (Wilkinson, 1996). Alcohol is widely used to counter
psychosocial stress from poor employment or housing conditions. Cross-national
evidence suggests a positive association between income inequality and alcohol-related
deaths (Wilkinson, 1996). And, finally, prolonged exposure to psychosocial stress
increases risks for diabetes and cardiovascular diseases (Marmot et al., 2006).
While the Social Determinants of Health explanation is more relevant for adulthealth differentials in high-income countries, the Social Determinants of Health scholars’
proposition that social protection relieves psychosocial stress from any form of
deprivation has child- and adult- health implications. As such, income security and
entitlements to non-income social transfers such as food, health care, and education)
benefit child- as well as adult-health in low- as well as high-income countries (Van
Ginneken, 2003).
Alternatively the redistribution account of child mortality argues that the public
provisioning of social services—primary health care, sanitation, clean drinking water,
and especially female education—is responsible for improved health and literacy
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outcomes in poor countries (Anand and Ravallion, 1993; Anand and Barnighausen, 2004;
Caldwell, 1986, 1993; Dreze and Sen, 1991; Hill and Pebley, 1989; Preston, 1980;
Bohkhari et al., 2006; Gupta et al., 2002; McGuire, 2001; Wagstaff, 2003; Jalan and
Ravallion, 2003; Soares, 2007; Schultz, 2002; Frost et al., 2005; Ravallion, 2006). Child
mortality decline, typically viewed as orthogonal to economic growth, is possible with
public provisioning of basic social services that is found to often benefit the poor in
particular yet are available to ALL. The redistribution account is more consistent than the
economic growth account with respect to rapid child mortality declines experienced in
low-income countries—Costa Rica, Sri Lanka, and Kerala (India).
The redistribution account thus challenges the “Wealthier is Healthier” account of
mortality reduction, and questions its premise based on (a) the historical and
contemporary empirical evidences, and (b) over-assumption about market effectives in
health. Scholars argue that McKeown did not present any direct evidence on nutrition of
individuals to test this thesis (McKeown 1976, p: 130; Easterlin, 1999), and the age-old
association between growth-induced nutritional improvement and mortality reduction
remains open. Stolnitz (1965) highlighted a seemingly unrelated trend between economic
development and mortality in Asia, Latin America and Africa, but it is Samuel Preston
whose analysis posed the biggest challenge to the economic deterministic explanation of
mortality. In what is commonly known as the “Preston Curve”, the author showed that at
a fixed income, its association with mortality showed temporal variation, and at a fixed
period in time, the association changed spatially. Considering the presence of a potential
third factor behind precipitation across time and space, Preston argued that economic
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development and mortality were far from being causally related.6 Among the more
contemporary scholars, Anand and Ravallion (1993) showed that the association between
economic growth and child mortality depended on public policies to reduce poverty
and/or improve health and health correlates.
In more recent years, using data from countries in all regions of the world,
numerous studies have demonstrated a robust inverse relationship between public social
spending and child mortality. Jalan and Ravallion (2003) show that public investments in
anti-poverty programs, water infrastructure, and health knowledge promotion have
reduced the prevalence and duration of diarrhea among children under five in rural India.
Soares (2007) shows that public investments in education and water and sanitation
infrastructures have increased life expectancy in Brazil between 1970 and 2000. Wagstaff
(2003) finds that higher levels of per capita public health investments are associated with
significantly lower levels of mortality and malnutrition among poor children. Bokhari et
al. (2007) find that public investments on health are important contributors to under-five
mortality reduction in developing countries. Gupta et al. (2002) show that public
investments on health care improves health among the poor in low-income developing
countries. And, based on empirical evidence that women education increases human
welfare, Schultz (2002) argues that the disproportionate allocation of public expenditures
towards women’s education is justified for countries seeking to increase child welfare.

6

In particular, Preston (1975) shows that (a) individuals lived longer in 1960s than 1930s at comparable
levels of economic development, and (b) at a given year, economic development has a closer association
with mortality in the countries with per capita GDP $400 or less than those with per capita GDP of $600
and above. Preston believes that that mortality increasingly dissociates with economic growth (p. 231), and
that only 16% of the increase in life expectancy between 1938 to 1963 can be attributable to GDP growth
(p. 238).
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Perhaps the most comprehensive critique of the “wealthier is healthier” account is
Caldwell’s (1986) correlation analysis between GDP per capita and child mortality rates,
and his comparative historical analysis of Sri Lanka, Kerala (of India) and Costa Rica to
show that economic development was not a necessary condition for mortality
breakthrough. Caldwell (1986, 1993) deepened redistribution arguments by directing
attention to cultural and structural preconditions for allocation and governance of
resources devoted to health and its correlates. His analytical building blocks, though
interrelated, were (a) religion (Islam) and the position of women in society, (b) religion
(Islam) and the role of modern, formal education, (c) egalitarian class structure, and (b)
democratic political system and populism. In sum, Caldwell argued that female autonomy
and education led to low mortality in democratic institutional contexts embedded in an
egalitarian class structure.
With regards to child mortality reduction, Caldwell singled out female education
and autonomy as the most significant determinants, and argued that mortality reduction
was more likely in “pro-women” societies. In particular, Caldwell argued that nonIslamic societies with women’s superior social status did better in saving children’s lives
than Islamic societies where women were socially inferior. Islamic societies allegedly
value a woman’s ascribed qualities (such as age or beauty) more than her achievements
such as formal education. Formal education often parallels Islam’s Quranic education,
and males as well as females in Islamic societies are equally affected by such aversion.
Moreover, female education is lower than male education since formal secular schooling
is often at odds with Islamic norms and values of purdah (seclusion), physical separation
between males (teachers/service providers) and females (students/clients), etc. As such,
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girls come in physical proximity of male teachers or fellow students while in school.
And, even when a girl acquires education, she is not more autonomous than before in a
significant way if her role as a decision maker does not have social or religious approval.
Children in Islamic societies suffer from lack of maternal health know-how and societal
“child-friendly” health services. As such, an Islamic society lacks an effective rural
health service since education among Muslim women is low and without education
among women a stronger pool of nurses, midwives, and other health human resources is
less likely to take place. And, a Muslim mother without education lacks the knowledge to
prevent diseases, or the ability to access/process health services/ information as well as
her educated counterparts even when services are accessible.
Why do social reform programs emerge in some but all societies? Caldwell traced
universal access to quality health and education services back to societies’ egalitarian
economic and political structures, to a great extent. Political ideology for equality
precedes land (wealth) and income redistribution and improves access among the poor to
not only physical but also human capital. Access does not necessarily mean quality, and
Caldwell argued that civic political participation made possible efficiency of health and
education services especially to the poor.

In sum, the above three perspectives deliver the following testable hypotheses:
HYPOTHESIS 2. 1: Children born to high-income parents are less likely to die before
they turn five years old than those born to low-income parents.
HYPOTHESIS 2. 2: Children born to high-social status parents with are less likely to die
before they turn five years old than those born to low-social status parents.
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HYPOTHESIS 2. 3: Children born to high- and low-income parents are equally likely to
live/die if their parents have equal access to publicly provided social services.
While both economic determinism and redistribution are plausible alternative
explanations of child mortality in low-income developing countries, and both find
considerable empirical support, exceptions are numerous however. First, some countries
have combined attributes of both growth-determined and redistribution-induced routes to
child mortality reduction, and have succeeded in reducing child mortality. For example,
growth combined with massive public investment in education in South Korea and
Taiwan contributed to child mortality decline. Second, several countries have reduced
child mortality by attributing to neither in its purest form. A burning example is
Bangladesh.
No other countries have reduced child mortality as fast as Bangladesh has in the
midst of a long list of deep cultural and structural constraints (Stern, 2002; Dreze, 2004).
Bangladesh thus poses an empirical puzzle for both the economic deterministic and the
public provision accounts of childhood mortality decline. In particular, the country defies
both (a) the economic determinist explanation of child mortality reduction by reducing
childhood deaths amidst economic stagnation of 1980s, slow growth in 1990s, and high
level of absolute poverty, and (b) the universal redistribution argument with low public
investment in health and education, low female literacy rates, 1980s’ authoritarian
regime, and a religious context that shows a tenuous commitment to women’s autonomy.
Table 1 further underscores Bangladesh’s performance in reducing infant and
under-5 child mortality rates. It does so by way of comparison to Pakistan and Sri Lanka
– countries with similar colonial legacies and religious traditions, and is influenced by
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Caldwell’s analysis of health performance relative to economic development. Caldwell
(1986), in an effort to screening out the superior and the poor health achieving countries
relative to economic development, carried out what appears to be a simple yet instructive
analysis. Caldwell (a) regressed infant mortality rates on the level of economic
development for 99 developing countries in 1982, (b) obtained the residuals – the
difference between the actual infant mortality rates and the mortality rate that countries’
level of economic development predicts, and based on the residuals, (c) identified as well
as ranks the countries having prevented or failed to prevent, on average, 25 or more
infants’ deaths per 1000 live births given their respective level of economic development.
Kerala and Sri Lanka, Caldwell showed, save, on average, 75 and 62 more infants’ lives
per 1000 live births, respectively, given their level of economic development, and
therefore rank in the top 1% of the superior health achieving countries. Caldwell’s (1986)
analysis of the residuals is particularly instructive in that it helps to show that
Bangladesh’s recent gain in reducing deaths exceeds its economic expectations, whereas
Pakistan and Sri Lanka continue to, respectively, under and over-perform relative to
economic growth (Table 1).
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Table 2.1: Percentile Positions for IMR and U5MR Residuals Relative to Economic
Development
ith percentile for residuals of IMR
ith percentile for residuals of
relative to GDP per capita
U5MR relative to GDP per capita
1980
1990
2000
1980
1990
2000
Bangladesh
16
22
51
17
24
43
Pakistan
29
19
21
35
29
32
Sri Lanka
91
98
98
91
98
99
Source: World Development Indicators (various years). The measure of economic
development is GDP per capita (2000 constant US$)

While Sri Lanka continues to surpass expectations, and Pakistan races backward,
Bangladesh has transformed from a hopeless under-performer into an incipient success
story by substantially reducing infant and child mortality in only 20 years (1980-2000).
Table 1 shows that Bangladesh placed in the bottom 16th percentile in 1980, indicating
that only 16% of the developing countries around the globe performed worse than
Bangladesh in preventing infant-deaths given their level of economic development in
1980. Based on the actual residual, I further find that Bangladesh failed to prevent, on
average, 42 infant-deaths per 1000 live births, given its level of economic development.
In only 20 years, however, Bangladesh has progressed to the 51st percentile, indicating
that more than half of the developing countries performed more poorly than Bangladesh
in preventing infant-deaths in 2000. The similar trend holds for Bangladesh’s
performance in preventing death of children five years old or younger. Whereas only
17% of the developing countries performed worse than Bangladesh in preventing under
five children’s deaths in 1980, almost half of the developing countries performed less
well than Bangladesh in 2000. In more substantial terms, Bangladesh failed to prevent, on
average, 72 under five children deaths per 1000 live births in 1980 given its level of
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economic development; but it saved, on average, 11 more children’s lives per 1000 live
births, relative to its level of economic development in 2000.
Nonetheless, one needs to go beyond the cursory statistical preview and into
substance to fully appreciate the Bangladeshi human development puzzle in comparative
context.
Bangladesh is all in all a poor, populous country. With nearly 1070 people per
square mile, Bangladesh is the most densely populated country in the world. The country
fits firmly within the bracket of the least developed countries even with an average GDP
growth of 4.91% during the 1990s, and ranks 34 (37) from the bottom among 166
countries with per capita GDP of US $416 (US $1797) in nominal (purchasing power
parity) terms (BBS, 2000; WDI, 2004).7 Despite economic growth, 40% of Bangladeshi
people still live on less than $1 a day, and the poverty rate jumps to 82% if poverty is
referred to as living on less than $2 a day. Let’s note, the rates at which infant and child
mortality reduced have reached to double-digits and remained so since 1980s, whereas
the Bangladeshi economy has started to grow since early 1990s (see Figure 2.1), and
poverty is widespread all along in the contemporaneous or temporal terms. This suggests
that economic growth and poverty reduction are poor independent predictors of mortality
reduction among infants or children under 5.

7

The World Bank’s groups countries into the following four categories of development: low income, $975
or less; lower middle income, $976 - $3,855; upper middle income, $3,856 – 11,905; and high income,
$11,906 or more.
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Figure 2.1: GDP Growth and IMR and U5MR Reduction in Bangladesh, 1980-2000

The state’s political system is as fragile, if not more so, as its economic system.
Bangladesh is currently a struggling democracy with weak checks and balances against
government misconduct. Since gaining independence in 1971, the country has endured 20
years of authoritarian rule. Although the country ascended to democracy in 1991,
Bangladesh has yet to institutionalize democratic rule of governance beyond elections.
Even the “free and fair” election to political power is hardly consensual among
stakeholders, and often results in a series of violent political conflicts and instability. It
should not then surprise, that, electoral checks and balances have not held government
officials as accountable as is expected in a democratic political context. Evidence is
widespread of mis-governance in service delivery. Even foreign business leaders
recognize signs of corruption among government officials, and the country is ranked at or
near the bottom in surveys to gauge the pervasiveness of corruption across countries.
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This might be more than a speculation that dysfunctional political institutions, and
inadequate public policies have some legitimacy in structural and cultural contexts –
Islamic beliefs and practices, economic structure, clientelistic social relations, and
patriarchy. Though not as closed as a caste-based society, Bangladesh is hierarchically
organized, with an allegedly rigid class structure, based on production relations.
Distribution of income, status, and power is closely related to the distribution and control
of arable land (Cain, 1977). Foreign anthropologists often portray Bangladesh as the
antithesis of an equal or egalitarian society (Cain, 1977; Cain et al., 1979; Arthur and
McNicoll, 1978). And, the poor and the women are the most vulnerable.
First, the poor and the poorest face threats to their survival and must rely on
patron-client ties to avoid destitution (Blair, 2005). Patron-clientelistic relations
perpetuate in rural Bangladesh where economic opportunities are land-based, agrarian,
economic-diversification is low, and credit markets fail to provide financial services to
the poor, especially in times of personal, or (periodic) natural calamities. And, patronclient relations often act as a medium—and barrier—between government and the poor
(Khan, 2005; Bhaduri, 1973). Anecdotal evidence shows adverse effects of clientelism on
antipoverty projects. Hartman and Boyce (1983) talk about how rich local farmers
captured a publicly provided local irrigation facility intended for poor farmers. Un Nabi
(1999) talks about the local power structure and how local elites are often consulted when
a development project is undertaken in community.
Second, women in general, and poor women in particular face as much structural
and institutional constraints as poor men do. But, their economic disadvantages are
aggravated by Islamic and patriarchal traditions in Bangladesh. Norms of seclusion and
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purdah go hand in hand with limits on ownership of wealth and formal education after
puberty. For instance, according to the Islamic law of inheritance, a girl receives half as
much property as her brother receives, and according to patriarchal custom, she gives up
her right to (inherited) property when she gets married and leaves her parents’ household.
Moreover, patriarchy at times overrules Islamic customs to girls’ further disadvantage.
As such, girls, especially, in rural Bangladesh are expected to pay dowry at marriage to
their husbands or in-laws. This is opposite to the Islamic practices of mehr or the brideprice where the ritual dictates that girls are entitled to receive a “price” from her
prospective husband.
In this context of tenuous social and religious commitment to women’s welfare,
as defined traditionally, it is unusual for the state to enact gender-sensitive, pro-poor
redistributive development policies or for women to indeed access them when available.
How is it possible then that Bangladesh has overcome these obstacles to improved child
survival? A vast majority of Bangladeshi women’s social (status)- and economic (food)insecurities from man-made and natural disasters are among the strongest candidates for
Bangladesh’s adoption of gender-sensitive, pro-poor redistributive development policies.
The history of the country’s origin provides relevant context. In 1947, at the end
of British colonial rule, the Indian sub-continent was divided into India and Pakistan, and
Pakistan was comprised of five provinces—Punjab, Baluchistan, Sind, the North-West
Frontier, and East Pakistan. The division of the Indian sub-continent into India and
Pakistan was based on religion—“the Hindus belonging to India and the Muslims to
Pakistan” (Bhatnagar, 1971, p. 27). Following this, East Pakistan was made a part of
Pakistan despite the in-between geographic separation by more than 1,000 miles (see the
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map below), and differences in language, cultural heritage, physical appearance, and
climate. But, East and West Pakistan commonly shared Islamic beliefs and practices
among its people because 80% of the populations were Muslims. The division of the subcontinent also resulted in massive inter-country migrations in that a large number of
Hindus/Muslims of East Pakistan/India’s West Bengal migrated to India’s West
Bengal/East Pakistan (Williams, 1972; Kuper, 1981).

Figure 2. 2: The Map of South Asia

Bangladesh, the then East Pakistan, became an independent state in 1971 after a
nine-month long war with (West) Pakistan. The reasons for Bangladeshi’s independence
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range from their relative economic and political deprivations to their ethnic and cultural
differences. Yet, independence came at the expense of massive human and physical
casualties. One to three million people were killed during the nine-month long war
(Chaudhury, 1972). There were also systematic killings of the Bangladeshi professionals
and intellectuals (doctors, engineers, civil servants, college professors, writers, etc.) right
before the war ended on December the 16th. The country’s development prospects were
bleak following the massive human and physical casualties in 1971 and the famine,
population displacement, and extreme political instability of the 1970s in addition to the
country’s limited natural resource base, mounting population pressure, and periodic
natural calamities. Thus, Bangladesh was labeled as “the test case of development,” an
“international basket case”, etc. (Faaland and Parkinson, 1975).
Table 2.2 lists casualties following Bangladesh’s 1971 liberation war and major
natural disasters since its colonial era. Notably, loss of social and economic protection
from deaths, displacements, or “dishonor” among the consequences of natural or manmade disasters is gendered in that disasters in Bangladesh have affected women and men
differently. Massive female casualties in Bangladesh’s war with Pakistan in 1971
elaborate the point. Despite possible under-reporting, an estimated 400,000 women were
reportedly raped during the nine-months’ wartime in 1971, and 250,000 rape victims
became pregnant (Brownmiller, 1975; McGinn, 2000; Smith, 1994). In other words, up to
12 for every 1,000 adult women were raped, and journalist’s reports show that the rape
victims were of all ages, ranging as low as 8 to as high as 75 years, of all social classes
and religion, and incidences occurred at home, public places, or military barracks where
the women were held (Brownmiller, 1975).

26

Table 2.2: Major Disasters in Bangladesh (or then East Pakistan)
Year
Event
Casualties
1769- Great Bengal Famine
“Eliminated almost a third of Bengal’s population”
76
(A. Ahmed 1962, p. 140), although impact was less
severe in East Bengal (N. Ahmed, 1968, p. 327)
1784- Floods and famine; radical Unknown (N. Ahmed, 1968, pp. 33, 101
88
shift in course of the
Brahmaputra (1787)
1873- Famine
Unknown (A. Ahmed, 1962, p. 141)
74
1876 Barakganj Cyclone and
400,000 deaths (N. Ahmed, 1968, p. 51)
tidal wave
1884- Famine
Unknown (Bhatia, 1967, p. 164)
85
1897 Chittagong Cyclone
175,000 deaths (N. Ahmad, 1968, p. 51)
1918- Influenza epidemic
400,000 deaths (M.R.Khan, 1972b, p. 384)
19
1943 Bengal Famine
2-2.5 million deaths (A. Ahmed, 1962, p. 141; M.
R. Khan, 1972b, p. 384)
1947 Partition of India
Unknown; total deaths of Partition one million, but
most were in West (Davis, 1951, p. 197)
1970 Cyclone and tidal wave
200,000-500,000 deaths (L. C. Chen, 1973)
1971 War of Independence
500,000 deaths (Curlin, Chen and Hussain, 1976,
p. 31), although some estimates are much higher
(e.g. one to three million deaths—Choudhury,
1972, p. 22)
200,000—400,000 women raped (Brownmiller,
1975, p. 79) causing 25,000 pregnancies (Smith,
1994, p. 3)
1974

Famine

1987
1988

Flood
Flood

1991
1996

Cyclone
Flood

Officially 30,000 deaths (Majlis, 1977), although
some estimates are much higher (e.g. 500,000—
Baldwin, 1977; 80,000 in Rangpur district alone—
Haque et al., 1977)
Officially 1657 deaths (Brammer, 1990)
Officially 2379 deaths and 45 millions affected
(Brammer, 1990)
138,000 deaths (Bern et al., 1993)
Officially 1,000 deaths and 30 millions affected
(Shah, 1999)

The sheer number of rapes of Bangladeshi women makes this a rare event even by
the historical comparison. Aydelott (1993) wrote, “two cases of mass rapes remain the
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most horrendous examples of this practice [method of warfare]: the Japanese invasion of
Nanking China…. and the Pakistani invasion of Bangladesh in 1971” (p. 591-592).
However, Bangladeshi women’s physical assault is perhaps more consequential if we
take into account the country’s economic, social, religious, and legal institutional
contexts, and how physical assaults of women is perceived by others in the Islamic,
patriarchal cultural context, and affect the prospects for women’s status attainment by
marriage and childbearing. First, a rape victim loses her rights as a wife to a large extent
if she is married, and her demand in the (arranged) marriage market if she is unmarried.
Eighty percent of the rape victims in the 1971 war were Muslims, and, following the
Islamic values of female chastity and purdah, no Muslim men/husbands would agree to
marry a women/take back a wife who had been touched by another man (Brownmiller,
1975). Families reportedly abandoned the rape victims as well. An estimated 3 million
deaths during Bangladesh’s war against Pakistan also affected women in that, for women,
the loss of the husband, son, or both means the loss of social status, socio-economic
protection, and old-age insurance. When women’s education and labor force participation
is low, and rights to property are limited, loss of traditional support networks is
consequential. According to the Muslim inheritance laws, a daughter receives one-half
the share of a son in theory, though she receives less or none in practice. Also, women
tend to relinquish their share of inheritance to their brothers (Cain et al., 1977). When she
follows purdah, and has restricted physical mobility, she misses out on the employment
opportunities, if available, even in extra-ordinary circumstances.
Second, Bangladesh confronts yet another food crisis in 1974—nearly 30 years
since the Great Bengal Famine in 1943 under the British Colonial Rule, and three years

28

since independence from Pakistan. Though allegedly less catastrophic with regards to the
lives lost, the 1974 Famine is comparable to the 1943 Bengal Famine when nearly 4.35
million people—more than 6 percent of the total population died from prolonged
starvation (Sen, 1981). Estimated deaths in the 1974 Bengal Famine range from the
government’s estimate of 30,000 to the nongovernmental estimate of 500,000 deaths. For
example, the Rangpur district in Bangladesh alone faces 80,000 to 100,000 during 2-3
months of an acute food shortage (Haque et al., 1977). Another estimate suggests the
national account of one million deaths from August 1974 to February 1975, and an
additional half a million in the following year (Alamgir, 1980).
Women experience an abrupt decline in status following death of the husband or
son, and “dishonor,” and fall from the family and community networks to potentially
become the state’s “burdens.” As early as 1972, Bangladesh has seen political
reservations, i.e., institutionalized support for women’s economic and social
empowerment. For instance, in Bangladesh, fifteen parliamentary seats were reserved for
women; a five percent quota of government employment was reserved for rape victims
(Kibria, 1991; Huda, 1987). Bangladesh is one of the pioneers among the developing
countries to establish a full-fledged ministry for women affairs in 1978. Such an
institutionalized support for women in Bangladesh, and their absence in Pakistan or any
other Muslim majority country in the world suggest that female casualty in 1971 had a
role to play. Second, massive mortality due to prolonged, involuntary hunger had paved
the way of restructuring of the country’s food distribution system in that the
government’s food management in the post-famine period was different from that in the
pre-famine period. Regardless of whether the famine occurred due to (a) Food
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Availability Decline (FAD)—“a sudden, sharp reduction in the food supply in any
particular geographic locale has usually resulted in widespread hunger and famine”
(Brown and Eckholm, 1974, p. 25), or (b) Entitlement Failure (EF)—a sudden reduction
in purchasing power when food supply is constant (Sen, 1981), or (c) a combination of
both, the Bangladeshi governments’ role in ensuring food security had changed since
then. In particular, if 1.5 million deaths from starvation in the infamous Great Bengal
famine in 1943 reinforced public regulation of production, marketing, and distribution of
food, the 1974 Famine—under public regulation—founded its eventual reform to become
targeted food distribution programs.
To reiterate, the immediate need for rehabilitation of those hardest hit by the
natural or man-made disasters—the poor and the women—was pressing. In the early
1970s the Bangladeshi government initiated a number of social safety net programs,
initially as relief efforts in a war-wrenched country, and for seasonal calamities,
unemployment, loss of primary income earners and other sustained needs (Deolalikar,
2005). These social programs evolved as part of the country’s poverty reduction strategy
(Sen et al., 2004) (see below). Overall, the goals of these social programs are to enhance
(a) capital accumulation among the poor, (b) nutrition/food security, and (c) human
development (education, in particular). The state provides food and/or cash incentives to
eligible demographic groups in poor areas to encourage primary and secondary education
among children from poor households. Examples include Food-for-Education, Food-forWork, Vulnerable Group Feeding, Female Secondary School Assistance Program,
microfinance programs, etc.
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A discussion detailing origin, goals, eligible beneficiaries, size, and mode of
delivery of the major social safety net programs follows.8 But first, let’s note, the social
safety net programs work independently of the state’s health and education programs and
are expected to increase uptakes of health and education services. Second, it is not clear
how the state’s expenditures on safety net programs, health and education programs or
both are associated with its economic growth. Are the state’s social expenditures made
possible by economic growth or vice versa? Evidence indicates simultaneous upward
movement of social expenditures and growth, but is insufficient to suggest the direction
of causality between them. As such, the state’s expenditures on education and health are
low even by the South Asian standards though they have been growing since early the
1980s (see below). In 2000, Bangladesh spent $11 per capita on health—57% lower than
the South Asian average health expenditure of $26 per capita (WB-HNP, 2008).
Similarly, the country spent 2.1 percent of GDP on education—lower than the South
Asian average of 3.7 percent. However, the government’s development policy
emphasizes on the social safety net programs as the key to enhancing progress in
education, health, and economic growth (World Bank, 2006).

8

Social safety net programs in Bangladesh include Food-for-education, Female Secondary School
Assistance Program (FEMALE SECONDARY SCHOOL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM), Vulnerable Group
Development (VGD), Food-for-Work (FFW), Rural Maintenance Program (RMP), Test Relief (Rural
Infrastructure Maintenance Program (RIMP), Old Age Allowance, Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF),
Gratuitous Relief (GR), Fund for Mitigation of Risk of Natural Disaster, Allowance to the Widowed,
Deserted, and Destitute Women, Honorium Program for Insolvent Freedom Fighters, Fund for Housing for
the Distressed, Fund for Rehabilitation of Acid Burnt Women and the Physically Handicapped.
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Table 2. 3: Bangladesh’s Health and Education Expenditures as Percentages of GDP
1980/81—
1985/1986—
1990/91—
1995/96—
1984/85
1989/90
1994/95
1999/00
Health (and
0.66
0.70
0.90
0.97
population
planning)
Education
1.00
1.33
1.81
2.11

Food-for-Education (FFE): In 1993, the government of Bangladesh launched Food-ForEducation, whose overall aim was to encourage schooling for primary school age
children from poor households with in-kind food incentives. In particular, the program
lists four objectives: increased school enrollment among children from poor households,
better school attendance and completion, lower dropout rates, reduced child labor, and
higher quality primary education (Murgai and Zaidi, 2005; The World Bank, 2004).
Food-For-Education is rural-based, and poor-focused. First, one of more economically
backward unions from each rural thana (sub-district) participates in Food-For-Education.
Second, all schools—government, non-government, satellite, and low-cost primary
schools, and one madrasa from a selected union are eligible for Food-For-Education
participation. Third, all children enrolled in Food-For-Education participating schools are
eligible to receive food (and recently cash) stipends, in addition to free primary-school
education, as long as their families meet one or more of the following criteria: (a)
functionally landless (families that own 0.50 acres of land or less), (b) distressed femaleheaded (widowed, separated from husband, or divorced), and (b) household head is a day
laborer. A child must maintain an 85 percent attendance rate in school in order to
continue participation to Food-For-Education. On average, A family receives 114 kg of
rice per year, which translates into an average monetary value of Taka 100 or 125 per
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month if, respectively, one or more than one child attends primary school.9 The
Government of Bangladesh estimates over 5.3 million beneficiaries of Food-ForEducation per year, and spends US $100 million per year (The World Bank, 2004). The
government of Bangladesh finances Food-For-Education, and its Ministry of Education is
responsible for its execution. Food-For-Education is a decentralized program where the
Ministry of Education assigns the program across unions (within thanas), but the
community selects the actual beneficiaries (using eligibility criteria) (Galasso and
Ravallion, 2005).
Female Secondary School Assistance Program (FSSAP): Launched in 1993, Female
Secondary School Assistance Program is one of a very few female secondary schoolenrollment subsidy programs available in developing countries.10 Female Secondary
School Assistance Program aims to (a) increase the number of female students in
secondary school, and (b) reduce incidence of under age marriage. The program is
primarily rural-based, and serves close to four million girls (Chaudhury and Devarajan,
2006). Districts are chosen based on pervasiveness of poor households, and low literacy
and attendance rates among girls from those households. Schools within these districts
voluntarily participate in Female Secondary School Assistance Program and, upon
participation schools receive a stipend based on the number of girls they enroll. Girls who
have successfully graduated from primary school and reside in eligible districts qualify
for participation in Female Secondary School Assistance Program. To qualify, a girl
needs to maintain 75 percent attendance in school per academic year, passing grades, and

9

This suggests that FFE stipend is about 13% of the average monthly earnings of boys and 20% of that for
girls, according to the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics Survey in 1996 about the average monthly income
for boys and girls of primary-school age in rural areas (Galasso and Ravallion, 2005; BBS, 1998).
10
Secondary schooling in Bangladesh refers to Grades 6—10.

33

remain unmarried while in secondary school. Eligible girls receive tuition, book
allowances, and examination fee waivers, and a stipend of Taka 300 while enrolled in
Grade 6, Tk. 360 in Grade 7, Tk. 420 in Grade 8, and Tk. 720 in Grades 9 and 10. The
Ministry of Education is in charge of Female Secondary School Assistance Program. The
program is financed by the Government of Bangladesh, USAID, Asia Foundation,
NORAD, World Bank, and ADB.
Vulnerable Group Development (VGD): The VGD programme started in 1986. VGD
transfers food while providing its beneficiaries with the following services: skill and
literacy, credit and savings mobilization, and health and nutrition education. The program
is rural-based and women-focused, and its objectives are: (a) to increase employment
opportunities for women, and (b) to build awareness of disaster management and
nutrition. VGD thanas are of high food insecurity, and to qualify participants must be: (a)
owning 0.15 acres of land or less, (b) of low or no permanent family income, (c) day
laborers, and who (d) lack productive assets. Upon participation, beneficiaries receive 30
kilograms of wheat per month. The Ministry of Women and Children Affairs is in charge
of VGD. The Government of Bangladesh spends US$40 million for VGD and claims to
serve nearly 500,000 beneficiaries per year (The World Bank, 2004).
Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF): VGF began in 1975. VGF is the government’s
program to provide short-term relief to disaster victims. The VGF program transfers food
or other in-kind aids. Only disaster-affected thanas qualify to participate in the VGF
program, and food aid is distributed based on popular demand in those thanas following
natural disasters or overall food insecurity in general. To qualify, victims of natural
calamity must be: (a) household head earning less than Taka 300 per month, (b)
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functionally landless, and (c) household heads who are day-laborers. The Ministry of
Food and Disaster Management is in charge of VGF. The Government spends US$30
million per year on VGF, and claims to provide food transfers to 240,000 people per year.
Food-for-Work (FFW): FFW in Bangladesh started in 1975, and is the government’s
effort to generate employment in the infrastructure development sector for the poor
especially during the dry season. Beneficiaries include households that are (a)
functionally landless, (b) lack productive assets, (c) are female headed, (d) are day
laborers, and (e) earn monthly incomes of less than Taka 300 per month. The amount of
food transfer is not specified in the government documents. The Department of Local
Government Engineering Department is in charge of the program. The Government
spends US$40 million per year in FFW, and claims to serve about 1,000,000 participants
per year.
Microfinance Institutions (MFI): Microfinance institutions are characterized by groupbased, small-scale, often collateral-free credit and savings services to especially lowincome and traditionally unbankable households. These institutions were born—if not in
their current organizational structure—in Bangladesh soon after the liberation war in
1971, began their credit program in early-to-mid 1980s, and expanded considerably since
early 1990s. The Grameen Bank and Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee
(BRAC) lead microfinance programs in Bangladesh in regards to the number of client
they serve and the amount of loan they disburse per year. The Grameen Bank was born in
1976, and became a bank in 1983. In 1983, Grameen had 36,000 members and a portfolio
of $3.1 million, and in 1997 it had 2.3 million members and a portfolio of $260 million.
In 2009, the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh made loans totaling Taka 75 billion (US

35

$1,091 million) to 7.93 million borrowers—97% of them women. And, BRAC was born
in 1972, under its original name—Bangladesh Rehabilitations Assistance Committee.
Though originally established to assist the people displaced during the country’s war
against Pakistan, BRAC transformed into a microfinance institution and began its
service-delivery role in early 1980s. In 1980, BRAC’s annual expenditure was less than
$1 million ($0.78), and in 2000, its expenditure rose to $152. In 2007, BRAC lent Taka
27 billion (US $576 million) to 7.37 million borrowers—90% of them women.
Households owning half an acre or less are eligible to participate to the Grameen
Bank, BRAC, or similar microfinance programs in Bangladesh. MFIs in Bangladesh
provide credit to thus defined functionally landless rural poor after they form groups of
five. Each individual member is eligible to receive credit, but if one defaults the whole
group fails to receive further credit. The groups are required to meet weekly with a credit
officer to make repayments on their loans as well as mandatory contributions to savings
and insurance funds. Groups are gendered in that the females meet with other female
members and the males with fellow male members, thus abiding with gender norms in
Bangladesh; but if a female member interacts with, say, a male credit officer in the
presence of other females, this does not necessarily challenge norms of seclusion
(purdah) in rural Bangladesh. Contrary to traditional financial institutions, micro-finance
institutions have gained unprecedented success in repayment rates. Group-based lending
and peer monitoring as substitutes for collateral and as mechanisms for enforcing
contracts are the obvious candidates for MFI’s successful banking with a seemingly
unbankable population.
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Have these programs worked? If so, how? And why have they proven viable in a
less than hospitable social and political context? The next three chapters attempts to shed
some empirical light to this question, and identify the distal determinants of child
mortality reduction in Bangladesh. In particular, among the distal determinants, I
examine income effects on child mortality in Chapter 3, and reexamine this effect after
considering the fact that Bangladesh’s redistribution policy targets poor households to
transfer social services in Chapter 4. I examine the effect of another robust distal
determinat—female education—on child mortality in Bangladesh in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER III: DISTAL CAUSES OF MORTALITY DECLINE IN
BANGLADESH
Over the course of the past three decades Bangladesh has been transformed from an
“international basket case” into the “fastest reducer of infant mortality” in the world
(Stern, 2002). Infant mortality in Bangladesh has dropped from 145 to 88 per 1000 live
births—a 55% reduction in nearly three decades since independence in 1971. Similarly,
child mortality has dropped from 239 to 88 per 1000 lives births—a 63% reduction
during the same period. Bangladesh has done well in comparative context as well.
Between 1990 and 2000, Bangladesh reduced infant and child mortality rates by 34% and
48% respectively, and the reduction rate is 19% (30%) in infant (child) mortality in
countries of comparable economic development—2000 per capita national incomes
between $300 and $400. Bangladesh has nearly halved mortality in infancy and
childhood by saving, on average, 5 more lives per 1000 live births from the baseline per
year for the past thirty years.
In addition to aggregate mortality trends, Figure 1 presents how infant and child
mortality is distributed across income-groups in Bangladesh. Evidence further shows all
income groups have progressed in saving lives relative to their respective initial mortality
states. Figure 1 plots male, female, and both genders’ rates of infant and child mortality
per 1000 live births. The figure shows that the (often urban) rich tend to avoid death in
Bangladesh as in all countries; but the poorest of the poor (the poorest quintile) have not
experienced disproportionately high incidences of death. In particular, the poorest of the
poor have faired equally well or better than the relatively less, but still, poor income
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groups (the 25th and the 50th income quintile: the second and the third income quintile in
the Figure 1).
U5MR, by Incom e Quintiles
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Figure 3.1: U5MR and IMR in 2004 across Income Quintiles
Source: Gwatkin et al. (2000); I present data in graphical form.
Our current understanding of child mortality in Bangladesh does not explain its
recent “breakthrough.” Caldwell (1986) referred “breakthrough” to the period of
exceptional advances against mortality (p. 172). Bangladesh reduced child mortality rate
in double digits since 1985, and, by only accelerating this rate of child mortality
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reduction, Bangladesh entered a breakthrough period since 1990. Bangladesh reduced
infant and child mortality by 56% and 63% respectively between 1980 and 2000 and 13%
and 17% respectively between 1960 and 1980. Moreover, if we look away from these
trends within Bangladesh over time, and look at Bangladesh from comparative
perspective, the country’s breakthrough is more apparent. For instance, the countries with
2000 per capita national incomes between $300 and $400 have reduced infant and child
mortality rates, on average, by 19% and 30% respectively between 1990 and 2000, and
Bangladesh with a 2000 per capita national income of $365 has reduced 34% and 48%
infant and child mortality respectively.
To date, prior studies have studied determinants of overall child mortality decline
in Bangladesh. It has yet to attend to the distributional differences in mortality decline—
perhaps due to that the data is not widely available. Second, research is more focused on
unraveling proximate causes, such as health technologies and interventions, than distal
determinants. And, third, household data on social transfer programs have appeared on
national surveys only recently, and access to surveys is often restricted to pertinent
institutions. As a result, gaps remain concerning distal determinants of child mortality in
Bangladesh; and, we don’t know how distal determinants respond in affecting child
mortality when social transfers are available.
The bulk of child mortality research is evaluative in design, and primarily focuses
on the effectiveness of immunization, oral rehydration therapy, or other health
interventions. Bangladesh has a world-renowned experimental site for numerous fertility
and mortality interventions. The Matlab thana (sub-district) is an example of such a
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research site, and the Matlab11 Demographic Surveillance System (MDSS) has supplied
data to almost all public health and social science research. Since 1966, MDSS has
contained data on births, deaths, migration, and changes in marital status from a
population of approximately 200,000. This is a particularly demanding source of
population data because of its quasi-experimental set-up. In 1977 a family planning and
health services program was introduced to half of the Matlab area, leaving the other half
for comparison.
Child mortality research uses MDSS data to a large extent to evaluate the
effectiveness of a number of health interventions, namely, immunization, oral rehydration
therapy, etc (Ali et al., 2001; Koenig et al., 1991; Amin and Li, 1997; Legrand and
Phillips, 1996; Blum et al., 2009; Baqui et al., 2008; Mercer et al., 2006a; Mercer et al.,
2006b). Koenig et al. (1991) evaluate how effective measles vaccination has been for
mortality decline in rural Bangladesh. Comparing immunization coverage between
treatment and control areas in Matlab, the authors find that measles immunization
accounts for mortality reduction among children ages 1-4 years. In particular,
immunization suppresses between 16 and 19 deaths per thousand births from a baseline
neonatal mortality of 69 per thousand (p. 96). Findings are consistent with earlier
findings by Keonig et al. (1990) and Clemens et al. (1988). Using the same MDSS data
from 1988 to 1993, Ali et al. (2001) compare infant and child mortality between areas
with acute lower respiratory infection (ALRI) program interventions, and finds that ALRI
mortality rate among very young children was 54% lower in the treatment than the
comparison area where there were no interventions.

11

A rural thana (sub-district) in Bangladesh.
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A parallel strand of child mortality research has studied health governance as a
potential determinant of child mortality. Availability of health technologies does not
ensure adoption, and scholars debate the efficiency of alternative health governance—
government, non-government and other stakeholders—in influencing health technology
adoption.12 Scholars argue that public-private partnerships in home- and communitybased health services speed up technology adoption and thereby reduce mortality (Baqui
et al., 2008; Ensor et al., 2002; Zafar Ullah et al., 2006; Mercer et al., 2004, 2006; Sen et
al., 2006). They recommend that the long-standing partnerships between Bangladesh’s
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in
family planning and immunization services should be scaled up to cover more health
services.
Ali et al. (2001) evaluate whether educating community health workers about
detection, diagnosis, and management of pneumonia cases reduces mortality due to
pneumonia among children, and show that the pneumonia mortality rate was 54% lower
in the areas with community-based health care provisioning than in those that lacked such
services. Using a clustered-randomized controlled trail, Baqui et al. (2008) find homebased health intervention to be more effective in reducing neonatal mortality rates than
either community-based or no special service delivery interventions. Scholars believe that
governmental and nongovernmental community health workers reduce proximity to
12

Ensor et al. (2006) nicely sums up Bangladeshi health delivery system by identifying its decentralized
and community-based dimensions. Ensor et al. write, “Bangladesh has a comprehensive network of health
facilities serving much of the population. The country is divided into 64 districts (zilas) in each of which
there is a hospital with between 50 and 200 beds. In turn, these districts are divided into sub-districts
(upazilas), each with a Health Complex (31 beds), and into unions, most of which have a Health and
Family Welfare Center. Below union level the system has to depend heavily on community workers, who
dispense family planning supplies and provide health advice. Controversially this door-step approach is
being phased out in favor of services delivered through newly built community clinics serving a population
around 6000. The country is served by medical colleges (650 beds) serving district groups, and referral
facilities of at the national level. All facilities at upazila and below are regarded at primary level” (p. 248).
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health services and modern health facilities in rural areas by providing health services at
their clients’ doorstep, and female NGO community health workers have higher
acceptability than male health workers among (female) clients. A female health worker is
acceptable not only to her female clients but also to the male members in households and
villages, who often make health decision for their mothers and children (Simmons et al.,
1988).
However, with regards to distal child mortality determinants in Bangladesh, our
knowledge is neither context-sensitive nor as deep as it is with health technologies. Using
similar “umbrella” categories—(a) economic, (b) social/cultural, and (c) demographic—
prior studies explain variation in child mortality in Bangladesh (Muhury 1995; Muhury
and Preston, 1985; Majumder et al, 1997; Amin, 1988; Edmonston, 1983). However,
operationalization of variables following the global practice often defies empirical reality
in rural Bangladesh, and therefore is not as context-sensitive as it needs to be. Second,
global practices for framing the analysis in prior studies are questioned with regards to
their ability to explain mortality variation. This is particularly relevant considering the
fact that evidence is mounting that children in Bangladesh die from local reasons as much
as from global reasons. Third, the current analytical framework to assess distal
determinants under expansive social transfer programs for the poor and the women might
fall short, if traditional relationships between explanatory and outcome variables differ in
the presence of social transfer programs, as they do otherwise. And, finally, a more
complete understanding of distal determinants is needed not only because of prior
grounds but also considering inter-relations between distal-proximate determinants. As
such, distal determinants verify whether technology’s effectiveness on mortality
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reduction is site-specific, and whether it will not produce similar results if exported to
thanas or districts beyond Matlab.
A discussion is warranted from the outset, however, about household surveys in
Bangladesh. Available surveys from Bangladesh make it difficult to include
developmental and health intervention variables in a single analytical framework. Among
the available surveys, Demographic Health Survey, Household Income and Expenditure
Survey, Bangladesh Fertility Survey, and Child Nutrition Survey are commonly used in
the health literature, more broadly; and each limit empirical framing in an interesting
way. For instance, DHS is a national survey and samples a large segment of rural and
urban populations. But DHS is not disaggregated into the districts in Bangladesh, and
provides limited information about income, wealth, and recent development practices in
Bangladesh. Researchers settle for proxy measures of income. Similar limitations apply
to the remaining demographic surveys (BFS and CNS). The Household Income and
Expenditure Survey, on the other hand, makes available information about households’
income and participation in recent development programs, but provides data on proxy
measures of mortality or other health status (such as morbidities, nutrient intakes,
anthropometrics, etc.).
With regard to distal child mortality determinants, existing research examines
three categories of variables: (a) economic (land-ownership, income, expenditure), (b)
socio-cultural (religion, education, maternal age at marriage, maternal care), and (c)
demographic attributes (birth-spacing, parity, sib-size/fertility, maternal age at
marriage/at times of childbirths, prior child death). Generally researchers find that sociocultural and demographic attributes are strong predictors—often stronger than economic
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counterparts—of neonatal and infant mortality (Muhury, 1995; Muhury and Preston,
1985; Majumder et al., 1997; Amin, 1999; Edmonston, 1983).
Among them, maternal attributes are especially pertinent in Bangladesh,
considering predominant Islamic beliefs and practices and patriarchal kinship and
economic systems (Islamic inheritance law, dowry practices, etc.) that limit female
education and autonomy (Caldwell, 1979; 1986). Yet, current research has not examined
this association as thoroughly as the relationship between women’s low status and
fertility in the Bangladeshi context (Balk, 1994). Also, studies do not differentiate
between status and autonomy/ empowerment/decision making ability, and often use
education as a common proxy (Muhury, 1995; Muhury and Preston, 1985; Majumder et
al., 1997; Amin, 1999; Edmonston, 1983). While authors endorse a strong association
between maternal education and child mortality, neither their efforts in the context of
Bangladesh, nor those of others elsewhere, separate, or even recognize, the potential
correlation-in-disguise in the posited causal association. As such, studies do not control
for the full list of community and household variables—perhaps due to inadequacies in
the data available from household surveys—which would be needed to disentangle the
strong association between maternal education and household income, and cultural
attributes (Desai and Alva, 1999).
The preceding discussion leads to two questions, and three hypotheses
(Hypotheses 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3). First, do the aforementioned distal determinants account
for Bangladesh’s rapid child mortality decline during 1990s? I propose that Bangladesh’s
rapid child mortality decline has been made possible due to the fact that more
Bangladeshi households have (a) better absolute income per capita and (b) higher levels
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of maternal education in 1990s compared to preceding decades. And, I set up the initial—
rather exploratory—Hypotheses 3.1 and 3.2.
In 3.1, I hypothesize that household income decreases child mortality likelihood
as such children born to poor households die in a higher frequency than those born to rich
households. I reiterate the causal mechanisms by the “wealthier is healthier” scholars
(reviewed in Chapter II), and state that, with higher income, households are better
positioned to purchase preventive (food, nutrition, water, sanitation, education, etc.) and
curative (health care services, immunization, etc.) goods and services to fight disease and
death. And, without adequate income, poor parents can neither prevent child’s exposure
to disease environment nor treat disease by purchasing care.
HYPOTHESIS 3. 1: All else equal, household-income diminishes child mortality
likelihood.

46

Figure 3.2 depicts in a diagram the hypothesized relationship between household-income
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Figure 3.2: Household Income Effects on Child Mortality
In 3.2, I hypothesize maternal education diminishes child mortality likelihood as such
children born to uneducated mothers have a higher likelihood to die prematurely than
those born to educated mothers. Maternal education is often correlated with (a) a higher
socioeconomic status, (b) a greater ability to learn about the causation, prevention,
recognition, cure of disease, and nutritional requirement, (c) a greater receptivity to
rational explanations of diseases and modern medicine, (d) a higher autonomy and
decision-making power within the family network and (e) a greater control over
reproduction, such as lower fertility, longer birth intervals, etc. And, each of these
correlates can link maternal education’s inverse affect on child mortality since health
among children born to educated mothers benefit from educated mothers’ better ability to
(a) purchase preventive (food, nutrition, water, sanitation, education, etc.) and curative
(health care, immunization, etc.) goods and services, (b) understand health messages and
recommendations, (c) go beyond traditional practices related to pregnancy and exercise
autonomy in seeking maternal- and child-health care from modern health organizations,
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and (d) take care and breast-feed their children adequately as they often opt longer birthintervals and lower fertility.
HYPOTHESIS 3. 2: All else equal, maternal education decreases child mortality
likelihood.
Figure 3.3 depicts in a diagram the hypothesized relationship between maternal education
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Figure 3.3: Maternal Education Effect on Child Mortality
However, Bangladesh’s expansion of social transfer programs puts Hypotheses 3.1 and
3.2 to test and I consider Hypotheses 3.3 as I consider the second question: How do the
posited effects of distal determinants—especially household-income—of child mortality
change in the context of expansive social programs? Let’s note, even though Bangladeshi
social transfer programs do not include health services (see Chapter II), their broader aim
is to suppress child mortality by transferring food, income and education.13
Our knowledge in this regard is limited, however, and based on a very few
systematic studies to date. Recent efforts find support between household’s participation
in nongovernmental development program in village and child health. At inception,

13

The fact that health services is not listed among Bangladesh’s social safety net programs differs from
social safety net programs in countries in Latin America (Ravallion, 2006).
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nongovernmental programs started out as either to providing microfinance or community
organizing service to clients, but began to provide non-financial as well as financial
services to their clients since mid-1980s. For example, the Grameen Bank started out as
to providing microfinance services to its poor clients, but the Bank now provides health
services to its clients. And, BRAC started out as to providing non-financial primary
health and education services to its poor clients and now provides those and microfinance
services to its clients. By doing so, the Grameen Bank has incorporated in its model
elements of Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee’s (BRAC) model as well as
transferred elements of Grameen Model to BRAC, and vice versa. Furthermore, BRAC
approaches health and education as means to reduce poverty, and has received wide
recognition for this approach. BRAC recruits female health workers and teachers to
deliver health and education services especially to its female clients. And, BRAC’s Oral
Rehydration Therapy (ORT) program among available child health interventions has
been credited to substantially improve child health since 1980 as BRAC’s model to
deliver ORT service has facilitated its rapid adoption among largely illiterate mothers in
rural Bangladesh.
While health benefits from household’s access to nongovernmental health and
education services are not systematically analyzed, studies find a strong association
between microfinance program participation and several indicators of child health and its
correlates (Hossain, 1988; Hashemi et al., 1996; Deolalikar, 2005; Pitt et al., 2003;
Bhuiya and Chowdhury, 2002; Khandker, 2006; Pitt, Khandker and Catwright, 2006).
Studies show that the presence of microfinance institutions in a village in Bangladesh
appears to have reduced child underweight rates by nearly 20% among the poor
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(Deolalikar, 2005); that micro-credit lending to women has a large and statistically
significant impact on the nutritional status of both boy and girl children (Pitt et al., 2003),
and that mothers’ participation in micro-credit programs increases the probability that
their children will survive childhood (Bhuiya and Chowdhury, 2002). Results, however,
are anything but conclusive. Further studies need to show that (a) the observed
association is not driven by NGOs’ strategic program placement (Fruttero and Gauri,
2005), and thereby (b) knowledge generated from controlled social experiments exports
well to all regions across the country. Moreover, there is a mismatch in prior studies
between the trends in which explanatory variables change and child mortality declines.
Evaluation of social transfer programs is not as relevant for child mortality
research as it is for, say, education (the effect of Food-for-Education on educational
attainment, for instance). This is because the Bangladeshi social transfer programs do not
include health per se as do Conditional Cash Transfers/PROGRESA in Latin America.14
Under Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) the state transfers money to the targeted groups
in an effort to popularize their demand for public social services, such as education,
health care, and nutrition. The targeted groups are those who are “needy” and can refer to
a particular demographic (young, old, women) and/or economic (poor) group. And,
transfers of cash are conditional in that Conditional Cash Transfer recipients must
conform to the state’s certain expectations. With Conditional Cash Transfer, the state
intervenes on the demand side of public social services, and Conditional Cash Transfer is
often perceived as playing a complementary role to the state’s interventions into the
supply of public social services.
14

Evaluations are easier said than done. Methods of program evaluation are hotly debated among scholars,
and robust evaluation as an empirical practice is rare, if not entirely absent (Strauss and Thomas, 1995; Pitt
et al., 1995; Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1986; Deolalikar, 1995).
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Lomeli (2008) lists the following Conditional Cash Transfer premise, logic, and
aims:
(a) “A fundamental reason for the reproduction of poverty over various generations is
the lack of investment in human capital in the areas of education, health and
nutrition” (Villatoro, 2004).
(b) “Conditional Cash Transfer raises the income of poor households through
transfers of cash, goods, and services in the short run, and encourages investment
in human capital formation by offering economic incentives and conditional
rewards for continued schooling among children in the long run” (p. 479).
(c) “Conditional Cash Transfer programs concentrate their interventions at carefully
chosen points in the life cycle, focusing particularly on nutrition and health during
pregnancy and the first years of life, on the continuation of education during
transitions from primary to secondary school.” (p. 479).
(d) “Because social programs are always subject to budget constraints, Conditional
Cash Transfer generally channels their benefits to the neediest cases in order to
achieve the greatest effect with the budget on a determined relief of poverty, or to
use alternative terms, to produce a determined effect at the lowest cost” (p. 480;
Coady et al., 2004).
Bangladesh’s conditional transfers conform to the general models of Conditional
Cash Transfer except that Bangladeshi Conditional Cash Transfer does not provide health
incentives. Thus, what we need is not necessarily social program evaluation per se—we
know evaluations are easier said than done. But we can take advantage of the presence of
social programs in villages, and reassess “old” distal determinants of child mortality in a
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new light. There are reasons to assume that the relationships between the “old” distal
determinants and child mortality outcomes are not the same with and without social
transfer programs. First, Rosenweig and Wolpin (1982) show that public social programs
directed towards achieving a single target might have unanticipated consequences in
other sectors. This suggests that relationships between social transfers might affect child
mortality through a cross-program effect. And, social transfer programs (old-age-pension
program) in developing country context (South Africa) are shown to improve heath
indicators (Duflo, 2004).
Based on the preceding discussion of Bangladesh’s expansive social programs, I
alternatively consider how household-income effect on child mortality alters with the
advent of social transfer programs in Hypotheses 3.3. I hypothesize household-income
neither increases nor decreases child mortality likelihood. As such, children born to poor
households maintain as high/low survival likelihood as those born to rich households do.
I invoke the causal mechanisms by not only the “wealthier is healthier” (reviewed in
Chapter II) but also the redistribution scholars and state the following. While rich
households are better positioned to purchase preventative (food, nutrition, water,
sanitation, education, etc.) and curative (health care, immunization, etc.) goods and
services to fight disease and death, poor households have access to similar preventative
(food, nutrition, water, sanitation, education, etc.) and curative (health care,
immunization, etc.) goods and services due to their participation to social transfer
programs.
HYPOTHESIS 3. 3: Household-income neither increases nor decreases child mortality
likelihood, all else equal.
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Figure 3.2 depicts in a diagram the hypothesized relationship between household income

+
+
+

Preventive and
Curative Health
Goods and
Services

_

Child
Mortality

Low

Income
Middle

High

and child mortality in the context of expansive social transfer programs.

Figure 3.4: Household Income Effects on Child Mortality
Let’s consider the table below. Table 3. 1 records temporally (a) Bangladesh’s
“breakthrough” period in infant and child mortality reduction, (b) government’s initiation
of social transfer programs, and (c) the years for which the Bangladesh-Institute of
Development Studies and World Bank (BIDS-WB) survey data is available. Please see
below as I discuss how the BIDS-WB fits my study.
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Survey

Redistributive
Policies

Mortality

Table 3. 1: Timeline Indicating Years of IMR and U5MR Reduction, Redisbributive Policy, BIDS-WB Surveys
’80 ’81 ’82 ’83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00
IMR
U5
MR
VGF
VG
D
FFW
FFE
FSS
AP
MFI
BID
SWB

Note: Gray area Indicates Years of IMR and U5MR Reduction, Redisbributive Policy Operation, BIDS-WB
Surveys
IMR: Infant Mortality Rate;U5MR=Under 5 Mortality Rate: VGF=Vulnerable Group Feeding; VGD=Vulnerable
Group Development; FFW=Food-for-Work; FEMALE SECONDARY SCHOOL ASSISTANCE
PROGRAM=Female Secondary School Stipend Program; MFI=Microfinance Institutions; BIDS-WB=Bangladesh
Institute of Development Studies-World Bank
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Research Methods
Data, Variables, and Measurements
I employ surveys conducted by the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies and the
World Bank (BIDS-World Bank) in 1991/92 and 1998/99. In addition to providing
detailed information on employment, income, and expenditures, the surveys include a
module on marriage and pregnancy history for all women between 12 and 50 years; land
ownership; food and non-food expenditures; participation in agricultural or
nonagricultural employment; as well as data on participation in rural financial services
and the amount of credit borrowed. Information on family planning program
participation, religion, and education in governmental and non-governmental educational
institutions is also available. The survey also documents a diverse set of village-specific
attributes—i.e., prices of staple food items, wage rates for male, female, and child labor,
availability of state-led employment programs (food-for-work, road construction),
government and non-governmental food programs, NGOs, formal financial institutions,
markets/haat in the village, and health and education facilities—that allow me to
understand the interrelationships of community-level and household characteristics. Of
the village-specific attributes, food and health program availability is particularly
important for child health, and while surveys include questions to gauge their availability,
these questions in the first round differ to those in the last round. For example, the
1991/92 survey asks, “Is there any government run food programs in the village?” The
1991/92 survey therefore does not differentiate among the available government food
programs by early 1990s (VGF, VGD, FFW), and the respondents were likely to answer
positively to this question if VGD, VGF, or FFW is available in village—however small
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its scale and scope of operation might be at the time of survey. And, the 1998/99 survey
asks: “Is there any Food-for-Education project in any of the village schools?” The
1998/99 survey thereby asks about government’s specific food program which started in
1993, after the 1991/92 survey, and the respondents were likely to answer to this question
positively if ONLY Food-For-Education is available in the village. Nonetheless, these all
are government food programs, and I can crudely compare health status among children
living in village with food program with those living in village where n food program is
available.
The surveys include 1,798 and 2,599 households—1,638 of which were surveyed
in both periods—from 87 villages of 29 thanas across Bangladesh. Data from the same
households over time allow for a better understanding of “causal” variation in child
survival prospects due to variations in explanatory variables than cross-sectional evidence
can offer.15 Notably, parental and village attributes typically change only slowly, if at all,
and prior literature on child health or its indicators, more broadly, reports findings using
the survey data from a single year (Strauss, 1990; Thomas et al., 1996; Lavya et al., 1996;
Barrera, 1990; Frankenberg, 1995; Maitra, 2004, Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1982; Thomas
et al., 1986; Haughton and Haughton, 1997; Jalan and Ravallion, 2003; Suwal, 2001;
among others; See Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1988; Edmonds, 2004; Katz et al., 2003;
Fedorov and Sahn, 2005; Cebu Study Team, 1992; O’Donnell et al., 2008; Wagstaff and
Nguyen, 2002 for exceptions). However, based on review, targeted social transfer
programs in villages are likely to change in scale and scope, and intergenerational effects

15

A thana is an administrative unit, which is smaller than a district but bigger than a village; a thana
consists of a number of villages. Bangladesh’s administrative units are divided into: Divisions (N= 6),
Districts (N= 64), Thanas (N=507), Unions (N=4484), Villages (N=59,990), and Households
(N=25,362,321).
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of parental attributes on child mortality can alter with or without targeted social transfers.
Panel data is thus more valid and reliable for this analysis.
The households sampled in both periods are overwhelmingly poor. More than half
of the households in both waves are functionally landless with an average income per
capita per week of 81/127.5 taka (equivalent to $1.5/$2) and mean landholding of
0.68/0.66 acres in 1991/92/1998/99.16,17

Variables
I estimate household determinants of child mortality using households’ economic status,
social status, religion, and demographics, and control for child’s gender. I measure
income alternatively in terms of expenditure per capita and land ownership.
Child mortality: I measure child mortality with survival status at the time of survey
among the children born during the ten years preceding the surveys. I use respondents’
answers to these following questions. In both rounds, the surveys ask a woman
respondent to: (a) list her pregnancy order, (b) identify if pregnancy resulted into a childbirth or otherwise, (c) identify the gender of the child if born alive, (b) state date of birth
of the child, (d) state if the child is still alive. Given that mortality is a rare event, and the
BIDS-World Bank survey data on mortality is sparsely distributed. To deal with this, I
select ten years preceding the surveys to allow the mortality measure to (a) contain
enough variation for meaningful inferential analyses, and (b) allow the current data on
mortality’s structural covariates to represent as much as possible the data on those when
mortality occurred in the past.
16

The 1998/99 measure for income is not adjusted for inflation.
Households spending 117.28 taka and 158.62 taka or less per person per week are considered poor in
1991/92 and 1998/99 respectively.
17
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Income (in Taka): The BIDS-World Bank survey asks about expenditures on specific
food and non-food items in the last week and year, respectively. I calculate food
expenditures by adding all expenses on food items during the prior week, four times a
week. Also, I calculate the non-food expenditures by adding all expenses on nonfood
items during the last week, divided over twelve months. I calculate food and non-food
expenditure as normalized to be a monthly estimate of total expenditures. I divide the
sum by the total number of household members, and I find per capita expenditure. I
logarithmically transformed per capita expenditure. The survey uses a comprehensive
(i.e. standardized for all) matrix of usual food and nonfood items (and allows respondents
to specify “other” expenditures). This should suppress recall bias.
Land (decimals): I measure land-ownership by adding the irrigated and non-irrigated
land households own. I include the logarithm of land ownership in the analysis.
Maternal education (years): Maternal education is based on years of completed formal
education.
Education among the oldest male member in the household (years): The oldest male in
the household is typically, but not necessarily, the child’s father. This is thus a proxy for
paternal education, and should be a close correlate. The survey does not ask, and thus
readily provide, information about children’s fathers since the child health module in the
survey asks questions only about mothers and children. I could approximate parental
education by matching mothers’ information from the child health module to her
information in the background module, but this would be a difficult endeavor with a
limited gain, considering the role of paternal education on child health or mortality. And,
because households as opposed to individuals typically make decisions in rural
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Bangladesh, I don’t expect paternal education to resume effects different from this proxy
measure.
Demographics: I include (a) the logarithm of household size as a quantitative attribute of
demographic profile of households, and (b) ratios of male and female members in certain
age-brackets to the total household size as a qualitative attribute of demographic profile.
While household size is straightforward in concept and measurement, the ratios are
motivated by (a) shortcomings in the traditional calculation of the dependency ratio in the
context of Bangladesh, and (b) economic role across age and gender groups has special
significance in the development context of Bangladesh. First, the measurement of
dependency ratio (DR) as commonly referred to as:
DR=

Population ≤ 14 years + Population ≥ 65
× 100 does not really capture dependency
Populaiton 15 - 64 years

and therefore defies the purpose since children in rural Bangladesh village are
economically active from the age of six (Cain, 1977). Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) find a
similar trend in South Asia at large where, child labor is found to help supplement the
income of rural Indian families. Scholars commonly disaggregate male and female
household members into numerous age groups (less than 5 years, between 5 and 9, 10
and 16, 17 and 40, and above 40) and calculate the ratios of each group to the total
household size (Ravallion and Wodon, 2000; Wodon, 2000). Alternatively, I calculate
dependency ratio with DR=

Population ≤ 6 years + Population ≥ 65
× 100 and expect
Populaiton 15 - 64 years

this ratio to capture the nature of dependency in the context of rural Bangladesh.

Table 3.2 presents the descriptive statistics or stylized facts of the variables discussed
above.
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Table 3. 2: Summary Statistics
Variables
Year
N
Child
Mortality
Child gender
(Male=1)
Income per
capita (Taka)
Land
ownership (in
decimal)
Maternal
Education
Education
among adult
male
Dependency
ratio
Household
size
Religion
(Islam=1)

Mean

1991/92
1998/99
1991/92
1998/99
1991/92
1998/99
1991/92
1998/99

3478
4245
3478
4245
3478
4245
3478
4245

0.146
0.095
0.512
0.503
81.129
127.463
67.566
66.207

Standard
Deviation
0.353
0.294
0.499
0.500
46.735
93.00
211.433
125.043

Minimum

Maximum

0
0
0
0
20.640
22.807
1
0.500

1
1
1
1
710.677
1574.808
4575
2108

1991/92
1998/99
1991/92
1998/99

3478
4245
3478
4245

1.1263
1.706
2.330
2.379

2.280
2.836
3.234
3.424

0
0
0
0

14
14
16
16

1991/92
1998/99
1991/92
1998/99
1991/92
1998/99

3478
4245
3478
4245
3478
4245

38.076
32.946
6.244
6.300
0.890
0.892

31.053
29.827
2.464
2.541
0.312
0.310

0
0
2
2
0
0

300
200
19
20
1
1

Estimation Strategy
I estimate a linear relationship between household income, education, and demographics
and child mortality outcomes (Equation 1). Both theoretical motivation (reviewed
previously) and practical constraints guide variable selection in this rather exploratory
analysis.18,19

18

While prior explanations motivate the selection of income and maternal education as the most robust
socioeconomic determinants of child mortality, I select demographic controls based on practical
considerations. First, as opposed to a continuous indicator with potentially “large” variations across the
sample, mortality is a binary outcome, often with insufficient variability. For instance, a 10 percent not
alive (0) translates into a modest 423.6 when the sample size is 4263, and 4026.3 when the sample size is
40263. Second, this poses additional restrictions when (a) the overall sample size is not as big as household
surveys usually entail, and (b) explanatory variables are also binary. Cross-tabulation of binary explanatory
and outcome variables often results in insufficient cell entries. Let’s consider, female headship; it is
variable of considerable interest in pertinent study, I opt not to include this variables as chi-sq analysis of
association between female household head and mortality is not significant. However, this result can be an
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[1] Yit = β 0 + β1 X it + β 2 Z it + ε it
where Yit is the mortality outcome of the child i at time t, and X it is household income in
which child i is born, Z is a vector of control variables—parental education and
dependent children in households, and t is the years of the surveys, namely, 1991/92 and
1998/99.
To present robust parameter estimates, I (a) run cross-sectional and panel models
using data from each survey year and over time; and (b) correct for the possibility of
heteroskedasticity in standard errors in order to conduct meaningful significance tests.
The Weibull model estimates the probability of mortality among children born during the
ten years preceding the surveys conditional on the covariates in Equation 1. For all
children, the surveys include the age at death or age at the survey date if the child is still
alive and are therefore right censored. The Weibull functional form makes sense
theoretically as well as empirically since hazard for death is a decreasing function of age
among children, and the model estimates independent variables using a proportional

artifact of data-structure. I have no certain way of telling whether this result is a sampling artifact or not,
considering that only 3 percent of cells/observations (138 cases in the 1998/99 data) contain the Yes-Yes
matching in the mortality-female headship cross-tabulation and are compared against 97 percent alternative
matching and hence 0 value. But, since female headship is highly correlated with household landownership
and income, it is likely not to add to further explanation of variation in child mortality, but can aFood-forEducationct the magnitude of land or income variable.
19

Ideal estimation of child mortality is quite demanding of data. Similar to alterative child health
indicator—anthropometric outcomes (child’s health-for-age, weight-for-age, or weight-for-height), child
mortality is ideally modeled with (observable) stocks (child, parent, and village fixed
attributes/endowments) and flows (health inputs/processes), and with recognition of child, parental, and/or
village level unobserved disturbances. Child attributes include gender, age, parity, etc.; parental attributes
include parental education, income (land, productive assets or nonlabor income), healthiness, stature,
weight, etc.; community characteristics include health, education, income infrastructures; and finally health
inputs include the child’s diet (such as nutrient intake, the length of breastfeeding, age at which
supplementary foods were introduced, activity level, amount of time spent caring for the child (both in and
out of the home), the utilization of clean water, the level of sanitation in the home, and the utilization of
health care services (such as pre- and postnatal care). Ideal estimation is thus possible with only a few
socioeconomic surveys (for example, Vietnam Living Standard Survey and Indonesia Living Standard
Survey).
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hazards specification. I also present Probit estimates of the probability of child mortality
as an alternative to Weibull Estimates.
The standard errors are robust, and the significance tests are therefore based on
heteroskedasticity-consistent estimates of the variance-covariance matrix. In particular,
variance-covariance matrix is corrected for (a) heteroskedastic and (b) clustered (within
104 villages) residuals.20 Although children are the units of analysis, the fact that
(sampled) children live in households, and households are available in villages, and
failure to adjust for this hierarchical structure in data could plague analysis. Random
sampling of clusters implies that clusters are “independently and identically distributed”
(iid) (inter-cluster correlations = 0), yet random sampling of households does not
eliminate the fact that households within clusters somehow correlate (due to unobserved
cluster effects). Jackknife variances are clustered over villages, and I use those to tackle
some sources of iid violation.21
Nevertheless, the following methodological constraints could confound findings.
Firstly, errors almost always plague measures of household income using survey data
from developing countries like Bangladesh, and a consequent systematic difference
between actual and observed household income poses a credible threat to the analysis. I
use total household expenditures per capita per week and land ownership as alternative

20

Both are common in the survey data, and clustered residuals are more common in rural Bangladesh.
Heteroskedasticity occurs from deviation of each household from (aggregate/all) household mean due to
that particular household’s unique conditions, known to households, unknown to researchers. Clustered
residuals occur when households living in a same cluster behavior similarly among household living within
that cluster and differently from households living outside clusters due to cluster-specific attributes,
unknown to researchers through survey instruments.
21
Studies identify several routes to inter-household correlation within villages: (a) household exposure to
identical amenities in villages, (b) households’ selective migration to villages with certain amenities, and/or
(c) households seeking community approval adapt behavior and utilization of village amenities.
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measures to estimate the income effect.22 While both are commonly used as indicators or
predictors of permanent household income, land ownership captures household wealth,
which is a key predictor of income and is often the basis of targeting for redistribution
programs.23 I have logarithmically transformed both variables to correct for possible
skewness and to attain normalcy in the distribution of income, and identify effects on
child mortality as income increases by a percent regardless of initial income.
More fundamental problem perhaps is the fact that income measures are from the
survey years, and mortality occurred in years preceding the surveys. With this, I assume
household’s income in the years when children died to stay statistically unchanged until
the years when the BIDS-World Bank conducted the surveys in 1991/92 and 1998/99. I
therefore make an assumption, which may or may hold true in the empirical reality

Regression Results
Tables 1-4 present the Weibull parameter estimates of the household determinants on the
mortality outcome for the children born during the ten years preceding the surveys.24
Households’ income, education, demographic characteristics, religious affiliation, and
child’s gender constitute the baseline specification in this analysis largely because of
robustness as distal determinants of child mortality or its proximate correlates in general,

22

In addition, I conduct a descriptive analysis of the distribution of the key income correlates across
income groups and check for external validity in income measures. I find that the average years of
education among mothers, fertility rates, etc. are of expected magnitude across income quintiles.
23
Especially where the credit market is absent or inaccessible
24
The analysis includes children aged 10 years or less at times of surveys. By doing so, I respond to the
constraint I face from not having enough variability in the outcome variable as I use the survey that
provides rich information on the explanatory variables of my interest but is not primarily intended to assess
child mortality as thoroughly as DHS, for instance. I therefore stretch the population from its actual
space—children aged 5 or less (infants and children under 5). However, I follow the fix, commonly
practiced in empirical research on child mortality in low-income developing countries facing similar
constraints (Lavya et al., 1996).
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and Bangladesh, in particular (Sen, 2003; Wodon, 2000; Nargis and Hossain, 2006).
Income and demographic structure are measured, alternatively, with per capita income
and land ownership, and with household size and dependency ratio.
Tables 1 and 2 report estimated effects of these determinants using cross-sectional
evidence from 1991/92 (Columns 1 and 2) and 1998/99 (3 and 4), and panel evidence
(Columns 5 and 6). Overall, with regards to household determinants, results comply with
conventional wisdom as much as they tend to defy it.
Income, maternal education, dependency ratio, and Islamic belief have significant
association with the child probability of death in rural Bangladesh in the 1990s. With
regards to association based on the 1991/92 survey data on each of these household
characteristics, maternal education confirms the prior finding in that maternal education
has a negative and significant association with child mortality (Column 1 in Table 1). If I
were to make a “causal” prediction based on this association, I can say, an additional year
of maternal education reduces median time to a child’s death by 0.4 percent. 25 Education
of adult male members in the household has no significant association with child
mortality, however. Household size has a significant and negative association with child
mortality. As such, a 10 percent increase in household size reduces the median time to
child death by 2 percent. In substantive terms, between the two same-gender children
whose parents have similar levels of income and education, one would have a lower
mortality likelihood than the other if the child lives in a household with more members.
Finally, household’s Islamic belief has a negative but insignificant association with the
child probability of death. This suggests Islamic belief neither accelerates nor delays
25

We know, S(x)=exp[-h(x)], where S(x) is the time-to-event(mortality) function and h(x) is the hazard
rate. The STATA output indicates that the hazard rate for education is 0.952, and based on that I calculate
this coefficient.
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death. Among the child-specific attributes, I include only child’s gender due to its
availability in survey data. And, I find child’s gender coefficient to take on a positive but
statistically insignificant coefficient. This suggests preferential treatment, if there is any,
towards male children in the household is not high enough, and female as well male
children face comparable likelihood to live or die.
Let’s note, the 1991/92 Weibull income estimate maintains a positive sign, and
this estimate is significant. This suggests household income has a positive association
with child mortality after I control for variation in household’s education attainment,
demographic attribute, and religious affiliation. And, income’s positive association with
child mortality is significant at α=0.01 (Column 1 in Table 1). The magnitude of the
effect is also sizeable. A causal prediction based on this association suggests, a 10 percent
increase in household income, for example, speeds up the median time to child mortality
by 2.4 percent.
Household income coefficient retains it positive sign when I re-estimate the
baseline specification in Equation 1 with the Probit modeling technique (Column 2 in
Table 1). With regard to associations based on the 1991/92 survey data of household
characteristics, I find maternal education and both household demographic
characteristics, namely, household size and dependency ratio have negative associations
with child probability to death. Weibull and Probit parameter estimates are therefore
consistent with respect to the explanatory variables’ directions of, and statistically
significant associations with child mortality.
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Table 3. 3: Parameter Estimates of Child Mortality Determinants
1991/92
1998/99
Panel
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Weibull
Probit
Weibull Probit
Weibull
(Log of) Income
0.344*** 0.202*** 0.210** 0.106*
0.381
per capita
(0.106)
(0.063)
(0.100)
(0.062)
(0.066)
-0.044*** Maternal
-0.048*
-0.026*
education
(0.025)
0.014
0.076*** (0.013)
0.065***
(0.024)
(0.018)
-0.033*** -0.028**
Education among 0.001
-0.001
adult male
(0.016)
(0.009)
0.063*** (0.010)
(0.012)
(0.019)
(Log of)
-0.052*** -0.133
Household size
0.153*** 0.075*** 0.110*** (0.012)
(0.020)
(0.028)
(0.011)
(0.029)
Dependency ratio -0.002*
-0.003*** -0.002**
(0.001)
0.002*** 0.004*** (0.001)
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.001)
Child gender
0.079
0.049
-0.169*
-0.104*
-0.029
(Male=1)
(0.089)
(0.052)
(0.095)
(0.054)
(0.066)
Religion
-0.064
-0.031
-0.303*** (Islam=1)
(0.137)
(0.082)
0.579*** (0.078)
0.271***
(0.131)
(0.095)
-0.931*** Constant
4.437*** 1.337*** 5.109*** (0.321)
4.920***
(0.294)
(.574)
(0.359)
(0.528)
Obs
3478
3478
4245
4245
7723
Log pseudo
likelihood ratio
2567.515 1417.817 1856.767 1292.4031 4523.054
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10
Note: Heteroskedasticity adjusted robust standard errors are in parentheses.

(6)
Probit
0.019
(0.040)
0.038***
(0.009)
-0.008
(0.007)
0.064***
(0.008)
0.002***
(0.000)
-0.014
(0.037)
0.168***
(0.056)
-0.560**
(0.201)
7723
2752.523

Columns 3 and 4 in Table 1 present Weibull and Probit parameter estimates using
the 1998/99 survey data. Overall, the results show surprising directions of associations.
Maternal education has a negative and significant association with child mortality
(Column 2 of Table 1). A casual speculation based on this association suggests that an
additional year of maternal education reduces median time to a child’s death by a 0.9
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percent—0.5 percentage points higher than 1991/92. 26 Education of adult male members
in the household becomes significant as I use the 1998/99 survey data. Household size
has a significant and negative association with child mortality. A 10 percent increase in
household size reduces the median time to child death by 0.9 percent. Similarly,
household dependency ratio has a significant and negative association with child
mortality. Surprisingly, household’s Islamic belief has a negative association, and is
statistically significant at α=0.01. In substantive terms, a Muslim child has a 56% less
likelihood than a non-Muslim child to die before its fifth birthday. And, no less
surprisingly, a male child has a higher likelihood to die prematurely than a female child.
As before, the 1998/99 Weibull income estimate maintains a positive sign, and
this estimate is statistically significant. This suggests household income has a positive
association with child mortality after I control for variation in household’s education
level, demographic attributes, and religious affiliation. Income effect is robust to
alternative estimations in that the Probit income estimates are consistent with the Weibull
income estimates and show income’s positive association with child mortality. In
substantive terms, children in poor households have higher survival likelihood than those
in rich households.
Columns 5 and 6 in Table 1 present Weibull and Probit parameter estimates using
household survey data from both 1991/92 and 1998/99. Parameter estimates based on
these panel evidence are consistent to those based on the each round of cross-sectional
evidence in 1991/92 and 1998/99. Supporting our current understanding, while education
is negatively associated with child mortality, child’s gender, household’s religious
26

We know, S(x)=exp[-h(x)], where S(x) is the time-to-event(mortality) function and h(x) is the hazard
rate. The STATA output indicates that the hazard rate for education is 0.952, and based on that I calculate
this coefficient.
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affiliation, and income and income’s demographic covariates maintain counterintuitive
directions in their associations with child mortality.
What does explain household income’s positive effect on mortality? Respondents’
bias in recalling data on income could play a role. Therefore, I re-estimate the baseline
specification in Equation 1 with household’s land ownership as an alternative, and
perhaps more robust, measure of income. As such, Ravallion and Sen (2006) find a
strong correlation between landownership and poverty in that landless households have
high levels poverty in rural areas in Bangladesh (Ravallion and Sen, 2006). I present
these results in Table 2
Table 2 presents land ownership’s estimated associations with the child
probability of mortality in addition to other explanatory variables’ associations using the
cross-sectional data from the 1991/92 survey (Columns 1 and 2), the 1998/99 survey (3
and 4), and the household survey data from both rounds, namely, 1991/92 and 1998/99
(Columns 5 and 6). With respect to the associations of household characteristics,
maternal education retains its consistently negative and significant association with child
mortality in the cross-sectional and the panel models. Education of adult male members
has a less systematic association than maternal education in that the male education
coefficient is not significant in the 1991/92 cross-sectional estimation; yet it is significant
in the 1998/99 estimation; and it is significant only in Weibull estimation using the panel
data. Household’s Islamic belief has a negative association with child probability of
death, but Islamic belief’s association is not consistent in that the coefficient is not
significant in the 1991/92 cross-sectional estimation. Child’s gender coefficient takes on
both a positive and a negative sign, and is significant in a less systematic fashion.
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Household demographic characteristics, namely, household size and dependency
ratio maintain a negative and significant association with child mortality. Household
demographic characteristics are household income’s close and inverse covariates, and the
fact that the significant land coefficients are positive while demographic coefficients are
negative in Table 2 might suggest that the counterintuitive income association is
mediated by household demographic characteristics and vice versa. In particular, land
coefficients are positive when they are significant (Columns 1, 2, 5, and 6). In substantive
terms, children from land-rich households have a higher likelihood to die prematurely
than those from land-poor households. Land association with child probability to death is
robust to the alternative Weibull and Probit estimation techniques.
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Table 3. 4: Parameter Estimates of Child Mortality Determinants, Alternative
Measurement of Income
1991/92
1998/99
Panel
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Weibull
Probit
Weibull Probit
Weibull
(Log of) Land
0.073*** 0.047*** -0.009
-0.002
0.037**
(0.021)
(0.013)
(0.022)
(0.013)
(0.015)
Maternal
-0.044*
-0.026*
education
(0.024)
(0.014)
0.070*** 0.040*** 0.052***
(0.024)
(0.013)
(0.017)
Education among 0.001
-0.001
-.022*
adult male
(0.016)
(0.009)
0.053*** 0.029*** (0.012)
(0.020)
(0.010)
(Log of)
-1.224*** -0.674*** -.464*** Household size
(0.140)
(0.076)
0.929*** (.080)
1.097***
(0.110)
(0.165)
Dependency ratio -0.002*** -0.002*** (0.001)
(0.001)
0.005*** 0.003*** 0.002***
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
Child gender
0.080
0.050
-0.181*
-0.107** -0.035
(Male=1)
(0.089)
(0.053)
(0.095)
(0.054)
(0.066)
Religion
-0.062
-0.021
(Islam=1)
(0.135)
(0.082)
0.574*** 0.303*** 0.274***
(0.131)
(0.079)
(0.095)
0.062
Constant
-1.931*** 0.140
(0.283)
(0.156)
3.170*** (0.162)
2.157***
(0.394)
(0.218)
Obs
3478
3478
4245
4245
7723
Log pseudo
-2553.241 -1404.089 likelihood ratio
1850.353 1286.564 4513.128
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10
Note: Heteroskedasticity adjusted robust standard errors are in parentheses.

(6)
Probit
0.027**
(0.009)
-0.042
(0.009)
-0.009
(0.007)
0.566***
(0.054)
0.002***
(.001)
-0.018
(0.037)
0.157***
(0.056)
0.059
(0.111)
7723
2728.526

While I find counterintuitive patterns of association between several explanatory
variables and child mortality, nothing seems to be as surprising as income’s positive
association with child mortality. Household income’s positive coefficients are nearly
impossible to explain in substantive terms in that it is difficult to imagine why children
from rich households should die at higher rates than those from poor households.
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Additionally, even an insignificant income association is no less important especially in
the context of rural Bangladesh where poverty is widespread and any increase in income
should retain a significant and negative association with child mortality (Anand and
Ravallion, 1993; Preston, 1975; Deaton, 2002).
What could be behind this positive income coefficient? I investigate this
association in further detail in Tables 3 and 4. I examine if the linear association I specify
in Equation 1 is misspecified, and do so by altering the functional form between income
and child mortality relation from a linear to nonlinear. In particular, I introduce a
quadratic income term, and thereby explore the possibility of a NONLINEAR and an
inverted-U relationship between income and child mortality.27 I estimate:
[2] Yit = β 0 + β 1 X it + β 2 X it2 + β 3 Z it + β 4 J it + ε it
where Yit is the mortality outcome of the child i at time t, and X it is presumably timeinvariant income of the household where child i is born, and X it2 is the polynomial
construction of income, Zit is a vector of presumably control variables—child i’s parental
education, household’s demographic characteristics at time t, Jit is availability of food
and health redistribution programs in the village child i lives in at time t, where t is
1991/92 and 1998/99.
First, let’s consider Figure 2. Figure 2 presents survival status among children
aged ten years or less in 1991/92 and 1998/99. It further shows how children’s survival
differs by their households’/parents’ economic status. Children from very poor and rich
households survive at a higher rate than those born in “middle-income” households in the
early 1990s. By way of contrast, the middle class appears to outperform the upper and
27

Basu et al. (2010) find that the relationship between land-holding and child labor is indeed an inverted-U
in India. This suggests greater as well as meager land wealth leads to higher child labor.
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lower classes in saving children’s lives in late 1990s. The fact that income and child
survival in the 1990s appears to have all but a strictly linear association offers a
contrasting picture to some anthropologists’ portrayal of this association in rural
Bangladesh in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. Those scholars stated that child
mortality rates for the poor nearly doubled those of the well-off (Arthur and McNicoll,

Survival rates
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Figure 3. 2: Trends in Child Mortality, by Consumption Quintile

Table 3 presents Weibull and Probit parameter estimates of income and incomesquared as well as parental education, household’s demographic characteristics, religious
affiliation, and child’s gender. Using the 1991/92 survey data, I find maternal education,
household size and dependency ratio are inversely associated with child mortality. This
finding is consistent with my previous findings in Table 2, and a causal speculation based
on this association suggests while maternal education reduces child probability of
mortality as do household’s size and dependency ratio. And, when income enters the

72

model in the first-order monotonic and second-order polynomial functional forms (as the
level and the squared terms), income coefficient remains positive but its squared-term
takes on a negative coefficient value (Columns 1-2 in Table 3). While the Weibull and
Probit estimates of income and its square are individually insignificant, a chi-square test
of joint significance of income and its square has a probability of 0.026 (Column 1 of
Table 3), and 0.021 (Column 2 of Table 3). This suggests (a) as a set, income and
income-square are associated with child mortality, and (b) household income maintains a
concave, nonlinear relation with child mortality. In other words, a child from a poor
household has a higher likelihood than a child from a “middle-income” household and as
high likelihood as a child from a rich household to avoid premature death.
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Table 3. 5: Parameter Estimates of the Income-Child Mortality Relationship
1991/92
1998/99
Panel
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Weibull
Probit
Weibull Probit
Weibull
(Log of) Income 1.148
0.593
1.691
1.030
2.366 ***
per capita
(1.097)
(0.754)
(1.259)
(0.714)
(0.780)
(Log of) Income -0.094
-0.047
-0.153
-0.096
-0.214**
per capita2
(0.119)
(0.084)
(0.127)
(0.072)
(0.081)
Maternal
education

-0.046*
(0.025)

-0.025*
(0.014)

Education
among adult
male
(Log of)
Household size

0.002
(0.016)

0.001
(0.009)

Dependency
ratio

1.092***
(0.140)
-0.002*
(0.001)

Child gender
(Male=1)
Religion
(Islam=1)

0.073
(0.089)
-0.069
(0.136)

0.586***
(0.073)
0.002***
(0.001)
0.047
(0.053)
-0.034
(0.082)

Constant

-5.184**
(2.567)

-1.582
(1.690)

0.078***
(0.025)
0.058***
(0.020)
0.901***
(0.164)
0.005***
(0.001)
-0.180*
(0.095)
0.560***
(0.131)

0.045***
(0.013)
0.031***
(0.010)
0.451***
(0.079)
0.003***
(0.000)
-0.106**
(0.054)
0.293***
(0.079)

7.768***
(3.174)
4245
1848.536
3.98

-2.674
(1.769)

(6)
Probit
0.631
(0.436)
-0.067
(0.046)

0.064***
(0.018)
-0.025**
(0.012)

0.038***
(0.009)
-0.006
(0.007)

0.998***
(0.107)
0.002***
(0.001)
-0.037
(0.066)
0.263***
(0.095)

0.529***
(0.053)
0.002***
(0.000)
-0.017
(0.037)
0.165***
(.056)

8.567***
(1.895)
4245
7723
1821.021 4499.717
3.67
26.50

Obs
3478
3478
Log pseudo
likelihood ratio 2554.789 2511.942
7.25
7.71
χ 2 test of joint
significance
0.026
0.021
0.136
0.159
0.000
p > χ2
Inflection point: 180.93
184.19
170.95
167.98
170.98
per capita total
expenditure per
month (in Taka!)
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10
Note: Heteroskedasticity adjusted robust standard errors are in parentheses.

-1.409
(1.024)
7723
2731.873
2.10
0.350
159.95
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Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 present Weibull and Probit parameter estimates of
Equation 2 using the 1998/99 survey data. While maternal education, household’s size
and dependency ratio maintain negative association with child mortality, I find a female
child and a Muslim child to have a higher likelihood to live than a male and non-Muslim
child (Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3). And, when income enters the model in the first-order
monotonic and second-order polynomial functional forms, income coefficient remains
positive but its squared-term takes on a negative coefficient value. But these coefficients
are neither independently nor jointly significant (Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3). A chisquare test of joint significance of income and its square has a probability of 0.136
(Column 3), and 0.159 (Column 4). In other words, a child from a poor, middle-class, or
rich household has the similar likelihood to live or die.
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 3 present Weibull and Probit parameter estimates of
Equation 2 using the survey data from 1991/92 and 1998/99. I find chances are
significantly low that children would die prematurely when their mothers are educated,
they live in households with large number of dependent members, and are Muslims. And,
when income enters the model in the first-order monotonic and second-order polynomial
functional forms, income coefficient remains positive but its squared-term takes on a
negative coefficient value. These coefficients are independently and jointly significant in
the Weibull estimation (Column 5), but not in the Probit Estimation (Column 6). A chisquare test of joint significance of income and its square has a probability of 0.000
(Column 5). This finding confirms those from the 1991/92 survey data that children in
very poor and rich households have a lower probability to die prematurely than those
born in middle-income households.
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I re-estimate Equation 2 and present in Table 4 Weibull and Probit estimates of
household land ownership as an alternative measure of household income. Across
estimations and samples from the 1991/92 and the 1998/99 cross-sectional survey data, I
find maternal education, household size and dependency ratio are inversely associated
with child mortality. Islamic belief reduces the child probability of mortality in more
estimations than not. And, when household land ownership enters the model in the firstorder monotonic and second-order polynomial functional forms (as the level and the
squared terms), land coefficient remains positive but its squared-term takes on a negative
coefficient value (Columns 1-6 of Table 4). While the Weibull and Probit estimates of
income and its square are individually insignificant, a chi-square test of joint significance
of income and its square has a probability of less than 0.05 using data from 1991/92
(Columns 1 and 2) and those from both 1991/92 and 1998/99 (Columns 5 and 6). This
suggests (a) as a set, land and land-square are associated with child mortality, and in
substantive term (b) household land ownership maintains a concave, nonlinear relation
with child mortality. In other words, a child from a land-poor household has a higher
likelihood than a child from a “land middle-range” household and as high likelihood as a
child from a land-rich household to avoid premature death.
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Table 3. 6: Weibull Parameter Estimates of the Income-Child Mortality Relationship,
Alternative Measurement of Income
1991/92
1998/99
Panel
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Weibull
Probit
Weibull
Probit
Weibull Probit
(Log of) Land
0.121*
0.073*
0.048
0.038
0.084
0.050
(0.071)
(0.041)
(0.091)
(0.050)
(0.056)
(0.031)
(Log of) Land2
-0.009
-0.005
-0.012
-0.008
-0.009
-0.004
(0.014)
(0.008)
(0.019)
(0.010)
(0.011)
(0.006)
Maternal education -0.044*
-0.026*
(0.024)
(0.014)
0.069*** 0.040*** 0.051*** 0.041***
(0.024)
(0.013)
(0.017)
(0.009)
Education among
0.009
-0.001
-0.021*
adult male
(0.016)
(0.010)
0.053*** 0.029*** (0.012)
0.009***
(0.007)
(0.020)
(0.010)
-.918*** (Log of) Household -1.211*** (0.142)
0.665*** (0.168)
0.456*** 1.086*** 0.560***
size
(0.077)
(0.081)
(0.111)
(0.055)
Dependency ratio
-0.002*
(0.001)
0.002*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.000)
Child gender
0.081
0.051
-0.179*
-0.107** -0.034
-0.018
(Male=1)
(0.089)
(0.053)
(0.095)
(0.054)
(0.066)
(0.037)
Religion (Islam=1)
-0.068
-0.025
(0.135)
(0.083)
0.575*** 0.302*** 0.278*** 0.158***
(0.131)
(0.079)
(0.096)
(0.056)
Constant
-1.960
0.121
0.042
-2.183
0.045
(0.286)
(0.159)
3.198*** (0.164)
(0.220)
(0.113)
(0.398)
Obs
3478
3478
4245
4245
7723
7723
Log pseudo
-2552.982 likelihood ratio
1403.871 1850.152 1286.205 4512.755 2728.254
12.37
13.56
0.58
0.74
6.43
9.41
χ 2 test of joint
significance
0.002
0.001
0.749
0.689
0.040
0.009
p > χ2
Inflection point:
0.82
0.86
0.30
0.37
0.67
!
total land (in acre )
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10
Note: Heteroskedasticity adjusted robust standard errors are in parentheses.
!
100 decimals =1 Acre

0.79
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To elaborate, I estimate with Weibull and Probit estimation techniques the distal
and household determinants of child mortality using households’ economic status, social
status, religion, and demographic characteristics after controlling for child’s gender.
Results show that the income per capita coefficient is positive, and this suggests that the
household income has a positive association with the child probability of mortality after I
control for variation in parental education, demographic structures, religious affiliation,
and child’s gender. In substantive terms, the positive and significant (α=0.01) coefficient
on income per capita suggests that children born in poor households have a higher
likelihood for survival than those born in rich households. A possible explanation for this
rather counter-intuitive income association is that survey responses can be plagued with
recall bias, and that income measure poorly captures household’s actual economic status.
In order to verify this speculation, I re-estimate the baseline specification with
household’s land ownership as an alternative measure of income. And, the results are
fairly consistent across alternative income measures. What does explain the positive
income coefficient? I investigate this association in further detail. I introduce a quadratic
income term, and thereby explore the possibility of a NONLINEAR and an inverted-U
relationship between income and child mortality. When income enters the model in the
first-order monotonic and second-order polynomial functional forms (as level and
squared terms), the coefficients on income remain positive and its squared-transformation
retains a negative coefficient. This suggests that income maintains a concave, nonlinear
relation with the probability of child mortality.
Among the non-economic indicators of child mortality, the fact that I find
children born in Muslim households to live longer than those born in Non-Muslim
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households is no less surprising. I can safely state that Muslim household’s effect is not
driven by their relative well-off economic status, since I control for income in
estimations. This hints to the possibility that, Muslim households, due to their religious
identity, have differential access to particular social services, i.e. some social services are
not available to Non-Muslims households but are beneficial for children’s good health.
The Female Secondary School Assistance Project (FSSAP) among all governments’
social transfer programs can benefit Muslim girls and households more than it does NonMuslim girls and households. Because, Female Secondary School Assistance Program
gives a stipend to the secondary school based on the number of girls it enrolls. This has
motivated even all-male religious schools in Bangladesh to have become co-educational
and enrolled female students in large number (Chowdhury and Devrajan, 2006). A
Muslim girl has a higher access to not only education but also monetary benefits than her
Non-Muslim counterpart in rural Bangladesh after the advent of the Female Secondary
School Assistance Program. So, one speculation of Islam’s beneficial effect on child
mortality could be that Muslim children are benefiting from the opportunities for the
Muslims in particular.
In sum, empirical evidence supports Hypotheses 3.2 and 3.1, and 3.3
substantially, partially, and negligibly. First, maternal education is negatively associated
with child mortality likelihood as such children born to uneducated mothers have a higher
likelihood to die prematurely than those born to educated mothers (Hypothesis 3.2). And,
second, household-income is negatively associated with mortality likelihood of the
children born to rich as well as poor households; household-income is positively
associated with the mortality likelihood of the children born to middle-income
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households. While I support Hypothesis 3.1 partially as I reject Hypothesis 3.3, I concur
with the redistribution scholars and argue that the direction of household-income effect
and the mechanisms by which income affects mortality are likely to deviate from
“wealthier is healthier” scholars’ rather uni-dimensional arguments, and are contingent
on countries’ redistributive development policies. In particular, the household-income
effect can range from a linear to a nonlinear direction and the mechanisms can range
from a greater purchasing ability to accessibility of health goods and services depending
on the scale and the scope of the social transfer programs in society.
Why is the relationship between income and child morality curvilinear? I answer
this question in the next chapter. One plausible explanation is the poorest of the poor and
the rich households’ differential access to health inputs. But as opposed to the rich who
purchase them with private income, the poor get access to them by being social transfer
program targets. A few studies—none in Bangladesh—have attempted to establish the
relationship between social transfer programs and child health. However, a careful
exploration of targeting criteria is warranted to (a) make sense of the inverted Urelationship I find in my analysis and (b) get better understanding of the income-child
mortality dynamic in social contexts with targeted social transfers and those without. I
tackle targeted social transfers or targeting in Chapter IV.
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CHAPTER IV: THE TROUBLE WITH TARGETING
Targeted transfers are among the most contemporary antipoverty programs in Bangladesh
and many low-income developing countries. Typically defined as the inability to afford
consumption needs, poverty perpetuates across generations due to poor parents’ limited
investment in children’s education, health, and nutrition (Ravallion, 2006; Villatoro,
2004; Lomeli, 2008). Social transfers are a state-subsidized, non-contributory, regular,
and predictable aid to fill the ability and necessity gap among the poor. They aim to help
the poor reaches the “threshold” to not only ensure a minimum living standard but also
invest in human resources development (Lomeli, 2008; DFID, 2006).
Transfers take the form of food, cash, or (human resources building) services, and
are directed to narrowly defined “target” groups within society (van de Walle, 1998). As
such, target groups are entitled to transfers—whatever they might be—as long as they
meet certain selection criterion(a). Bangladesh’s Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF) and
Vulnerable Group Development (VGD) are among the examples of such unconditional
social transfers where groups receive transfers as long as they are “vulnerable”. Transfers
are often conditional, however, upon behavioral changes among recipients. Parents’
receipt of food/cash transfers is conditional on children’s school attendance, performance,
and health. Latin American Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT), and Bangladesh’s Foodfor-Education (FFE), the Female Secondary School Stipend Program Assistance (FSSAP)
are the examples of conditional transfer programs.
Who are the “targets”? Simply put, targets are those demographic or economic
groups left behind by the market (economic growth). Women, children, elderly, and
landless rural poor often make potential targets using a more formal set of principals: the
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indictor- or self-targeting. Indictor targeting identifies an observable economic or noneconomic covariate of poverty, and uses that as a proxy for income to identify poor
people. Indicator targeting replaces income- or means test-based targeting practices under
the assumption that observing non-economic covariates of income is less problematic
than observing income itself (Ravallion, 2006; van de Walle, 1998; Besley and Kanbur,
1993; Ravallion and Sen, 1994). Gender, age, landlessness, area of residence, or
combinations of these are common indicator-targets in Bangladesh and many developing
countries. For example, the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh combines gender and
landlessness to target clients, and transfers small loans to rural women from landless or
near landless households. Indicator-targeting differs from self-targeting, where
households—as opposed to state bureaucrats—select themselves as potential transfer
recipients.
What are the conditions? As I mentioned before, targeted social transfers demand
either (a) their recipients conform to certain behavioral changes, and therefore are
conditional, or (b) none, and therefore are unconditional. Among the targeted conditional
social transfer programs in Bangladesh, two require that their recipients should maintain
a certain level of educational performance and recipients’ parents’ should conform to
certain behavioral changes. For example, the Food-for-Education program requires that
primary school age children should maintain regularity and perform well in school. And,
the Female Secondary School Assistant Program requires that the secondary school age
girls maintain regularity and perform well in school, and remain unmarried until they
graduate from the secondary school
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Targeted social transfers have stirred up excitement—even among neoliberal
institutions—as an alternative to transfers to all or universal transfers to best reduce
intergenerational poverty and income inequality. And, in the process, scholars and
development practitioners engage themselves to the following, long-debated question:
should only the poor be qualified to receive transfer benefits, or should every citizen be
assured as a social right of “government-protected minimum standards of income,
nutrition, health and safety, education, and housing” (Wilensky, 1975: xii). While noneconomists in general support universal transfers on the ground of greater equality,
economists, development practitioners and policy makers support targeted social transfers
on the grounds that “a comprehensive approach to poverty reduction…calls for a program
of well-targeted transfers and safety nets” (World Bank, 1990: 3) and that universal social
transfers negatively affect labor supply and savings, and are therefore detrimental to
economic growth. However, universalism is often critiqued even among its supporters as
they believe equality via universalism is less likely to take hold as long as universalism
ensures earnings-related—as opposed to flat-rate—benefits (Castles and Mitchell, 1992).
And, it critiques argue that universalism is best suited to maintain—instead of reduce—
income inequality and poverty. The critiques argue that the non-poor’s participation is
not only a waste of resources but also counterproductive in that “the more non-poor
benefit, the less redistributive (or, hence, egalitarian) the impact of the welfare state will
be” (Goodin and Le Grand, 1987: 215).
On practical (empirical) grounds, targeted social transfers are believed to be as
equitable as universal provisioning, and more efficient than either universal or market
transfers (Ravallion, 2006; World Bank, 2004). Transfers for all have far-reaching human
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developmental gains; yet scholars doubt gains in actuality as the big administration is
often plagued by maintenance costs, local capture, leakage, and absenteeism among other
metrics of inefficiency. Unannounced visits to primary schools and health clinics in
Bangladesh, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Peru and Uganda show that 19 percent of teachers
and 35 percent of health workers were absent. Moreover, one-quarter of government
primary school teachers in India were absent from school, but only about one-half of the
teachers were actually teaching when enumerators arrived at the schools (Chaudhury et
al., 2006; Banerjee and Duflo, 2006). Anecdotal evidence from Bangladesh suggests
local captures of redistribution programs. Hartman and Boyce (1983) talk about how rich
local farmers captured a publicly provided local irrigation facility intended for poor
farmers. Un Nabi (1999) talk about the local power structure and how local elites are
often consulted when a development project is undertaken in community. This says that
transfers can often bypass the poor considering imbalances in economic, social, and
political power between service providers and recipients, and the poor lack ability to hold
public officials accountable.
Efficiency might still be possible if those bureaucrats at work, or those refraining
from leaks generate enough human development gains to offset absenteeism or leakage
among fellow bureaucrats. But, speculations such as these remain just so, and
comparability across cases does not necessarily offer robust understanding.
Nonetheless, targeted transfers have gained traction on the grounds of higher
efficiency, and lower leakage than the alternatives (Ravallion et al., 2006; van de Walle,
1998; Besley and Kanvur, 1993). Even the World Bank sidetracks from only economic
growth to social transfers in addition to economic growth as a route to poverty reduction
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(The World Bank, 1990, 1997; 2000, 2004; Lyn Squire, 1993; Birdsall and Londono,
1997; Besley and Kanbur, 1993; Mosely et al., 2002; van de Walle 1998). Scholars argue
that the poor are not homogeneous—some are more poor and vulnerable to personal and
natural calamities than others. Cost-effectiveness in targeted transfers is made possible by
channeling limited state resources to those in the greatest need. Targeting does not
necessarily solve leakage, absenteeism or other institutional failures, and decentralized,
community based service delivery is proposed as an institutional check. As such,
partnerships between public and private (not-for-profit) organizations are believed to be
able to prevent leakage, absenteeism, and poor quality of service among public officials
serving targeted beneficiaries (Shleifer, 1998; Besley and Ghatak, 2001; Besley and
Ghatak, 2007).
Targeted transfers have generated considerable debate about prospects for human
resource development. Targeted transfers are more than only supply-side interventions
(like transfers for all); the most common forms of transfers create parental demand for
children’s human resources development (for example, Food-For-Education, Conditional
Cash Transfer). Transfers thereby combine various components of human capital into a
single transfer mechanism (education with nutrition in Food-For-Education, education
with income in Female Secondary School Assistance Program, and education, nutrition,
and health in Conditional Cash Transfer). Their interventions at particular points in the
life-course have far-reaching human development consequences. For example, Female
Secondary School Assistance Program in Bangladesh makes cash stipends available for
secondary school-age girls and thus discourages girls from dropping out of school and
perhaps getting married. Finally, demographic and social externalities are sizeable in
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(conditional) targeted transfers. Food-For-Education not only increases schooling but also
suppress child labor; Female Secondary School Assistance Program increases girls’ age
of marriage and child-bearing as well as schooling levels.
Nonetheless, “Targeting is almost never costless” (Van de Walle, 1998: 232).
Wilensky (1975) argued that the debate about how effective social transfers are goes
beyond whether or not targeted social transfers are more efficient and/or equitable than
its universal counterpart. Wilensky argued targeted social transfers could have a more
fundamental and often political implication in that transfers can serve to meet public
officials’ political aims. Citing France’s Family Allowance Program to increase fertility,
he talked about how the program had produced a pronatalist clientele organized to lobby
for benefits (p. 114). Second, some argue that gender-based targeted social programs tend
to disadvantage women. As such, spouse and widow benefits may justify unpaid
domestic work, and transfers can reduce the capacity to form or maintain personal
autonomy by insulating women from the pressure of the labor market (Harrington Meyer,
1996; O’Connor, 1993; Orloff, 1993). Moreover, transfers to the poor are often viewed
as a structural adjustment of social policies. They are criticized as a broader continuation
of economic reforms in developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s, and that social
transfers to the poor are “compatible with the logic of the market” as the state
interventions are restricted to the neediest section of the population to avoid “distortions
in relative prices” (Lomeli, 2008).
On practical grounds, targeted transfers share similar critiques as its universal
counterparts, and some more with regards to “targeting”. Perhaps the biggest drawback of
targeted transfers is their high reliance on the “successful” targeting of the poor, and
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especially when broad-based survey responses—as opposed to context-specific local
knowledge—are utilized. As such, Ravallion (2006) cautions against using conventional
poverty covariates to target the poor in actuality. He fails to explain more than half the
variance in consumption or income across households using even the most
comprehensive, high quality survey. When income proxies err in assessing the actual
income, the basis of targeting is questioned.
Second, targeted transfers share similar criticisms as universal transfers. Skeptics
worry that transfers discourage labor supply and savings, which negatively affects
economic growth. Institutional inefficiency does not wither away with targeted transfers.
Moreover, evaluations of targeted transfers are rarely embedded in the broader
developmental contexts. Do targeted transfers work by themselves? Do they depend on
universal targets to take effect? For example, in addition to universal primary education,
Bangladesh initiates Food-For-Education program. And, educational payoffs from FoodFor-Education without universal primary education are open to empirical scrutiny,
especially if Food-For-Education model were to export elsewhere.
Finally, even when targeting reaches those in the greatest need, universal welfare
might be an issue due to not only alleged quality-quantity tradeoff, but also possible
welfare contraction among those who are not living in absolute poverty but are poor
nonetheless. As such, transfers are criticized to achieve less in quality in pursuit of
achieving more in numbers among the targets. Ahmed and Arends-Kuenning (2006) find
that, as intended, food-for-education in Bangladesh has increased enrollment, especially
among primary-school age girls. However, performance, measured with test scores, has
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not corroborated the rate of enrollment especially among Food-For-Education nonbeneficiaries.
To sum, let’s consider Table 1. Table 1 divides social transfers in terms of their
(a) targeting and (b) conditionality criteria. The table also shows how Bangladesh’s social
transfer programs fit in this distribution.
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Conditionality

Table 4. 1: Distribution of Bangladesh’s Social Transfer Programs according to
Targeting and
Conditionality Criteria
Targeting criteria
Universal
Targeted
Unconditional Primary
Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF)
Education
Vulnerable Group Development (VGD)
Primary Health Rural Maintenance Program (RMP)
Care
Food-for-Works
Rural Infrastructure Maintenance Program
(RIMP)
Old Age Allowance
Gratuitous Relief
Fund for Mitigation of Risk of Natural Disaster
Allowances to the Widowed, Deserted, and
Destitute Women
Honorarium Program for Insolvent Freedom
Fighters
Fund for Housing for the Distressed (Grihayan
Tahabil)
Fund for Rehabilitation of Acid Burnt Women
and the Physically Handicapped
Conditional

?

Food-for-Education (FFE)
Female Secondary School Assistant Project
(FSSAP)

Non-Linearity between Income and Child Mortality in Bangladesh
Few countries sharing as many structural disadvantages as Bangladesh have as many
targeted social transfers as Bangladesh. Despite Islamic tradition, patriarchy, slow
growth, young democracy, and social inequality, Bangladesh runs fourteen cash and inkind social transfers programs. Among them, Food-For-Education, Vulnerable Group
Feeding, Vulnerable Group Development, and Female Secondary School Assistance
Program have recognition beyond the host country. Bangladesh has one of the pioneer
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primary schooling-subsidy programs—its Food-for-Education program was one of many
school-enrollment subsidy programs now found in both developing and developed
countries (Ravallion, 2006). Bangladesh runs one of the largest systems of targeted food
transfer programs in the world (Murgai and Zaidi, 2005); and it runs a secondary school
subsidy programs designed especially for women. Bangladesh spends about 10 percent of
its public expenditure budget to serve nearly 4-5 million households a year with its
targeted social transfer programs (The World Bank, 2006).
Can the relation between income and child mortality be nonlinear due to targeted
transfers? As noted in the preceding chapter, I found that income affects child mortality
positively in that child survival prospects shrink as households gain more purchasing
power. Further analysis show that the income-child mortality dyad is indeed nonlinear,
and the poor and the rich do better to suppress children’s lives than the middle-income
households in the contexts of rural Bangladesh. Why is this relationship nonlinear? Do
targeted transfers explain non-linearity between economic status and child mortality? In
other words, does the typical poor household’s access to cash and/or food transfers help
them attain as many health inputs as the typical rich household so that both income
groups are equally successful in suppressing child mortality?
I investigate this question in Chapter IV. The direction between the income-child
mortality relationship can range from a negative (income↑ → child mortality↓) to
nonexistent based on the scope or scale of transfers for all. However, this relationship is
non-linear only when the rich and the poor are similarly likely to prevent child mortality,
and more likely than those not-so-poor-or-rich. While the rich can buy health inputs with
private income, the poor can get access to health inputs via targeted transfers and thereby
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safeguard children’s deaths from nutritional deficiency, ignorance, and other difficulties.
This assumes that the middle-income households with neither enough private income nor
access to transfers generally fail to suppress child deaths as well as the targeted poor or
the rich.
Do the poor households in Bangladesh have access to the social transfers, which
are beneficial to health directly, or beneficial to health indirectly via social transfers’
effect on health correlates? The targeting principals that social transfer programs follow
would suggest so.
In Bangladesh, targeting is land-, gender-, and/or age-based. Land is the most
robust poverty covariate in Bangladesh and South Asian at large, and is used to select the
poorest among the poor in all social transfer programs in Bangladesh (Sen and Ravallion,
1994). In particular, households that own up to half an acre of land are considered
functionally landless and poor, and household becomes a target to receive social transfers
if it owns half an acre of land or less. For example, households’ participation in (a)
Vulnerable Group Development (VGD) program requires that households own up to 0.15
acres of land, (b) Food-for-Work (FFW) program requires that households own up to
0.50 acres of land, (c) Rural Maintenance Program (RMP) requires that households own
up to 0.30 acres of land, and (d) Food-for-Education (FFE) requires that households own
up 0.50 acres of land. In sum, a household that owns upto 0.15 acres of land can
participate in any of these four targeted-food transfer programs. In addition, these social
transfer programs target women (the widow, destitute, separated, or divorced) or children
(The World Bank, 2006). And, while program documents do not clearly state if the
recipients must conform to all as opposed to one of the selection criteria in order to
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qualify as the recipient, a female-headed household that own up to 0.50 acres of land with
primary-age old children is eligible to participate in Food-for-Work and Food-forEducation programs. And, a child’s health could benefit from increased nutritional supply
as its mother’s and/or sibling(s) participate in targeted social transfer programs.
Alternative explanations of income-mortality non-linearity include poor
households’ access to a microfinance program and the state’s universal education, and
maternal and child health services. The state spends 2.2 percent of GDP or 15 percent of
the public budget on education, and 40 percent of education spending is devoted to
primary education (Glinskaya, 2005). And, the maternal and child health components of
the state’s health policy appear beneficial to the poor in that 20 and 23 percent of public
expenditures on, respectively, maternal health (pre-natal, post-natal, and family planning
services) and child health (Oral Rehydration Therapy, immunization) has been spent on
the poorest single quintile of the income distribution in 2000 (Glinskaya, 2005).
However, considering universality in access among the poor and non-poor, health and
education services cannot explain children’s differential propensity to die across different
income-groups. And, if any, the poor should do worse considering that the poor usually
receives worse public services (Keefer and Khemani, 2004) Finally, poor households’
participation in the microfinance programs as an alternative explanation is contested on
the ground that microfinance programs are often criticized for bypassing the poorest of
the poor (Rahman and Razzak, 2004).
Based on the preceding discussion, I examine if household-income maintains a
nonlinear association with child mortality because of the rich and the poor households’
differential—and perhaps comparable—access to preventive and curative health goods
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and services (Hypothesis 4.1). While the rich, with private income, spend more money on
nutritional food, better housing with proper sanitation and clear water, medicine and
health care services, the poor with targeted transfers get access to greater supply of food,
exposure to health messages, recommendations, and services, or perhaps are enforced to
conform to certain behavioral changes that benefit maternal- and child-health (such as,
sanitation, clean water usage, delaying girls’ marriage etc.), and thereby safeguard
children’s deaths from nutritional deficiency, ignorance, and other difficulties. And, the
middle-income households with neither enough private income nor access to social
transfers generally fail to suppress child deaths as well as the targeted poor or the rich.
HYPOTHESIS 4.1: Children in the very poor and rich households have higher likelihood
of survival than those born in poor but perhaps non-targeted households because of the
very poor and rich households’ differential access to health goods and services.
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Figure 4.1 depicts in a diagram the hypothesized non-linear relationship between
household-income and child mortality.
Purchase of
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Figure 4.1: Household Income Effects on Child Mortality

Research Methods
I use the BIDS-World Bank surveys for data analysis in Chapters III and IV. This
suggests that the sections on Data, Variables, and Measurements and Estimation Strategy
are almost identical in both chapters.
Data, Variables, and Measurements
I employ surveys conducted by the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies and the
World Bank (BIDS-World Bank) in 1991/92 and 1998/99. In addition to providing
detailed information on employment, income, and expenditures, the surveys include a

94

module on marriage and pregnancy history for all women between 12 and 50 years; land
ownership; food and non-food expenditures; participation in agricultural or
nonagricultural employment; as well as data on participation in rural financial services
and the amount of credit borrowed. Information on family planning program
participation, religion, and education in governmental and non-governmental educational
institutions is also available. The survey also documents a diverse set of village-specific
attributes—i.e., prices of staple food items, wage rates for male, female, and child labor,
availability of state-led employment programs (food-for-work, road construction),
government and non-governmental food programs, NGOs, formal financial institutions,
markets/haat in the village, and health and education facilities-- that allow me to
understand the interrelationships of community-level and household characteristics. Of
the village-specific attributes, food and health program availability is particularly
important for child health, and while surveys include questions to gauge their availability,
these questions in the first round differto those in the last round. For example, the
1991/92 survey asks, “Is there any government run food programs in the village?” The
1991/92 survey therefore does not differentiate among the available government food
programs by early 1990s (VGF, VGD, FFW), and the respondents were likely to answer
positively to this question if VGD, VGF, or FFW is available in village—however small
its scale and scope of operation might be at the time of survey. And, the 1998/99 survey
asks: “Is there any Food-for-Education project in any of the village schools?” The
1998/99 survey thereby asks about government’s specific food program which started in
1993, after the 1991/92 survey, and the respondents were likely to answer to this question
positively if ONLY Food-For-Education is available in the village. Nonetheless, these all
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are government food programs, and I can crudely compare health status among children
living in village with food program with those living in village where n food program is
available.
The surveys include 1,798 and 2,599 households—1,638 of which were surveyed
in both periods—from 87 villages of 29 thanas across Bangladesh. Data from the same
households over time allow for a better understanding of “causal” variation in child
survival prospects due to variations in explanatory variables than cross-sectional evidence
can oFood-for-Educationr.28 Notably, parental and village attributes typically change
only slowly, if at all, and prior literature on child health or its indicators, more broadly,
reports findings using the survey data from a single year (Strauss, 1990; Thomas et al.,
1996; Lavya et al., 1996; Barrera, 1990; Frankenberg, 1995; Maitra, 2004, Rosenzweig
and Schultz, 1982; Thomas et al., 1986; Haughton and Haughton, 1997; Jalan and
Ravallion, 2003; Suwal, 2001; among others; See Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1988;
Edmonds, 2004; Katz et al., 2003; Fedorov and Sahn, 2005; Cebu Study Team, 1992;
O’Donnell et al., 2008; Wagstaff and Nguyen, 2002 for exceptions). However, based on
the review of targeted social transfer programs in villages are likely to change in scale
and scope, and the effects of parental attributes on child mortality can alter with or
without targeted social transfers. Panel data is thus a better option for accessing valid and
reliable data.
The households sampled in both periods are overwhelmingly poor. More than half
of the households in both waves are functionally landless with an average income per

28

A thana is an administrative unit, which is smaller than a district but bigger than a village; a thana
consists of a number of villages. Bangladesh’s administrative units are divided into: Divisions (N= 6),
Districts (N= 64), Thanas (N=507), Unions (N=4484), Villages (N=59,990), and Households
(N=25,362,321).
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capita per week of 81/127.5 taka (equivalent to $1.5/$2) and mean landholding of
0.68/0.66 acres in 1991/92/1998/99.29,30
Variables
I estimate household determinants of child mortality using households’ economic status,
social status, religion, and demographics, and control for child’s gender. I measure
income alternatively in terms of expenditure per capita and land ownership.
Child mortality: I measure child mortality with survival status at the time of survey
among the children born during the ten years preceding the surveys. I use respondents’
answers to these following questions. In both rounds, the surveys ask a woman
respondent to: (a) list her pregnancy order, (b) identify if pregnancy resulted into a childbirth or otherwise, (c) identify the gender of the child if born alive, (b) state date of birth
of the child, (d) state if the child is still alive. Given that mortality is a rare event, and the
BIDS-World Bank survey data on mortality is sparsely distributed. To deal with this, I
select ten years preceding the surveys to allow the mortality measure to (a) contain
enough variation for meaningful inferential analyses, and (b) allow the current data on
mortality’s structural covariates to represent as much as possible the data on those when
mortality occurred in the past.
Income (in Taka): The BIDS-World Bank survey asks about expenditures on specific
food and non-food items in the last week and year, respectively. I calculate food
expenditures by adding all expenses on food items during the prior week, four times a
week. Also, I calculate the non-food expenditures by adding all expenses on nonfood
items during the last week, divided over twelve months. I calculate food and non-food
29

The 1998/99 measure for income is not adjusted for inflation.
Households spending 117.28 taka and 158.62 taka or less per person per week are considered poor in
1991/92 and 1998/99 respectively.
30
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expenditure as normalized to be a monthly estimate of total expenditures. I divide the
sum by the total number of household members, and I find per capita expenditure. I
logarithmically transformed per capita expenditure. The survey uses a comprehensive
(i.e. standardized for all) matrix of usual food and nonfood items (and allows respondents
to specify “other” expenditures). This should suppress recall bias.
Land (decimals): I measure land-ownership by adding the irrigated and non-irrigated
land households own. I include the logarithm of land ownership in the analysis.
Maternal education (years): Maternal education is based on years of completed formal
education.
Education among the oldest male member in the household (years): The oldest male in
the household is typically, but not necessarily, the child’s father. This is thus a proxy for
paternal education, and should be a close correlate. The survey does not ask, and thus
readily provide, information about children’s fathers since the child health module in the
survey asks questions only about mothers and children. I could approximate parental
education by matching mothers’ information from the child health module to her
information in the background module, but this would be a difficult endeavor with
limited gain, considering the role of paternal education on child health or mortality. And,
because households as opposed to individuals typically make decisions in rural
Bangladesh, I don’t expect paternal education to resume effects different from this proxy
measure.
Demographics: I include (a) the logarithm of household size as a quantitative attribute of
demographic profile of households, and (b) ratios of male and female members in certain
age-brackets to the total household size as a qualitative attribute of demographic profile.
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While household size is straightforward in concept and measurement, the ratios are
motivated by (a) shortcomings in the traditional calculation of the dependency ratio in the
context of Bangladesh, and (b) economic role across age and gender groups has special
significance in the development context of Bangladesh. First, the measurement of
dependency ratio (DR) as commonly referred to as:
DR=

Population ≤ 14 years + Population ≥ 65
× 100 does not really capture dependency
Populaiton 15 - 64 years

and therefore defies the purpose since children in rural Bangladesh village are
economically active from the age of six (Cain, 1977). Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) find a
similar trend in South Asia at large where, child labor is found to help supplement the
income of rural Indian families. Scholars commonly disaggregate male and female
household members into numerous age groups (less than 5 years, between 5 and 9, 10
and 16, 17 and 40, and above 40) and calculate the ratios of each group to the total
household size (Ravallion and Wodon, 2000; Wodon, 2000). Alternatively, I calculate
dependency ratio with DR=

Population ≤ 6 years + Population ≥ 65
× 100 and expect
Populaiton 15 - 64 years

this ratio to capture the nature of dependency in the context of rural Bangladesh.

Participation in targeted social transfer programs: Among targeted transfer programs,
the survey asks questions about the food programs, and I consider whether the village has
a food program in 1991/92 and 1998/99. I therefore use food-program availability in
villages to proxy transfer program participation among households. The village module
of the surveys shows that the question about the availability of food program has been
modified in the 1998/99 questionnaire; the 1991/92 survey asks: “Are there any
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government run food programs in the village?” and the 1998/99 survey asks, “Is there
any Food-for-Education project in any of the village schools?” Social transfers have
grown targeted and conditional by the end of the decade. This is consistent with the
anecdotal accounts suggesting that targeted and conditional Food-for-Education has
grown out of Bangladesh’s universal and unconditional Rural Rationing Program—a
food subsidy program for the poor, which is not linked to education (Ahmed and ArendsKuenning, 2006).
Health infrastructure in villages: I use if health services are available in villages in
1991/92 and 1998/99.

Estimation Strategy
The objective of this analysis is to test the hypothesis that the poorer households benefit
from targeted redistribution programs (e.g., food-programs, health programs), and
thereby suppress mortality as much as relatively rich households. Accordingly, I
estimate: Yiht = β 0 + β it X it + β ht X ht + β vt X vt + β hvt X ht × X vt + ε iht , where Yiht is the
mortality outcome of the child i in the household h at time t, X it denotes gender of the ith
child at time t, X ht is the vector of characteristics of household (income/land, income/land-squared, parental education, demographic structures, and religion) in which the
child i is born, X vt denotes the availability of targeted transfer programs—specially food
and also health programs—in the village v at the time t is the time of the interview,
namely, 1992 and 1999. And, X ht × X vt denotes interactions between household income
indicators and the binary outcome for village participation in health- and targeted foodtransfer programs. The coefficient for this interaction term is a core focus for this
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analysis, and I test if this coefficient is greater than zero, β hvt > 0. Additionally, I
examine the joint effects of income indicators (per capita income and land-ownership)
and program variables (food and health-programs in villages).
About 12% (16%) and 6% (21%) of households in 1991/92 (1998/99) live in
villages where targeted food and health programs are available, respectively. The fact that
data on targeted transfer programs is available by village, whereas data on potentially
targeted households’ actual program participation is not, prevents optimal assessment of
the mechanisms explaining non-linearity between income and child mortality. The
optimal estimation requires an interaction effect between household income and program
participation when income correlates are controlled and household and village (perhaps
selective) participation in redistribution programs is accounted for. Results are
suggestive, nonetheless. Although, although availability does not necessarily demonstrate
participation, the latter is more probable when programs are available in villages
(program is conditional on availability). And, when households qualify to be targeted
(based on land-ownership and/or demographic attributes), their odds of participation in
are likely to be high in a poor rural economy under the assumption that (pecuniary or
non-pecuniary) returns from sending kids to school are higher than those from engaging
them in in-house chores and, in cases of male kids, outside labor (Ravallion and Wodon,
2000; Cain, 1977).
To present robust parameter estimates, I (a) run cross-sectional and panels models
using data from each survey year and over time; and (b) correct for the possibility of
heteroskedasticity in standard errors and therefore conduct meaningful significance tests.
The Weibull model estimates the probability of mortality among children born during the
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ten years preceding the surveys conditional on covariates. For all children, the surveys
include the age at death or age at the survey date if the child is still alive and are therefore
right censored. The Weibull functional form makes sense theoretically as well as
empirically since hazard for death is a decreasing function of age among children, and the
model estimates independent variables using a proportional hazards specification. The
standard errors are robust, and the significance tests are therefore based on
heteroskedasticity-consistent estimates of the variance-covariance matrix.
Nevertheless, the following methodological constraints could confound findings.
First, errors almost always plague measures of household income using survey data from
developing countries like Bangladesh, and a consequent systematic difference between
actual and observed household income poses a credible threat to the analysis. I use total
weekly household expenditures per capita per week and land ownership as alternative
measures to estimate the income effect.31 While both are commonly used as indicators or
predictors of permanent household income, land ownership captures household wealth,
which is a key predictor of income and is often the basis for targeting for redistribution
programs.32 I have logarithmically transformed both variables to correct for possible
skewness and to attain normalcy in the distribution of income, and identify effects on
child mortality as income increases by a percent regardless of initial income.

31

In addition, I conduct a descriptive analysis of the distribution of the key income correlates across
income groups and check for external validity in income measures. I find that the average years of
education among mothers, fertility rates, etc. are of expected magnitude across income quintiles.
32
Especially where the credit market is absent or inaccessible
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Regression Results
Tables 2 and 3 present Weibull and Probit parameter estimates of targeted social transfer
programs in village and their possible role in mediating the non-linear association
between income and mortality. Tables 2 and 3 report these estimates using the 1991/92
cross-sectional data (Columns 1 and 2), the 1998/99 cross-sectional data (3 and 4), and
the panel data from 1991/92 and 1998/99 (Columns 5 and 6). I include in specifications
targeted transfer programs’ availability in village, their interactions with income, include
as controls the similar set of variables I have specified in Equation I of Chapter 3—
education, household size and dependency ratio, Islamic belief, and child’s gender. As
previously, I have measured household income and demographic characteristics with,
respectively, per capita income and land ownership, and household size and dependency
ratio. To reiterate, I use mortality outcome for the children born during 10 years
preceding surveys.33
Results from interaction analyses are revealing, and, despite methodological
constraints, suggest that targeted social transfers can explain the non-linear association
between income and child mortality (Tables 2 and 3). Coefficients for the interactions
between households’ income and residence in village having a food-program are positive
and significant at α=0.01 using the 1998/99 cross-sectional survey (Columns 3 and 4 in
Table 2), and panel evidence (Columns 5 and 6 in Table 2). A positive coefficient
suggests that, for all villages, the income-mortality association is not the same, and this
33

The analysis includes children aged 10 years or less at times of surveys. By doing so, I respond to the
constraint I face from not having enough variability in the outcome variable as I use the survey that
provides rich information on the explanatory variables of my interest but is not primarily intended to assess
child mortality as thoroughly as DHS, for instance. I therefore stretch the population from its actual
space—children aged 5 or less (infants and children under 5). However, I follow the fix, commonly
practiced in empirical research facing similar constraints on child mortality in low-income developing
countries (Lavya et al., 1996).
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association is “more” positive in village with a food program than that in village without
a food program. In other words, income effect on child mortality depends on availability
in village of the food program. Children born to very poor households have a higher
probability of avoiding untimely deaths than those born to relatively less poor households
when very poor households live in a village where the food-program is available. Food
transfers seem to have been effective in offsetting the economic constraints very poor
households face in child mortality. Let’s note that interaction coefficients in the 1998/99
cross-sectional models are statistically significant, whereas those in 1991/92 are not. This
might speak to a possible food-program’s lagged effect on reducing child mortality since
social transfer programs are often placed in the relatively poorer villages.
Positive interaction effects might seem rather counterintuitive. However, they
make sense under the following assumptions/empirical grounds. First, poorer households
receive food whereas relatively less yet absolutely poor households are left out from the
food-programs. Second, local capture, or leakage of food-subsidies to non-targeted
households seems not to take place as often as ethnographic evidence from the early
1980s’ rural Bangladesh or more recent quantitative accounts suggest (Ravallion and
Wodon, 2000; Ahmed and Del Ninno, 2002; Murgai and Zaidi, 2005; Hartmann and
Boyce, 1983). And, third, less poor households in food- program villages are perhaps still
poor in absolute terms (Ravallion and Wodon, 2000; Ravallion, 2006). I find support of
prior assessment that food programs are generally available in impoverished villages
using the 1998/99 evidence, and I find partial support using the 1991/92 evidence. As
such, in food-program villages, households’ average per capita expenditure is Taka 113.5
per week, which is significantly lower than the average per capita expenditure of Taka
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130.2 per week among households living in non-food program villages (t =5.49; pvalue<0.001). The 1991/92 evidence shows that households’ average per capita
expenditure is significantly higher in villages with food programs (t = 3.79; p=0.01).
However, standard deviations for per capita income are higher among households living
in program compared to non-food program villages (49.20 vs. 46.29 in non food-program
villages). And, the maximum per capita income is higher among households in “No”
compared to “Yes” food-program villages (353.9 vs. 710.7 in non food-program
villages). Taken together, the 1991/92 descriptive trends suggest that although
households’ maximum per capita income is lower in inter-group comparison, but “high”
enough in comparison to neighbors’ average per capita income to have inflated the
average, and, via that, its dispersion from the average. High average income among
households living in food-program villages thereby under-represents a low average
income among households in food-program villages, and provides a “revealed”
endorsement that food programs tend to be available in relatively poor villages.
Income attributes and exposure to targeted social programs jointly determine child
mortality differentials, and explain a significant portion of variation in child mortality in
the 1990s. An inverted-U relationship still holds across estimations in that income
maintains a positive sign in its level and a negative sign in its quadratic form (Columns 16), and is significant even when interactions enter as a control in panel specifications
(Columns 1, 5 and 6). Also, a chi-sq test of joint significance shows that probability
values are low for this block of variables—income, income-squared, food and health
programs, and their interactions.
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Notably, mortality is considerably lower among children whose parents reside in
the village with targeted food- or heath- programs. In particular, children born to the
households living in food-program villages have a lower likelihood of mortality than
those born to households living in non food-program villages. This effect is significant
using cross-sectional evidence in 1998/99 and panel evidence. Considering that food
programs are available in impoverished villages, programs’ negative coefficients are
notable. This suggests, these programs seem to have a rather immediate as opposed to the
similar lag—and positive—effect prior studies identified between village-level
availability of social programs (placement based on endogenous/low human development
conditions) and human development (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1986). And, food
program’s large and more significant effect in late than early 1990s is attributable to the
shift from all to land-, and demography-based targeting criteria in food program
(Columns 1-2 vs. Columns 5-6).
Interactions between households’ per capita income and residence in villages
having health programs maintain a positive direction of association. However, this
interaction secures less statistical support than interactions between income and village
availability of food program. Village health programs are not targeted towards particular
income- or demographic-groups. Village availability of health programs maintains a
consistent negative effect in direction of association across specifications using
alternative cross-sectional and panel estimations (Columns 1-6 in Table 2). However,
health program effects are never statistically insignificant. A similar pattern is evident
when income interacts with village availability of health program. In particular, these
interactions do not secure enough statistical power to suggest that income effects are
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mediated as much by the availability of health programs as they are by the availability of
food-programs (Columns 1—6 in Table 2). A crude comparison of child survival
prospects between villages with and without food and health programs is warranted, and
this suggests that targeted food program seems to have a greater and more immediate
impact on child survival than health program in rural Bangladesh (Table 2).

107

Table 4. 2: Suggestive Causal Mechanisms-1
1991/92
(1)
Weibull
(Log of) Income per capita
1.13
(1.11)
(Log of) Income per capita2
-0.09
(0.12)
Maternal education
-0.04*
(0.02)
Education among adult male in HH
0.01
(0.01)
(Log of) Household size
-1.07***
(0.14)
Dependency ratio
-0.01*
(0.01)
Child’s gender (Male=1)
0.07
(0.08)
Religion (Islam=1)
-0.07
(0.13)
Government food program in village
-0.31
(Yes=1)
(1.51)
Health center in village (Yes=1)
(Log of) Income per capita (×)
Government food program in the village
(Yes=1)
(Log of) Income per capita (×)
Health center in the village (Yes=1)
Constant

(2)
Probit
0.52
(0.75)
-0.04
(0.08)
-0.02*
(.01)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.57***
(0.07)
-0.01***
(0.00)
0.04
(0.05)
-0.03
(0.08)
-0.17
(0.86)

1998/99
(3)
Weibull
1.43
(1.27)
-0.15
(0.13)
-0.07***
(0.02)
-0.05***
(0.02)
-0.89***
(0.16)
-0.01***
(0.01)
-0.18**
(0.09)
-0.57****
(0.13)
-2.31**
(1.03)

(4)
Probit
0.88
(0.73)
-0.09
(0.07)
-0.04***
(0.01)
-0.03***
(0.01)
-0.44***
(0.07)
-0.01***
(0.01)
-0.10**
(0.05)
-0.30***
(0.07)
-10.12**
(0.58)

Panel
(5)
Weibull
2.54***
(0.80)
-0.24***
(0.08)
-0.06***
(0.01)
-0.02**
(0.01)
-0.99***
(0.10)
-0.01
(0.01)
-0.03
(0.06)
-0.27**
(0.09)
-1.29*
(0.74)

(6)
Probit
0.94**
(0.45)
-0.10**
(0.04)
-0.03***
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.01)
-0.51***
(0.05)
-0.01***
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.03)
-0.16***
(0.05)
-1.04**
(0.43)

-0.99
(1.40)
-0.09
(1.40)

-1.02
(1.26)
0.01
(0.19)

-1.49
(1.30)
0.51**
(0.22)

-0.96
(0.76)
0.24**
(0.12)

-0.84
(0.90)
0.29*
(0.16)

-0.71
(0.55)
0.20**
(0.09)

0.22
(0.33)

0.23
(0.30)

0.29
(0.27)

0.19
(0.16)

0.18
(0.19)

0.13
(0.12)

-5.15
(2.63)

-1.42
(1.70)

-6.51
(3.17)

-1.99
(1.80)

-8.75***
(1.94)

-2.01
(1.06)
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Table 4. 2: Suggestive Causal Mechanisms-1 (cont.)
Obs
3478
Log Likelihood
-2552.80
2
2
5.82(0.05)
Joint significance test 1: χ (p > χ )
12.17(0.06)
Joint significance test 2: χ 2 (p > χ 2 )
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

3478
-1404.99
5.95(0.05)

4245
-1844.23
1.72(0.42)

4245
-1281.25
2.02(0.36)

7723
7723
-4497.49
-2721.73
15.56(0.00) 4.91(0.08)

11.13(0.08) 13.69(0.03) 10.27(0.11) 33.48(0.00) 21.35(0.00)

109

I re-estimate in Table 2 interactions between households’ land ownership as an
alternative income measure and residence in food- and health-program villages. Direction
of associations remains consistent regardless of the fact that I have used alternative
income measures. The coefficients for the interactions between households’ income and
residence in village having food-program are positively significant in the 1991/92 crosssectional model (Columns 1 and 2 in Table 3), and are positively significant at α=0.10 in
the panel model (Columns 5 and 6 in Table 3). A positive coefficient suggests that the
land-mortality association depends on the food program availability in villages, and is
“more” positive in village with food program than in village without food program. In
other words, children born to households with less land have a higher probability of
avoiding untimely deaths than those born in households with relatively more land when
households live in village with food-program. This hints to the fact food subsidy is
targeted to the poor households, and food transfers seem to have been effective—though
seemingly intermittently—in attenuating economic constraints the land-poor households
face in suppressing child mortality.
The assumption that food programs are available in impoverished villages finds
more direct support in the 1998/99 survey evidence than it does in 1991/92 survey
evidence. Difference is considerable in the average land-ownership between households
living in villages with food program and households living in villages without food
program. In 1998/99 average land-size among households living in village with and
without food-programs is 60.7 and 67.2 decimals, respectively.34 However, this
difference is not statistically significant at the conventional level (t =1.57; p-value=0.12).

34

100 decimals=1 acre
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The 1991/92 survey evidence shows that households’ average land ownership is higher in
food-program than non food-program villages. Also, the average deviation from
households’ mean landownership is higher in food-program villages. In particular,
households’ average land-size is 101.6(63.10) decimals with a standard deviation of
445.2(156.4) decimals in food-program (non food-program) villages in 1991/92. Overdispersion (i.e. the standard deviation exceeds the mean) in land distribution among
households in food-program village is clear. This suggests that the parametric measure of
the average land-size (a) does not represent the bulk of land-poor households in food
program-villages, and (b) is swayed by a few households owning a large amount of land.
In sum, land-ownership is not normally distributed.
Village availability of food and health program effect remains largely
indeterminate with regard to saving lives among children born to households living in
those villages. Table 3 shows that village availability of food program is negatively
associated with child mortality in 1991/92 (Columns 1 and 2), but this association is not
significant in the 1998/99 cross-sectional model (Columns 3 and 4) and panel model
(Columns 5 and 6). Village availability of food program seems to have a relatively larger
impact than village availability of health program. This is suggested by statistical
significance of program coefficients. As such, having a health program in village is
negatively associated with the child probability of mortality but this association is never
significant (Columns 1—6).
Overall, land-ownership maintains a nonlinear association in that an inverted-U
relationship holds across specifications (Columns 1-6 in Table 3). Prospects for child
mortality are lower among land-poor and land-rich households and relatively higher
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among landed middle-range households. This association is statistically significant—
though intermittently. However, a chi-sq test of joint significance shows that probability
values (p-values) are small when I consider joint significance of land and land-squared
terms. And, a chi-sq test of joint significance shows that probability values are also small
for a block of variables—income, income-squared, food and health programs, and their
interactions (Joint Significance Test 1 in Table 3). In substantive terms, this suggests that
households’ land-ownership and residence in food- and health-program village jointly
determine how effectively they succeed in saving children’s lives (Joint Significance Test
2 in Table 3).
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Table 4. 3: Suggestive Causal Mechanisms-2

(Log of) Land
(Log of) Land2
Maternal education
Education among adult male in HH
(Log of) Household size
Dependency ratio
Child’s gender (Male=1)
Religion (Islam=1)
Government food program in village
(Yes=1)
Health center in village (Yes=1)
(Log of) Income per capita (×)
Government food program in the village
(Yes=1)
(Log of) Income per capita (×)
Health center in the village (Yes=1)
Constant
Obs

1991/92
(1)
Weibull
0.10
(0.07)
-0.01
(0.01)
-0.04
(0.02)
0.00
(0.01)
-1.18***
(0.14)
-0.01*
(0.00)
0.07
(0.09)
-0.09
(0.13)
-0.62***
(0.22)
-0.25
(0.27)
0.17***
(0.06)

(2)
Probit
0.06
(0.04)
-0.01
(0.01)
-0.02*
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.01)
-0.65***
(0.07)
-0.01***
(0.01)
0.04
(0.05)
-0.04
(0.08)
-0.35***
(0.12)
-0.19
(0.16)
0.11***
(0.03)

1998/99
(3)
Weibull
0.01
(0.09)
-0.01
(0.01)
-0.07***
(0.02)
-0.05***
(0.01)
-0.91***
(0.16)
-0.01***
(0.00)
-0.18**
(0.09)
-0.57***
(0.13)
-0.05
(0.12)
-0.12
(0.15)
0.09**
(0.04)

(4)
Probit
0.01
(0.05)
-0.01
(0.01)
-0.04***
(0.01)
-0.02***
(0.01)
-0.45***
(0.08)
-0.01***
(0.01)
-0.10**
(0.05)
-0.30***
(0.07)
-0.04
(0.07)
-0.05
(0.09)
0.04
(0.02)

Panel
(5)
Weibull
0.07
(0.05)
-0.01
(0.01)
-0.05***
(0.01)
-0.02*
(0.01)
-1.09***
(0.11)
-0.01***
(0.00)
-0.03
(0.06)
-0.28***
(0.09)
0.04
(0.09)
0.00
(0.13)
0.05
(0.03)

(6)
Probit
0.04
(0.03)
-0.01
(0.01)
-0.04***
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.01)
-0.55***
(0.01)
-0.01***
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.03)
-0.16***
(0.05)
-0.14***
(0.05)
-0.09
(0.07)
0.02
(0.01)

0.07
(0.09)

0.04
(0.05)

-0.01
(0.05)

0.01
(0.03)

-0.02
(0.04)

-0.01
(0.02)

-1.90
(0.28)
3478

0.17
(0.16)
3478

-3.15***
(0.39)
4245

0.07
(0.16)
4245

-2.19
(0.22)
7723

0.09
(0.11)
7723
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Table 4. 3: Suggestive Causal Mechanisms-2 (cont.)
Log Likelihood
-2548.13
-1398.58
-1847.27 -1284.61 -4509.93
2
2
5.22(0.07)
5.89(0.05)
2.48(0.28) 2.08(0.35) 2.93(0.23)
Joint significance test 1: χ (p > χ )
21.52(0.01) 22.93(0.00) 6.72(0.34) 3.87(0.69) 12.90(0.04)
Joint significance test 2: χ 2 (p > χ 2 )

-2721.49
4.47(.11)
22.47(0.00)

***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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Supplementary Analysis
Interaction analyses in Tables 2 and 3 suggest that targeted government (food) programs
substitute economic effects on child mortality for the targeted households. Targeted and

poor households with food-subsidies can save nearly as many children’s lives as rich
households without subsidies. And, the observed inverted-U, non-linear direction of
association between household income and prospects of child mortality is no longer a
puzzle but rather a pattern when targeting is the new institution to organize social
transfers.
Let’s note, village organizational demography could lead to an upward bias in
governments’ food program (Tables 2 and 3). This could happen if government- and
NGO- programs are jointly available in village. Failure to recognize village availability
of NGOs could overstate food program’s independent effect. The geographic targeting
criterion dictates that government food programs provide subsidies to households in
impoverished villages in Bangladesh. And, NGOs target those villages as well. NGOs
can have independent (such as microfinance, etc.) and/or collaborative projects with
Bangladeshi government (such as, health services—immunization, tuberculosis, etc.).
The village- or thana-level statistics are not readily available endorsing the assumption of
organizational co-existence (i.e., x number of villages contain y and z number of
government and non-governmental (GO-NGO) programs respectively). However, prior
studies talk about organizational coexistence as those studies evaluated GO-NGO
collaboration in anti-poverty programs, health service provisioning, controlling
tuberculosis, primary health care and neonatal care service provisioning (Zafarullah et al.,
2006; Mercer et al., 2004; Mercer et al., 2006).
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I find modest support for organizational coexistence in my study, however. In
food program and non-food program villages, I calculate numbers of NGOs and the
frequency for household’s participation in Grameen Bank, BRAC, and Bangladesh Rural
Development Board (BRDB)—the state-run microfinance (MFI) program. A higher
number of NGOs some but villages would suggest a “herding” behavior NGOs, and if so,
can cloud the estimate for government food program’s independent effects on child
mortality. The 1998/99 cross-sectional evidence shows that government food program
villages have an average of 3.64 NGOs (an average of 3.58 NGOs are available in non
food-program villages); 31% of its households participate in the GRAMEEN
microfinance program (23% participate in the GRAMEEN microfinance program in non
food-program villages); however, 4% of its households participate in the BRAC
microfinance program (9% participate in the BRAC microfinance program in non-foodprogram villages); and 2% of its households participate in the BRDB microfinance
program (7% participate in the BRDB microfinance program in non food-program
villages). The 1998/99 pattern of organizational coexistence aligns with the 1991/92
pattern. However, data on the number of NGOs is not available in 1991/92. The 1991/92
evidence shows that 30% of households in food-program villages participate in the
GRAMEEN microfinance program (17% participate in the GRAMEEN microfinance
program in non food-program villages); however, 10% of its households participate in the
BRAC microfinance program (17% participate in the BRAC microfinance program in
non food-program villages); and 15% of its households participate in the BRDB
microfinance program (17% participate in the BRDB microfinance program in non foodprogram villages).
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Nonetheless, I re-examine food-program effect after taking into account village
NGO availability. I examine if non-linearity in the income and mortality association is
made possible when NGOs—as opposed to food programs—are available in village. I
thereby provide further evidence of food program effects on the child probability of
mortality, and, in the process, offer a rather crude comparison of government and NGO
programs in explaining this non-linearity. In particular, I re-estimate the specification in
Equation 2 by adding (a) households’ participation in GRAMEEN, BRAC, or BRDB
microfinance program and (b) interactions between income and microfinance program
participation. I examine joint effects of income, microfinance program participation, and
their interactions to suggest whether these variables conjointly explain variation in child
mortality outcome.
I report these results in Tables 4 and 5. As for alternative income measures, Table
4 utilizes household’s income and Table 5 utilizes household’s land-ownership.
Government food program maintains prior direction and significance when I consider its
association (a) independently and (b) as interaction with household income using the
1998/99 and panel evidence (Columns 2 and 3 of Table 4). As such, child mortality is
low when households live in food program village. Also, poverty does not hinder, but
rather helps, to save children’s lives if poor households live in food-program village and
poor households are food subsidy targets. Among controls for NGO programs, neither
MFI participation nor its interaction with household’s income appears statistically
significant at the conventional level. This suggests NGO program effects do not offset
and/or substitute income effect on child mortality.
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Table 4. 4: Supplementary Interaction Analysis-I with NGO Programs in Village
1991/92
1998/99
Panel
(1)
(2)
(3)
(Log of) Income per capita
1.220
1.803
2.621***
(1.148)
(1.297)
(0.813)
2
(Log of) Income per capita
-0.114
-0.206
-0.267***
(0.124)
(0.135)
(0.087)
Government food program in the
-0.237
-2.203**
-1.457**
village (Yes=1)
(1.508)
(1.033)
(0.755)
Health center in the village (Yes=1)
-1.133
-1.780
-0.939
(1.451)
(1.360)
(0.920)
Grameen membership (Yes=1)
-0.894
-1.569
-1.183
(1.256)
(1.161)
(0.781)
BRAC membership (Yes=1)
-0.914
-0.653
-1.145
(1.251)
(1.990)
(0.967)
BRDB membership (Yes=1)
-2.553*
-4.775
-2.414*
(1.567)
(3.230)
(1.290)
-0.019
0.4931**
0.320**
(Log of) Income per capita (×)
(0.339)
(0.219)
(0.162)
Government food program in the
village
0.260
0.354
0.199
(Log of) Income per capita (×)
(0.344)
(0.287)
(0.199)
Health center in the village
0.224
0.348
0.271
(Log of) Income per capita (×)
(0.288)
(0.244)
(0.170)
Grameen Membership
0.211
0.177
0.259
(Log of) Income per capita (×) BRAC
(0.287)
(0.421)
(0.215)
Membership
0.500
0.916
0.443
(Log of) Income per capita (×) BRDB
(0.355)
(0.669)
(0.286)
Membership
Constant
-5.233**
-7.465**
-8.748***
(2.708)
(3.197)
(1.947)
Obs
3478
4245
7723
Log Likelihood
-2548.006
-1843.923
-4488.807
2.00(0.367)
3.03(0.219)
11.09(0.003)
Joint significance test 1: χ 2 (p > χ 2 )
22.60(0.031)
25.32(0.013)
53.73(0.000)
Joint significance test 2: χ 2 (p > χ 2 )
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Specifications include the following controls: Maternal education, education among adult male
in HH, (log) of household size, child’s gender, and religion.

Table 5 shows village availability of governments’ food program retains a
significant negative association with the child probability of mortality (Columns 2 and 3).
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And, land-based, income effect is still mediated by food program availability in village in
that poor households do relatively better in suppressing deaths than relatively less poor
households if poor households reside in food program village and are food-subsidy
targets. The fact that government food program offsets the poor’s economic constraint is
robust when I control for poor households’ microfinance program participation. MFIs or
NGO programs receive greater support in land-based income specification using panel
data in Column 3. As such, MFI participation suppresses child mortality—as does village
availability of food programs, and its interactions with land are as statistically significant
as food programs’ interaction with land (Column 3). Overall, panel evidence shows that
government or NGO programs that target land-poor households can offset the economic
constraints rural poor households face in saving children’s lives. Also, based on the
findings that government food program retains its negative association with the child
probability of mortality in the face of alternative income measures, sample, and
estimation techniques (Columns 2 and 3 in Tables 4 and 5), it is safe to conclude that
government targeted food programs have been more effective than NGO programs in
offsetting economic constraints of child mortality.
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Table 4. 5: Supplementary Interaction Analysis-II with NGO Programs in Village
1991/92
1998/99
Panel
(1)
(2)
(3)
(Log of) Landholding
0.115
0.052
0.084
(0.072)
(0.090)
(0.056)
2
(Log of) Landholding
-0.012
-0.015
-.0012
(0.014)
(0.019)
(0.011)
Government food program in the
-0.465
-1.583**
-1.106*
village (Yes=1)
(1.393)
(0.825)
(0.602)
Health center in the village (Yes=1)
-1.469
-1.751
-1.236
(1.311)
(1.226)
(0.789)
Grameen membership (Yes=1)
-1.403
-0.709
-1.442**
(1.121)
(0.869)
(0.597)
BRAC membership (Yes=1)
-1.416
0.114
-1.534**
(1.065)
(1.717)
(0.776)
BRDB membership (Yes=1)
-2.962**
-4.182
-2.862**
(1.398)
(2.945)
(1.113)
0.040
0.361**
0.254**
(Log of) Landholding (×)
(0.313)
(0.173)
(0.128)
Government food program in the
village
0.337
0.350
0.264
(Log of) Landholding (×)
(0.313)
(0.259)
(0.171)
Health center in the village
0.344
0.161
0.332**
(Log of) Landholding (×) Grameen
(0.256)
(0.180)
(0.129)
Membership
0.339
0.009
0.352**
(Log of) Landholding (×) BRAC
(0.242)
(0.362)
(0.172)
Membership
0.607**
0.789
0.550**
(Log of) Landholding (×) BRDB
(0.316)
(0.609)
(0.246)
Membership
Constant
-2.146***
-3.599***
-2.433***
(0.283)
(0.393)
(0.217)
Obs
3478
4245
7723
Log Likelihood
-2545.587
-1845.071
-4493.281
2
2
1.13(0.569)
3.56(0.168)
Joint significance test 1: χ (p > χ ) 7.26(0.026)
25.36(0.013)
58.73(0.000)
Joint significance test 2: χ 2 (p > χ 2 ) 31.22(0.001)
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Specifications include the following controls: Maternal education, education among adult male
in HH, (log) of household size, child’s gender, and religion.

But, how? The finding that government’s social transfer programs have been
more effective for child mortality decline than the country’s world-renounced
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microfinance programs is puzzling. This in turn implies (a) efficient government’s social
transfers to the poor: transfer leakages to non-targeted groups or local elite- or
administrative- capture of social transfers seem not to be as prevalent; (b) effectiveness of
government’s social transfers programs in poverty reduction, broadly speaking; and (c)
inadequate—if no inefficient—microfinance programs’ coverage. While the BIDS-Word
Bank survey data does not permit that I systematically unravel any of these possible
mechanisms via which government social transfer programs have achieved so, I elaborate
on those in the following.
First, although both government’s social transfer and microfinance programs
target the poor, the actual participants might represent different poverty groups in that the
poorer group participates in government’s programs and the less poor groups participate
in microfinance programs (Rahman and Razzak, 2004). Second, while the data on (a)
total participants in social transfer programs or total expenditures on social transfer
programs and (b) total participants in microfinance programs and total expenditures on
credit is not readily available, it is plausible that the government spends more on social
transfers than microfinance institutions do on credit, and government thereby extends
those transfers to more poor households. These hypotheses still do not explain why
government’s social transfers to the poor should be efficient given that poor elsewhere
receives poor services from their governments (Keefer and Khemani, 2004). I
hypothesize that governmental and nongovernmental organizational co-existence bolsters
the efficiency of service provision via “competition” between public and (nongovernmental) private providers of social services to the poor. Microfinance programs in
the village might be critical for government’s efficient social transfers to the poor.
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Let’s note, findings differ when I use, alternatively, income- and land-based
economic indicators. This questions the assumption that (a) income per capita and land
are alternative indicators of income, and (b) land as a robust indicator of income fair
poorly even in rural agrarian economy in Bangladesh (Ravallion and Sen, 2004).
Chapter 4 sheds light to the puzzle of nonlinear income and child mortality
relationship. Nonlinear relationship between income and child mortality is possible only
when the rich and the poor are equally likely to prevent child mortality, and they are
more likely to prevent death than the middle-income group. While the rich can buy health
inputs with private income, the poor can get access to health inputs with social transfers
and thereby safeguard children’s deaths from nutrition deficiency, ignorance, and other
difficulties. And, the middle-income households with neither enough private income nor
transfers fail to suppress child deaths as well as the targeted poor, or the rich. Do the poor
households in Bangladesh have access to the social transfers, which are beneficial to
health directly, or beneficial to health indirectly via social transfers’ effect on health
correlates? The targeting principals that social transfer programs follow would suggest
so. And, I test this hypothesis within the limit of the data. Results are suggestive,
nonetheless. Income effect on child mortality depends on the availability of food program
in villages in that children born to very poor households have a higher probability to
avoid untimely deaths than those born to relatively less poor households when very poor
households live in the villages with the food-program. The fact that data on targeted
transfer programs is available by village whereas that on potentially targeted households’
actual program participation is not prevents optimal assessment of the mechanisms
explaining non-linearity between income and child mortality. The optimal estimation
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requires an interaction effect between household income and program participation when
income correlates are controlled and household and village (perhaps selective)
participation in redistribution programs are accounted for.
In the midst of examining the puzzle of income-mortality nonlinearity, I find
female education to have a robust effect in reducing child mortality. In other words, when
women in Bangladesh become educated, their children do not die in premature age. Let’s
consider the facts that (a) I find women’s education effect is stronger in late than early
1990’s BIDS-WB sample, and (b) women’s education remains significant when I control
for income and education among male adults household suggest the following. First, a
child born to a poor mother with X level of education has the same probability to live on
as a child born to a rich mother with the same level of education. And, second, evidence
suggests that education is no longer confined to only “rich” women but also has been
extended to those, non-rich. This thus poses another piece of a puzzle in the Bangladeshi
context. What does explain female educational attainment in predominantly Muslim
Bangladesh? I answer this question in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER V: THE SOURCES OF SCHOOLING
Existing literature says Islam is inveterately patriarchal, and therefore inimical to human
development. Patriarchy inducts men to protect their womenfolk, and restricts women’s
access to secular—also religious—education among the available routes to status
attainment (Caldwell, 1986; Ammar, 1954). Raphael Patai (1971) wrote, “in the
traditional Muslim view the education of girls was considered not merely unnecessary
and superfluous but positively wrong” (p. 462; quoted from Caldwell, 1986).
However, Bangladesh—predominantly Islamic with 83% Muslim population—
has made some of the greatest women’s education and human development strides of any
country of late, especially after controlling for levels of economic development.
Bangladeshi women’s secondary school (gross) enrollment has more than tripled within a
decade. Female secondary school enrollment has increased from 13.6% in 1990 to 47.2%
in 2000, and this corresponds to a staggering 247% increase in female secondary school
enrollment just within a decade. Female secondary education growth is (a) 173
percentage points higher than male secondary education growth for the same period, and
(b) 220, 163, 32, 49, and 33 percentage points higher than female secondary education
growth rates in India, Pakistan, South Asia, low-income countries, and predominantly
Muslim countries.
Islamic belief or patriarchal culture seems not be as constraining for Bangladeshi
female educational attainment as the existing literature suggests. But, what does explain
Bangladesh’s rapid secondary female educational attainment? Development practitioners
attribute much of this rapid female secondary educational attainment to Bangladesh’s
replacement of gender-neutral secondary education policies with its gender-sensitive
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counterpart since early 1990s. The rationale for such a policy experiment was simple.
Pro-male gender-gaps in the face of gender-neutral education policies and programs call
into question their effectiveness for increasing gender equality in education. As such,
despite much investment in education, the ratio of girls to boys is 85% and 81% in
primary and secondary schools in South Asia; and 86% and 75% in Africa (Lewis and
Lockheed, 2006; UNESCO, 2006; Glick, 2008). Feminization of education is believed
critical for reducing pro-male gender gaps, and for hastening otherwise lagging access to
female education and economic and human development at large by breaking
intergenerational social mobility (Glick, 2008; Schultz, 1993, 2002). Similarly,
Bangladeshi pro-female secondary education policy is believed to improve its historically
low rates of education among “adult” girls especially in rural areas. And, in the process,
Bangladesh joins a few Latin American developing countries, which have experimented
with pro-female education policy and have subsidized tuition-free instruction, cash
rewards, and merit-based scholarships for girls in school (Bellew and King, 1993;
Khandker, Pitt and Fuwa, 2003; Filmer and Schady, 2006).
Bangladesh poses a two-fold puzzle. First, in absence of social requisites, what
does explain pro-female education policy adoption in predominantly Muslim,
Bangladesh? And, second, does the feminization of education policy in and of itself
ensure gender equality in education where inequality is historically high? If so, how does
it compete with or complement the intergenerational effects on female educational
attainment? How does it interact with structural determinants? And, could the educational
effects of this gender-targeted policy intervention mask the impact of more fundamental
social transformation?
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I shed some empirical light on some of these questions in this chapter. And, I do
so by using the 1998/99 BIDS-World Bank household surveys from Bangladesh. In
particular, I study (a) how gender affects educational attainment as Bangladeshi
government expands schooling opportunities to girls; we do not know as completely as
we should how the relationship between gender and educational attainment changes in
the onset of education policy changes, such as universal education, feminization of
education policy, etc. (Beutel and Axinn, 2002); (b) when all secondary school age girls
are eligible for free education—who among them actually continue on to the secondary
school?, and (c) does the feminization of education policy in and of itself ensure female
educational attainment and gender equality in education?.

The Feminization of Education Policy in a Predominantly Muslim Country
Bangladesh is an Islamic country in that 83% of its population is Muslim. Following the
Islamic beliefs and traditions, Bangladeshi parents and society are more likely than not to
be “deeply apprehensive of girls who were approaching puberty being involved in
schooling or other forms of participation in public life” (Caldwell 1986: p. 177). It is
unclear, however, how much of such an apprehension is due to the fact that (a) girls are
attaining secular education per se, or that (b) girls are breaching the norm of seclusion
(purdah), and are coming in a closer physical proximity of opposite gender teachers or
students. Additionally, the Bangladeshi state adheres to the Islamic, Sharia law. The
socio-economic institutional context is pro-male than pro-female in that the state assigns
women’s rights to property, marriage, and divorce according to the Quranic injunctions.
Following the Islamic marriage and family laws, the state assigns far greater rights with
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regards to marriage and divorce to men than to women. Only men have unilateral and
unconditional right to divorce (talaq), and while the Bangladeshi Muslim married women
do not have rights to initiate divorce, they face divorce threats. Furthermore, following
the Islamic inheritance law, a Bangladeshi woman is allowed to inherit one-half the share
her brother receives.
Despite void in social requisites, Bangladesh is one of the pioneer countries,
which have subsidized girls’ schooling costs in addition to increasing their access to
quality schooling. In 1994, Bangladeshi government in collaboration with the World
Bank began to subsidize girls’ secondary education costs by launching the Female
Secondary School Assistant Program (FSSAP). The Female Secondary School Assistance
Program intervenes in the supply- and demand-aspects for increasing girls’ secondary
education in the following ways. First, Female Secondary School Assistance Program
provides tuition-free education and a monthly stipend to secondary school (Grades 6—
10) age girls as long as they maintain regular attendance, passing grades, and remain
unmarried until they graduate from secondary school. Second, Female Secondary School
Assistance Program provides secondary schools with a stipend based on the number of
girls schools enroll (Chowdhury and Devrajan, 2006). Secular as well as religious schools
have responded to this intervention at a-historic rate. As such, religious schools
(Madrasa) have switched from being all-male to co-educational institutions. By late
1990s, female student population made up a staggering 47 percent of total Madrasa
school enrollment. Such a high female Madrasa enrollment, especially in secondary
level, is unique to Bangladesh and unparallel in any other Muslim country (Chowdhury
and Devrajan, 2006).
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Economic Incentives to Female Educational Attainment
Do monetary incentives increase female education? Does the Female Secondary School
Assistance Program’s tuition-free education and cash-transfers sway parental decisions to
send girls to schools? In its simplest form, the economic argument to this question is: the
Female Secondary School Assistance Program and similar cash transfer programs raise
household income in absolute term, and should motivate parents to educate their
daughters (Schultz, 2002).
Gary Becker’s (1981) and Becker and Tomes’ (1976; 1979; 1984) model is a
common point of departure in the income-education research. Becker maintains that
parents are altruists, and garner satisfaction from the success of their children. Parents
invest monetary and non-monetary resources to educate children. Education is expected
to enhance children’s human capital and earning potential in the labor market.35 How
much parents invest depends on their ability and preferences and absolute and relative
costs of education, which reflects the number of children in the household. So, when
parents have higher income, they invest more in children’s education. And, when
education costs less due to cash transfer or other education stipends, parents can afford
more of children’s education for their income.
The Beckarian model assumes that parents treat children impartially along the
birth-order and gender-divide. Yet, parents might invest differently—and “efficiently”—
between two otherwise identical children for reasons related to the economic institutional
context within which parents operate. In particular, parents might invest more and/or for
35

Children, especially from well-off families, inherit gifts, bequests, and other forms of non-human capital,
which
can also enhance quality.
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a longer period on a particular child if the child has (a) “endowed luck”—endowments
that help him/her perform better in school, and (b) “market luck”—endowments that help
him/her perform better in the labor market. Such allocation of parental resources is
“efficient” as well as equitable under the assumption that hence abler children will look
after their “less able” siblings due to the abler children’s altruistic beliefs and practices.
The Beckarian model further predicts that parents tend to invest more in sons’ than
daughters’ education even when a son and a daughter are identically endowed because
market returns for male labor are higher than those for female labor.
Would parents in rural Bangladesh allow their daughters to participate to the
Female Secondary School Assistance Program? If female education is a normal
consumption good in this model (i.e. its consumption increases linearly with income) and
the parents can bear the direct36 and opportunity costs37 of female education, the
Beckarian model would more likely than not to predict a positive outcome. Parents in all
likelihood would take advantage of the price-break in educational and incomeaugmenting opportunities reflecting girls’ participation to the Female Secondary School
Assistance Program, and let them attend school. The Female Secondary School
Assistance Program reduces relative costs of educating a secondary-school age girl in
rural Bangladesh. Fertility reduction and market opportunities for women also help. The
opportunity costs of sending girls to school are lower than before (girls skip school and
look after young siblings at home and/or help with household chores Deolalikar, 1998;
Glick and Sahn, 2000; Levison and Moe, 1998; Pitt and Rosenzweig, 1990). In

36

Direct costs of attending school include such as, texts, materials, special school clothing or uniforms, and
transportation costs.
37
Costs incurred upon attending school and withdrawal from the activities a girl would have performed
otherwise.
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contemporary Bangladesh, the demand for female labor is ahistorically high in
microfinance institutions, apparel industries, and elsewhere. However, whether
educational attainment among adolescent girls increases with income depends on noneconomic cultural factors (below), and the question is open to empirical scrutiny.

Cultural (Dis)Incentives to Female Educational Attainment
Culture defines a unique set of incentives and disincentives to female educational
attainment, and it is unclear whether they remain intact following the advent of the
Female Secondary School Assistance Program. Despite vagueness in definition and
difficulties in operationalization, the framework that considers the relevance to females of
(a) ascribed vs. achieved status, (b) the institutions of marriage, family, and reproduction,
and (c) living in a pronatalist value system vs. otherwise, is important to this discussion.
In combination, these facts explain when stipend program participation and female
educational attainment are (a) “rational,” and (b) not so “rational.” Costs are defined in
social (latent) as well as economic (manifested) terms in what follows. What are the
social, latent costs of female education? Do subsidies erode the latent costs of female
education? Are they significant enough to offset monetary incentives for female
education? Do parental role in educating girls accepted in the community?38
Non-economic, cultural understanding of girls’ stipend program participation and
educational attainment is particularly insightful on at least two grounds. First, target
families are not the poorest of the poor, and while money always helps, these particular

38

“Certain women have in likelihood always been vulnerable to loss of protection. These include infertile
women and women who “for one reason or another have run afoul of the structures of dependence in which
their genderual birthright places them—widows; spinsters too old, ugly, or black to marry; unmarried
mothers; divorcees, etc.”
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families may or may not be economically constrained to send girls to school. The
program targets families that can afford at least primary schooling for their daughters but
debate whether to let their daughters continue on to secondary school. Second, target
pupils are adolescent, “adult” girls who would otherwise assume rather the more
important role of female adult life—a wife and a mother—in the context of rural
Bangladesh.
Cost elimination and immediate monetary rewards might be more effective in
bringing to school girls of pre-puberty as opposed to post-puberty age from very poor, as
opposed to less poor, families. As such, in pushing the female education ceiling from
primary to secondary school, it is plausible that education increases with cash transfers
(income) but does so up to the threshold that is justifiable by the existing norms of
marriage, female adult roles, etc.
When marriage and reproduction assume centrality in female adult roles, her
parents decide rationally between education and marriage. Parents ought to choose
between daughter’s education and marriage because her age in attending secondary
coincides with that of marriage in rural Bangladesh. And, parents are likely to favor
education only if postponing marriage now does not defy the norms of marriage and
thereby hurt its prospect to happen later.
Marriage is mostly arranged in Bangladesh. Parental reliance on networks of
primary and secondary social relations makes it more likely that parents conform to the
norms of arranged marriage. And, education is not as desirable or important as her youth,
virginity, or physical appearance to help girls secure a nuptial contract. For arranging a
marriage, the family and the community follow a set of informal norms, and consider
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girls’ physical attributes, the family she is born into, and the family she relocates to upon
marriage, among others. The practice is to arrange marriage for a girl as soon she
becomes an “adult” where adulthood is biologically determined and commences at the
age a girl attains menarche.39 Parents, however, maintain the order she is born in
arranging marriage for daughters. High emphasis on ascribed qualities and that
educational attainment often attenuates marriage-friendly qualities often discourages
parents to allow girls to attend school. As such parents take into consideration that by
staying in secondary school, a girl (a) grows too “old” for marriage, (b) receives too
much education to be matched with a suitable (i.e. more educated) groom, and (c) is
exposed to social situations that might limit her ability to retain her virginity.
Thus, stipend program participation might prove necessary among the parallel
government interventions or as opposed to none as long as educational attainment does
not curb her prospects for a “good” marriage in time to a groom who is more educated
than she is. Educational attainment depends on the supply-side factors as well. The way
the Female Secondary School Assistance Program participating secular schools operate
matter as well in that if the latter maintains the (Islamic) social and religious norms of
seclusion, separation, dress code, the girls do not “look bad” by entering the public
sphere by commuting to and from school, coming in a closer physical proximity of fellow
class-mates of opposite gender, being taught by male teachers at school. Furthermore, if
education-contingent economic roles and statuses become more socially acceptable,

39

In particular, education is not as important as her virginity, (young) age, physical appearance, and
networks by birth with male members of high social and economic status—father’s occupation, land
ownership, number of male siblings, their occupation, etc. (Arends-Kuenning and Amin, 2004).
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stipends might increase educational attainment even in the context favoring marriage,
reproduction, and childbearing.

Research Methods
Data, Variables, and Measurements
For this analysis, I use data from the survey conducted by the Bangladesh Institute of
Development Studies and the World Bank (BIDS-WB) in 1998/99. The BIDS-WB
survey employs a multi-clustered stratified-random sampling design to generate data, and
interviewed 2,599 households in 104 villages from 29 in rural Bangladesh in 1998/99. 40 I
construct the sample using 1635 households for this analysis and, from those, I include
2742 individuals aged 12—20 in 1999. I use this wide age range because individuals as
young as 12 and as old as 20 were enrolled in what is considered secondary school in
Bangladesh (Grades 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10) during the time of survey in 1998/99.
The BIDS-World Bank survey is more appropriate than the most available
secondary data sources from Bangladesh for this study. The survey makes available
village-, household-, and individual- levels information on the socio-economic and
demographic attributes despite the fact that the purpose of the BIDS-World Bank survey
was to assess changes in household’s income from their microfinance program
participation. The BIDS-World Bank includes a separate module to record each
member’s history of education attainment. The survey provides data on respondents’ (a)
enrollment in, performance in, and completion of school, (b) participation in the Female

40

A thana is an administrative unit, which is smaller than a district but bigger than a village; a thana
consists of a number of villages. Bangladesh’s administrative units are divided into: Divisions (N= 6),
Districts (N= 64), Thanas (N=507), Unions (N=4484), Villages (N=59,990), and Households
(N=25,362,321).
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Secondary School Assistance Program, (c) receipt of the Female Secondary School
Assistance Program stipends, and (d) receipt of other forms of educational rewards, such
as free textbooks, etc. The BIDS-World Bank survey also includes data on marriage and
pregnancy history for all women between 12 and 50 years; land ownership; food and nonfood expenditures; participation in agricultural or nonagricultural employment; as well as
data on participation in rural financial services and the amount of credit borrowed.
Information on family planning program participation, religion, and education in
governmental and non-governmental educational institutions is also available. And the
survey documents a diverse set of village-specific attributes –i.e., prices of staple food
items, wage rates for male, female, and child labor, availability of state-led employment
programs (food-for-work, road construction), government and non-governmental food
programs, NGOs, formal financial institutions, markets/haat in the village, and health and
education facilities—that allow me to understand the interrelationships of communitylevel and household characteristics.
Let’s note, I will consider the sample of this study in two ways: (a) unrestricted,
and includes all individuals aged 12-20, and (b) restricted to only girls aged 12-20 who
are eligible to participate into Female Secondary School Assistance Program. And, with
this split, I attempt to gain some analytical traction I discuss below. Let’s also note, the
sample contains an unequal number of households from villages. As such, 1635 (733)
households from 104 villages comprise the unrestricted (restricted) sample, and the
unrestricted (restricted) sample includes as low as 7(2) and as high as 51(2) with an
average of 26(9) households from these villages. Finally, household members vary in
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number by which they enter the sample: the unrestricted (restricted) sample includes as
low as 1(1) and as high as 6(4) with an average of 1.7(1.2) members from households.
Estimation Strategy
I estimate Equations (1) and (2) below to examine whether female secondary educational
attainment can be made possible with targeted enrollment subsidies, namely, Female
Secondary School Assistance Program. Let’s note, Female Secondary School Assistance
Program makes previously absent educational opportunity available to all secondaryschool age girls in rural Bangladesh at the same time. Yet girls’ Female Secondary
School Assistance Program participation is voluntary, and therefore self-selective. So, the
question—whether female secondary educational attainment is possible with a targeted
enrollment subsidy must be fore-fronted by a more fundamental question—“Who among
those eligible actually participate into the Female Secondary School Assistance Program
stipend program?” And, I specify Female Secondary School Assistance Program stipend
program ( Stipend ) as a function of girls’ age ( Age ) and birth-order ( Birth ) along with
controls.
[1] Enroll i = α + β .Stipend i + β ′X i + ε i ,
[2] Stipend i = α + β 1 .Birthi + β 2 . Agei + β 3 . Agei + β ′X i + ν i
2

The vector X includes households’ demographic and socio-economic attributes—father’s
and mother’s education, household’s land ownership, religion, and a number of villagefixed attributes.
My identification strategy, therefore, is to use an instrumental variable approach
to predict girls’ Female Secondary School Assistance Program stipend program
participation, and use the predicted Female Secondary School Assistance Program

135

participation values to capture Female Secondary School Assistance Program
participation’s independent effect on female secondary school enrollment. This
identification strategy is valid and reliable only when the instrument is valid, and the
criterion for a valid instrument requires that the instrument should closely correlate with
the endogenous regressor (Female Secondary School Assistance Program participation)
but not (directly) with the outcome variable. The observed association between the
instrument and the outcome should be (fully) mediated by endogenous explanatory
variable (Angrist and Kreuger, 2001: p. 73).
Female Secondary School Assistance Program participation requires that girls
must stay unmarried until they graduate secondary school. This institutional arrangement
is particularly instructive for my choice of an instrumental variable considering the
following. In the context of rural Bangladesh, the norm of marriage dictates that parents
should arrange their daughter’s marriage (a) as soon as she reaches the age of menarche,
and (b) in the order she is born. This marriage norm should affect girls of different age
and birth-order differently to participate to Female Secondary School Assistance
Program. As such, parental decision to send their daughters to school and allow them to
participate to the stipend program should be the same. However, if we assume the
violation of Female Secondary School Assistance Program rules has consequences, we
should expect parents to consider daughter’s age and birth-order into serious
consideration as they decide whether or not to allow their daughters to participate in the
stipend program. A 15-year old girl who is first in parity faces more pressure to get
married than another 15 year-old girl who is not a first-born and/or in the order of
marriage, and is awaiting marriage of her earlier sister(s) instead. And, the latter will
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have a higher likelihood than the former to participate in the stipend program. So, after
controlling for the common education-correlates, girls’ birth order is an instrument of
stipend program participation.
I employ a 2-Step Least Squares and the Biprobit techniques to estimate the
parameters in Equations (1) and (2). The two-step Least Squares and Biprobit are the
standard econometric techniques when explanatory and outcome variables are binary
(Yes/No).41 But, first, a discussion about the structure of data is warranted. The data is
structured in the way that we observe enrollment outcomes of mostly those who are
receiving stipends.42 We therefore are dealing with Scenario A as opposed to Scenario B
in Table 1. Scenario A maintains some variation in the explanatory variable in that
enrollment is happening (mostly) with or (sometimes) without stipends as opposed to
Scenario B where enrollment occurs only with stipends.43 Secondly, the Yes-Yes cells in
the stipend-enrollment columns can differ fundamentally from the No-No cells in the
stipend-enrollment columns. And, an inter-group comparison between Yes-Yes and NoNo might produce biased estimate for stipend program participation since the estimated
effects would capture a combined individual- as well as stipend program participation
effects and would overestimate stipend program participation effects on enrollment.

41

Probit and Logit models, regardless of differences in respective logistic and normal distribution, produce
similar results for most part. However, researchers choose between them based on (a) mathematical
convenience, and (b) theoretical consideration in that when (a) the binary outcome is distributed as though
there are a very few “Yes” or “No” values, and because of that (a) a key explanatory variable has a widely
varied responses, models tend to offer inconsistent estimates of probabilities. However, differences seem
not to be sizeable (Greene, 2000: 815).
42
The survey asks: (a) “Are you currently going to school?”, and in the case of positive responses, (b) “Did
you get stipend/scholarship/tuition waiver from following sources?”
43
The survey does not ask if girls had had received stipend while in school yet decided to drop out
regardless.
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Table 5. 1: Actual and Hypothetical Data Scenarios
Set up A: current scenario
Stipend
Enrollment
Vs.
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No

Set up B: hypothetical scenario
Stipend
Enrollment
Yes
Yes
No
No

Second, the Two-Step Least Squares mimic the logic behind Two-Staged Least
Squares (2SLS), and is commonly employed in the following situations. First, researchers
have data on outcome variables from those who are participating in social programs, and
they have no data from those who are not participating in social programs. But,
researchers must somehow also consider those who are not participating in the social
programs so that they can estimate with validity social program participation effects on
outcomes of their interest (Heckman, 1979). Second, explanatory and outcomes variables
are neither continuous nor random.
Accordingly, I (a) estimate the probit of the binary stipend program participation,
and (b) use the predicted program participation estimates from (a) and sequentially
estimate another probit for the binary enrollment status. Alternatively, I compare
parameter estimates from 2-step sequential Least Squares modeling with those using the
Bivariate Probit modeling technique. I do so because the sequential estimation from 2step Least Squares is not as attentive as Bivariate Probit to simultaneous determination of
endogenous and outcome variables, and thereby risks faulty tests of significance.
Bivariate Probit is particularly applied when explanatory and outcome variables are (a)
binary and (b) jointly determined. Joint determination in this study suggests that
unobserved heterogeneity (disturbances) affecting parental decision to allow their
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daughter’s stipend program participation also affect their decision to allow daughter to
attend secondary school (i.e., error terms are correlated). And, when this exists, and I
ignore simultaneity in equations, I might report inconsistent variance estimates and faulty
significance tests of stipend program participation effects on female educational
attainment.
Variance-covariance matrix is corrected for (a) heteroskedastic and (b) clustered
(within 104 villages) residuals.44 Although households are units of analysis, the fact that
(sampled) households live in villages, and this hierarchical (multi-level) sampling design
plagues the analysis. Random sampling of clusters implies that clusters are
“independently” and identically distributed, iid, (inter-cluster correlations = 0), yet
random sampling of households does not eliminate the fact that households within
clusters somehow correlate (due to unobserved cluster effects). Jackknife variances are
clustered over villages and aim to overcome this possible violation of iid.45

Results
Descriptive Patterns
Secondary school enrollment among successive age cohorts is on the rise in Bangladesh,
and this increase among girls is particularly noticeable (Figure 1). While the gender
gap—at a decreasing rate— still persists across age-cohorts, a reversal in evident in that

44

Both are common in the survey data, and clustered residuals are more common in rural Bangladesh.
Heteroskedasticity occurs from deviation of each household from (aggregate/all) household mean due to
that particular household’s unique conditions, known to households, unknown to researchers. Clustered
residuals occur when households living in a same cluster behavior similarly among household living within
that cluster and differently from households living outside clusters due to cluster-specific attributes,
unknown to researchers through survey instruments.
45
Studies identify several routes to inter-household correlation within villages: (a) household exposure to
identical amenities in villages, (b) households’ selective migration to villages with certain amenities, and/or
(c) households seeking community approval adapt behavior and utilization of village amenities.
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in 1999 secondary school enrollment among girls was higher than that among boys aged
13—18.
Secondary School Attainment Rates
45
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Figure 5. 1: Gender-Specific Secondary School Attainment Rates in Bangladesh, 1998/99

I explore in detail this upward secondary school enrollment among girls. I want to
gather a rather crude understanding whether the period for pro-female gap in education
(Figure 1) corresponds to 1994—the year when secondary school stipend program for
girls started nationwide. I estimate a PROBIT for Equation 3 and compare the marginal
enrollment probabilities for girls aged 14—24 years with girls aged 25 years or older. I
repeat this for boys.
24

[3] S i = α + ∑ Pβ l + ε i , S=enrollment status (Yes/No); P=age
l =14

The cut-off of age at 25 is based on the following logic. I compare secondary
school enrollment between boys and girls aged 14—36 in 1999 (during the time of the
survey). Those who were completing or yet to complete secondary school and were aged
19 or less in 1994 have had some exposure to the secondary school subsidy program. To
capture this with the 1999 survey responses, I identify those 24 or less in 1999 are those

140

who have had some exposure to the stipend program and those who were 25 or older in
1999 had already past secondary school age when Female Secondary School Stipend
Program Assistance was introduced in 1994 and had not benefited from the program.
In addition, I estimate Equation 3 separately for boys and girls. Boys serve a
natural “reference” category in that boys’ enrollment is what we can expect to see over
time and without any interventions.
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Enrollment Probability: Male Respondents,
14--24 vs. 25/+
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Figure 5. 2: Gender-Specific Marginal Probability to Secondary School Enrollment in
Bangladesh, 1998/99

Overall, the marginal enrollment probabilities are systematically higher for girls
aged 14—24 with exposure to the stipend program than those aged 25 years or older with
no such exposure. As such, a 14-year-old girl in or after 1994 has nearly 40% higher
likelihood than a 14-year-old girl before 1994 to enroll in secondary school. A similar
trend is all-but-systematic for boys. Marginal probabilities for enrollment are higher
among male respondents aged between 14 and 24 years compared to 25 or older. This
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suggests the possibility of an upward trend in education without intervention in
Bangladesh in that younger cohorts are more likely to enroll in secondary education than
older cohorts. But (high) enrollment probabilities across ages for boys are not as
systematic as for girls, and such inconsistencies hint that education differences across
cohorts is not only due to age differences.
In sum, a side-by-side boy-girl comparison of their marginal enrollment
probabilities shows that enrollment among all is getting higher, yet these rates for girls
are increasing more systematically than those for boys. An upward trend in girls’
enrollment defies the “natural”, boys’ enrollment trend, and suggests that some external
effects are in action.
Summary Statistics
Table 2, and Figures 2 and 3 show that nearly half of secondary school age women
included in the analysis were born to parents/households with no or low education and
income. Only 25% (45%) of are born to mothers (fathers) with primary or secondary
educations, and 60% are born to households owning half an acre of land or less (Column
1). Among those who are currently enrolled, their parental education and landownership
are high. However, notably, enrollment is also high among those whose parents are not
educated. 57% (40%) of enrolled girls are born to mothers (fathers) with no formal
education; and 50% are attending schools despite households’ low or no landownership
(Column 2). Patterns in parental education and landownership are comparable between
girls enrolled and enrolled with stipend program participation. Mothers of more than half
(56%) of the girls attending the secondary school while participating in a stipend program
have never attended a secular (formal) school; 46% of girls participating in the stipend
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program and attending school are born to uneducated fathers; and nearly half of them are
born to and live in families with low or no agricultural land (Column 3). Most girls
belong to Islamic faith regardless of being enrolled with or without stipend program
participation.
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Table 5. 2: Summary statistics
(1)
All (n=904)

(2)
Enrolled
(n=418)

(3)
FSSAP Participants
(n= 292)

Age
12
21.10
11.48
7.88
13
17.68
20.10
20.89
14
20.33
23.21
20.55
15
13.70
17.94
20.21
16
11.71
15.79
19.18
17
4.53
5.02
5.82
18
6.74
4.55
3.77
19
1.99
0.72
1.03
20
2.21
1.20
0.68
Islam
89.94
89.00
88.36
Father: No Education
55.91
40.43
40.41
Father: Primary education
26.52
29.90
28.77
Father: Secondary education
17.57
29.67
30.82
Mother: No education
72.49
57.89
56.16
Mother: Primary education
20.77
27.75
28.77
Mother: Secondary education
6.74
14.35
15.07
Landless
16.24
9.09
7.88
Land ownership: 5 to 49 decimals
44.20
41.63
40.75
Land ownership: 50 to 149 decimals
22.32
26.32
26.71
Land ownership: 150 to 249 decimals
9.39
12.20
11.64
Land ownership: 250 decimals or more
7.85
10.77
13.01
Note: Columns 1, 2 and 3 include all girls, only enrolled, and only participants
respectively.
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Estimation Results
The Standard Model
Table 5. 3: PROBIT Estimates of Secondary School Enrollment
(1)
(2)
Age
1.756(0.166)*** 1.327 (0.219)***
Age-squared
-0.060(0.005)*** -0.045(0.007)***
Female
0.132(0.056)***
-Islam
-0.208(0.092)**
-0.338 (0.126)**
(Log) of household size
0.212(0.077)**
0.001(0.111)
Father’s education: primary
0.123(0.066)*** -0.015(0.093)
Father’s education:
0.640(0.087)*** 0.589(0.120)***
secondary
Mother’s education: primary 0.374(0.072)*** 0.362(0.101)***
Mother’s education:
1.032(0.144)*** 0.911(0.191)***
secondary
0< land ownership<0.50 acres
0.408(0.089)*** 0.460(0.129)***
0.50<= land ownership<1.50
0.741(0.098)*** 0.893(0.139)***
acres
1.50<= land
ownership<2.50acres
Land ownership=>2.50
Constant
Universe
Inflection point in years (AgeAge2)

N
Log likelihood ratio

(3)
2.347(.262)***
-0.081(0.009)***
--0.056(0.140)
0.430(0.113)***
0.277(0.098)**
0.723(0.131)***
0.393(0.106)***
1.276(0.234)***
0.312(0.127)***
0.522(0.141)***

0.771(0.121)***

0.949(.172)***

0.536(0.175)***

0.717(0.126)***
13.836(1.276)***
All
14.63

0.917(0.173)***
10.401(1.692)***
Male-only
14.74

0.491(0.189)***
18.331(2.007)***
Female-only
14.49

2742
-1326.496

1421
-697.094

1321
-610.118

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for village-level clusters. The
excluded categories for dummy variables are non-Muslim households, illiterate father,
illiterate mother, and landless households.
Table 3 shows parameter estimates of educational attainment among all (Column 1), boys
(Column 2), and girls (Column 3). Results are revealing especially concerning effects of
gender and culture. First, being a female increases the probability of enrollment in
secondary school. Considering that female enrollment is high despite low parental
education and income hints at the fact that some external intervention is active on the
female. Second, Islam constrains education, but does so significantly for boys but not for
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girls. This is counterintuitive in that existing scholarship reports a depressing effect of

Islam on secular education for all, and more so for girls than boys. This hints at recent
trends in Islamic schools in enrolling as many girls as boys in an effort to secularize
Islamic schools. Age maintains a nonlinear effect on educational attainment in that
education decreases with age after a threshold. The fact that girls drop out at around same
age as boys suggests that (a) parents keep their daughters in school as long as they keep
their sons—a key finding in a patriarchal society, and (b) their decision is influenced by
some other factor that is strong enough to offset preferential treatment of sons. Parental
education and income help educational attainment, as expected.

Results from First-Stage Estimation
Tables 4 and 5 present parents’ estimated direct and indirect economic, education, and
cultural effects on (unmarried, secondary-school age) daughters’ secondary school
enrollment in 1999. In particular, Table 4 presents parental effects on stipend program
participation, and Table 5 presents the stipend program participation effects on
enrollment. Estimation in two-steps serves a dual purpose: it allows estimation on female
education of (a) direct and mediated intergenerational effects and (b) independent effects
of otherwise endogenous stipend program participation, instrumented with specific
cultural attributes (discussed and justified on pages 12-13).
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Table 5. 4: First Stage Regression: Determinants of Stipend Program Participation
(1)
(2)
2-Part Method
Bi-variate probit
Gender-specific birth-order
0.432**(0.177)
0.367**(0.173)
Age
2.603***(0.454)
2.654***(0.462)
Age-squared
-0.085***(0.015)
-0.087***(0.015)
Islam
-0.087 (0.192)
-0.108 (0.188)
(Log) of household size
0.317* (0.179)
0.302* (0.179)
Father’s education: primary
0.244* (0.133)
0.231* (0.130)
Father’s education: secondary
0.530** (0.198)
0.510** (0.219)
Mother’s education: primary
0.361** (0.149)
0.371** (0.146)
Mother’s education: secondary
0.663*** (0.267)
0.683** (0.258)
0< land ownership<0.50 acres
0.467*** (0.157)
0.457*** (0.160)
0.50<= land ownership<1.50 acres
0.591*** (0.187)
0.579*** (0.188)
1.50<= land ownership<2.50acres
0.605** (0.263)
0.595** (0.262)
Land ownership=>2.50
0.838*** (0.233)
0.837*** (0.277)
Constant
-21.559*** (3.410) -21.337*** (3.833)
N
904
904
Log likelihood ratio
-467.480
-736.864
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for village-level clusters. The
excluded categories for dummy variables are non-Muslim households, illiterate father,
illiterate mother, and landless households.

Culture expands as well as constrains stipend program participation, and
maintains its constraining effect on stipend program participation in situations where
economic status is not as constraining (detail below). Age is significant at its nominal and
polynomial order and birth-order significantly affect participation (Columns 1 and 2).
Demographic characteristics are therefore no less important than parental education and
income. Despite differences in socioeconomic status, parents conform to (externally
defined) cultural norms that prescribe a unique set of parental roles and rules based on a
daughter’s age and birth-order. As such, culture encourages parents to marry off the firstborn daughter as soon as she reaches puberty—contracting opportunities for the first-born
for stipend program participation and education, and discouraging breaking birth-order in
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the order they are married off—expanding opportunities for the later-born despite
pubescent years as she awaits the marriage of her older sisters. These results suggest that
parents seem to have considered that in deciding who participates in the stipend program.
Firstly, gender-specific birth-order maintains a positive and significant effect on stipend
program participation, ceteris paribus. In other words, the (relatively) later-born between
two girls of comparable age and socio-economic backgrounds has a 5% greater chance of
stipend program participation. Age-effect on participation is significant (at α=0.01), as
we expect it to be for girls in a traditional society, yet the fact that the likelihood of
participation is not high (low) for younger (older) girls in the sample suggests that (a) the
age-effect is neither linear nor monotonic, and (b) the youngest cohort and the cohort
older than fifteen years—the average age of marriage—are less likely to participate in the
program.
Parental education and income matter for stipend program participation.
However, the fact that some paternal and maternal education (primary: 1-5 years of
education) helps daughters’ participation in the secondary school stipend program is
revealing. Similarly, the finding that even nearly landless households encourage
daughters’ stipend program participation suggests education intervention’s penetration
into the lower, if not the lowest, economic classes. Yet, the fact that parental education
and income are significant where Islam is not is no less intriguing, and suggests that
stipend program participation has yet to be entirely status-blind so much that
interventions have not reached the lowest income and education households. Even when
stipend relieves educational expenses, indirect costs of stipend program participation—
uniforms, being away from her usual chores at home, etc.—are still in place, and parents
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must attain a threshold income or education that makes that level of education possible in
order for girls to be able to complete primary education and participate in the secondary
school stipend program. As such, a little education among parents is not dangerous in that
some education and land among parents expands the likelihood of daughters’ secondary
school stipend program participation. A father with primary (secondary) school education
is 3% (5%) more likely than a father with no (formal) education to allow daughter’s
stipend program participation. And, an educated mother favors stipend program
participation more than an uneducated mother in that a mother is 6% and 11% more
likely to allow participation when she has primary and at least secondary school,
respectively. Girls from landless households participate less frequently than those with at
least some land: the likelihood increases by 7%, 8%, 10% and 11% when girls live in
household that is not landless but owns no more than half an acre, 1.5 acre, 2.5 acre and
more than 2.5 acre of land.
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Table 5. 5: Stipend Program Effects on Schooling
2-Part Method
Stipend program participation
3.111*** (0.391)
Islam
0.043 (0.181)
(Log) of household size
0.056 (0.174)
Father’s education: primary
0.072 (0.121)
Father’s education: secondary
0.238 (0.164)
Mother’s education: primary
0.026 (0.140)
Mother’s education: secondary
1.059*** (0.331)
0< land ownership<0.50 acres
0.027 (0.142)
0.50<= land ownership<1.50 acres
0.144 (0.177)
1.50<= land ownership<2.50acres
0.198 (0.223)
Land ownership=>2.50
-0.208 (0.258)
Constant
-1.399*** (0.375)
N
904
Log likelihood ratio
-494.194
ρ

χ 2 ( ρ =0)

Bi-variate probit
4.245*** (0.333)
-0.005 (0.221)
0.202 (0.192)
0.159 (0.117)
0.412* (0.243)
0.120 (0.159)
1.344*** (0.469)
0.005 (0.151)
0.240 (0.174)
0.283 (0.225)
-0.166 (0.324)
-1.724*** (0.405)
904
-736.864
-0.753
4.397**

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for village-level clusters. The
excluded categories for dummy variables are non-Muslim households, illiterate father,
illiterate mother, and landless households.

Results from Second-Stage Estimation
Table 5 presents stipend program participation’s direct and parent’s mediated
socioeconomic effects on enrollment. Stipend program participation is significant and
positive across estimation techniques and when the key predictors of education are
controlled in model specifications. Stipend effect on enrollment among the secondary
school-age girls is sizeable. All else equal, when a girl receives a stipend, she is a
staggering 200% more likely than a girl with no stipend to continue on to and get enrolled
in school. Except for maternal education, education and income endowments in the
family a girl is born into are no longer a significant route to intergenerational social
mobility. This suggests that in the rural Bangladesh context maintaining a general
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antipathy to female educational attainment, the state can evolve as an alternative
institution and do the job for parents as long as the state manages to successfully bribe
parents into letting daughters complete primary education and utilize secondary schooling
opportunities.
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Interaction Analysis
Table 5. 6: Complementarity Analysis
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Enrollment Enrollment Enrollment Attendance Performance
(Predicted) stipend 7.534***
7.167***
6.713***
0.829
5.411
program
(1.006)
(0.945)
(1.620)
(1.064)
(22.038)
participation
Mother: education
0.091***
0.102***
0.089
0.004
-0.841
(0.032)
(0.051)
(0.065)
(0.025)
(0.769)
Mother: Family
0.457***
0.294
0.184
-0.034
Planning utilization (0.155)
(0.267)
(0.230)
(4.158)
-0.127
0.007
-0.061
2.761
Stipend×Education
(0.201)
(0.327)
(0.107)
(2.861)
1.121
-0.631
5.974
Stipend×Family
(1.839)
(0.981)
(22.744)
Planning
Constant
-1.525*** -1.167*** -1.397*** 5.522***
22.862***
(0.184)
(0.116)
(.219)
(0.231)
(3.832)
Universe
Eligible
Eligible
Eligible
Participants Participants
N
636
864
636
456
426
Log Likelihood
-345.997
-483.244
-345.793
0.75
0.75
Ratio/F-value
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10
Note: Jackknife standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for village-level clusters in
(1), (2), and (3). Robust standard errors are reported in (3) and (4).
I further seek a rather crude understanding of whether maternal education, exposure to
modern health practices, and state interventions complement or substitute (that we need
one instead of all). Educating girls is easier with maternal education and, despite
education, exposure to modernity (perhaps though health practices—family planning).
And this poses a concern among policy makers about prioritizing programs and timing of
interventions. While maternal education and exposure to modernity (family planning) are
significant predictors of stipend program participation for secondary school enrollment
(Column 1), the fact that interactions are not significant suggests that stipend programs
can be successful even at low level of maternal education and exposure to modernity
(Columns 2 and 3). However, stipend program participation does not ensure quality of
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learning among girls (Column 4 and 5). Using two indicators of performance, namely,
weekly attendance in school and performance in the last annual exam, I show that that
stipend program does not ensure better attendance or performance.
In sum, the feminization of education opens up as previously unavailable route to
female educational attainment. Does the feminization of education augment female
educational attainment and dissociate parental positions, statuses, and resources from the
process as it aims to do? Are educational opportunities and parental attributes substitutes
or complements for female educational attainment during the period of mass expansion of
female educational opportunities?
I answer these questions of grave structural and policy importance, and offer a
systematic investigation within the limits of survey data by embarking on neither of the
following approaches: first, I do not evaluate the feminization of education policy, and
second, I do not include economic and demographic determinants as the alternative
determinants of female educational attainment as most prior studies do (Mare and
Maralani, 2006; Filmer and Schady, 2008; Berhman et al., 2005; Duflo, 2001).46 Instead,
I invoke a new analytical framework as I (a) unify rather disjoint efforts in demographic
and development literatures and (b) include largely omitted cultural parameters of policy
adoption.
Two empirical realities in Bangladesh are particularly instructive. First, female
education has risen fairly sharply in a relatively short period of time in Bangladesh,
which suggests the efficiency of intervention. Second, parents overwhelmingly concur
that their otherwise-would-be-married daughter(s) should participate in Female
Secondary School Assistance Program, and this suggests a fundamental change in norms
46

Exceptions include Beutel and Axinn (2002) among others.
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and values about ascribed and achieved female roles and statuses. If so, the questions is
whether Female Secondary School Assistance Program catalyzes as opposed to causes
educational attainments.
Results are revealing, and suggest that while culture indeed mediates gendersensitive education policy’s effects on female educational attainment, it is more
permeable than the existing literature often suggests. In particular, I find that education
subsidies increase female enrollment in the secondary school in a traditional society and
thereby eliminate reproduction of intergenerational social immobility for large part as
long as schooling delays but does not deny the cultural importance of girls’ marriage and
reproduction in rural Bangladesh where pro-natalist and pro-familial values prevail.
Female Secondary School Assistance Program-induced female educational attainment is
possible only after some level of parental economic and cultural constraints are relaxed.
Culture still constrains female education, but appears to be less constraining in the
presence of pro-female education policy than it could have been in its absence. As such,
while subsidies appear to have little effect upon first-born girls, who face overwhelming
pressure to marry and reproduce at a young age, they seem to have profound effect on
offspring of later parities, who tend to stay at school while their older female sibling(s)
await marriage—and thereby raise the prospects for human development down the road.
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CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION
My dissertation addresses this “Bangladeshi paradox” of rapid gains in human
development against the backdrop of a social scientific literature that portrays two
endemic features of Bangladeshi society—Islam and illiberal politics—as inveterate
obstacles to its achievement. Over the course of the past three decades, Bangladesh has
been transformed from an international “basket case” into one of the fastest reducers of
infant and child mortality in the world. The country has reduced mortality despite (a)
economic stagnation of 1980s, (b) high level of absolute poverty, (c) relatively low public
investment in health, (d) low female literacy rates, (e) a history of authoritarian and
fragile democratic regimes, and (f) unaccountable bureaucracy. Moreover, Bangladesh’s
success seems to follow, in its purest form, the “wealthier is healthier,” the “health with
public universal-provisioning of health and education services,” or the “social
determinants” explanation of human development.
The market-based, the “wealthier is healthier” account maintains that rising
national income increases private spending on goods and services that directly or
indirectly improve health (McKeown and Record, 1962; McKeown 1983; Pritchett and
Summers, 1996; Easterly, 1999; Filmer and Pritchett 1999; Filmer, Hammer and
Pritchett, 2000, 2002; Dollar and Kraay, 2004). Scholars who defend this account note
the empirical regularity that children die in higher rates in low-income countries and
lower rates in high-income countries and make the causal claim that economic growth
reduces childhood mortality by increasing individual purchases of health inputs, broadly
defined to include food, health care, medical services, and basic education. The marketbased approach faces myriad critiques, and among them, the social determinant scholars
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question their core assumptions as they differentiate between purchasing ability and
accessibility of health goods and services and argue that the former encourages but not
necessarily ensures the latter.
While proponents of the market-based thesis are concerned only with absolute
poverty reduction with economic growth, some scholars who study Social Determinants
of Health would argue that child health deteriorates from relative poverty as much as it

does from absolute poverty (Marmot 2004, 2005; Marmot et al., 2006; Wilkinson, 1996;
Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009; WHO, 2006). These scholars believe access to health goods
and services, such as adequate nutrition, clean water, quality medical care, etc. is socially
determined. As such, conditions at home, work, and leisure, education, life in
communities, towns, and cities socially constitute both the onset and response to
treatment of life-threatening diseases. In particular, the social determinant scholars look
at (a) individuals’ social hierarchical position—how an individual’s social position
deviates from the positions most members of his/her reference group maintain and (b)
individuals’ psychosocial stress from their absolute as well as relative social positions to
predict individuals’ susceptibility to life-threatening diseases and response to their
treatment.
Finally, others argue that the public provision of health inputs – primary health
care, sanitation, clean drinking water, and especially female education—helps reduce
childhood deaths regardless of macroeconomic trends (Anand and Ravallion, 1993;
Anand and Barnighausen, 2004; Caldwell, 1986, 1993; Dreze and Sen, 1991; Hill and
Pebley, 1989; Preston, 1980; Bohkhari et al., 2006; Gupta et al., 2002; McGuire, 2001;
Wagstaff, 2003; Jalan and Ravallion, 2003; Soares, 2007; Schultz, 2002; Frost et al.,
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2005; Ravallion, 2006). The growing dissociation between economic growth and
childhood mortality, and the striking human development gains of countries and states
like Sri Lanka, Costa Rica, and Kerala (India), pose a threat to the market-based,
economic explanation of childhood death, and thereby suggest that child health can be
achieved at relatively low cost. In fact, scholars in this camp maintain that economic
growth becomes instrumental in reducing childhood deaths only when growth translates
into (a) high public expenditures on health and education (Ranis, Stewart, and Ramirez,
2000), and (b) reduction of income poverty (Anand and Ravallion, 1993).
Why do cultural, structural, or institutional disadvantages seem not to be as
binding in Bangladeshi child mortality decline as pertinent literature so vividly suggests?
How has the country managed to reduce mortality despite its inhospitable political
culture? To reiterate, Bangladesh has not unequivocally followed any of the above three
explanations of human development. By saving substantially more lives than expected at
country’s levels of economic development and income-redistribution, Bangladesh’s such
success seems to follow unequivocally with neither the “wealthier is healthier” nor the
“health with public universal-provisioning of health and education services” explanation
of human development. Also, Bangladesh’s succeeded in saving lives among children
despite the fact that its socio-economic inequality, and the level of social capital and
cohesion have remained unchanged—if not more (Sen et al., 2006). I attempt to answer
in this dissertation the micro-implications of these macro questions.
I use panel data from household surveys, conducted by the Bangladesh Institute of
Development Studies in collaboration with the World Bank in 1991-2 and 1998-9 to
identify the distal causes of Bangladeshi mortality decline in Chapter 3. The Weibull
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model estimates the probability of mortality among children born during the ten years
preceding the surveys conditional on their parent’s economic and social status, and
household’s demographic characteristics. For all children, the surveys include the age at
death or age at the survey date if the child is still alive. The Weibull functional form
makes sense theoretically as well as empirically since the likelihood of death is a
decreasing function of age among children, and the model estimates independent
variables using a proportional hazard specification. The standard errors are robust, and
the significance tests are therefore based on heteroskedasticity-consistent estimates of the
variance-covariance matrix. To present robust parameter estimates, I (a) run crosssectional and panels models using data from each survey year and over time; and (b)
correct for the possibility of heteroskedasticity in standard errors and therefore conduct
meaningful significance tests.
I find that female education has a linear effect and household income has a
curvilinear effect on infant and child mortality. This merely pushes the Bangladeshi
paradox back a step, however, and the subsequent analyses therefore address the new
puzzles I have identified: Why is the relationship between income and child mortality
curvilinear (quadratic)? And why is female education improving in an allegedly hostile
Muslim environment?
I address the first question in Chapter 4. I consider whether Bangladesh’s targeted
antipoverty/social safety net programs are behind the counterintuitive curvilinear
association between household income and child morality. Soon after Bangladesh’s
independence from Pakistan in 1971, the government had initiated a number of social
safety net programs as relief efforts in a war-wrenched country. And, in later years, the
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Bangladeshi government utilized these social safety net programs to address seasonal
calamities, unemployment, loss of primary income earners among other such “ad-hoc”
needs (Deolalikar, 2005). In recent years, the Bangladeshi government have incorporated
these social programs into its poverty reduction strategy, and thereby aim to enhance (a)
capital accumulation, (b) nutrition/food security, and (c) human development (education,
in particular) among the targeted economic and demographic groups (Sen et al., 2004).
Examples of these social programs include Vulnerable Group Development, Vulnerable
Group Feeding, Food-for-Work, Food-for-Education, Female Secondary School
Assistance Program, etc.
Based on the analysis in Chapter 4, I suggest Bangladesh’s targeted
antipoverty/social safety net programs are behind the counterintuitive curvilinear
association between household income and child morality. By deploying an overly
conservative targeting criteria, the Bangladeshi government is excluding many poor
families, and is thereby raising the likelihood that the very poor—who benefit from the
programs—experience lower levels of infant and child mortality than the everyday poor,
who do not qualify for the subsidies. Results suggest that state redistributive programs
might have offset poverty-induced threats to human development among beneficiary
families but left the non-beneficiaries—many of whom are still poor—to fend (or in
many cases not fend) for themselves. Although the welfare gains among the targeted poor
are encouraging, as targeted redistribution appears effective and beneficial, the fact that
the non-targeted poor are less successful in suppressing premature death, perhaps because
they are cut off from redistribution, is troubling, and calls for a reevaluation of targeting
criteria or perhaps the very practice of targeting.
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I address why female education is improving in an allegedly hostile Muslim
environment in Chapter 5. In particular, I examine if secondary-education subsidies from
gender-targeted, Female Secondary School Assistance Program alleviate cultural
discouragement for female educational attainment in rural Bangladesh. I employ,
alternatively, 2-Step Least Squares, and Biprobit techniques to estimate the effects of
education subsidies on female secondary-educational attainment. 2-Step Least Squares
and Biprobit are the standard econometric estimation techniques when both explanatory
and outcome variables are measured at the bi-nominal level of measurements (Yes/No). I
find that female secondary-education attainment is possible by subsidizing the secondary
education as long as education delays but does not deny the cultural importance of
marriage and reproduction. And, the impact of female education subsidy is mediated by
birth order. While subsidies appear to have little effect upon first-born girls, who face
overwhelming pressure to marry and reproduce at a young age, they seem to have a
profound effect on offspring of later parities, who tend to stay in school while their older
female sibling(s) await marriage—and thereby raise the prospects for human
development down the road.
Results are revealing, and have significant implications for Bangladeshi human
development policy. Table 6.1 summarizes the key findings of my dissertation.
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Table 6. 1: Key Findings At A Glance
Income
Empirical HD Puzzles

I. Child deaths (decline in a
poor country with low level
of universal redistribution)
II. Female educational
attainment (in a patriarchal,
predominantly-Muslim
country)
Note: HD=Human Development

Determinants
Redistribution
Universal
Targeted redistribution
redistribution
FemalePoortargeted
targeted
education
food
services
transfers

↑

?

↓

↓ then ↑

↑

?

↑

NA

Results from the inferential analyses in Chapters 3—5 suggest: (a) gender- and
land-targeted redistributive development policies are overall human developmental since
they can augment even poor household’s access to food and education, and (b) gendertargeted redistributive education policy can increase female secondary-education
attainment and child bearing age by delaying marriage; however, (c) land-targeted
redistributive policy seem to maintain a ceiling effect in that land-targeted redistributive
policies are human developmental for targeted very-poor among all poverty groups.
Land-targeted redistributive policy appears human under-developmental based on the fact
that the non-beneficiaries—many of whom are still poor— are cut off from redistribution
and are left to fend (or in many cases not fend) targeting.
My dissertation findings will better reflect empirical reality as well as quantitative
analysis allows when I will tackle in future the following methodological and substantive
limits:
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(a) Variation is low in data on mortality among children aged 5 or less at times of
surveys. I have dealt with lack of variation by including data on mortality among
children born during the ten years preceding the surveys. By doing so, I have
stretched the concept of mortality among infants (1-11 months) and children (1259 months).
(b) Household-income measures are available from the survey years of 1991/92 and
1998/99, and mortality incidences are from pre-surveys years. With this, I assume
household-income to have stayed statistically unchanged between child deathand survey-years. I am making an assumption may or may hold intact in empirical
reality.
(c) The fact that data on targeted transfer programs is available by village whereas
that on potentially targeted households’ actual program participation is not
prevents optimal assessment of the mechanisms explaining non-linearity between
income and child mortality.
(d) Hierarchical structure in data, and, that, for some households, data is available
from two survey-years may violate the assumption that observations are
independently and identically distributed (iid). In other words, let’s consider the
scenarios that a few children can belong to the same household, or a number of
households can belong to the same village. If so, these can make childobservations within a household- and household-observations with a villagecluster to maintain a contemporaneous correlation. And, that, for some
households, data is available from two survey-years can refer to the fact that these
households maintain a temporal correlation. I have tackled the issues of iid
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violation with appropriate statistical fixes. Yet, I plea caution in interpreting
results since statistical fixes to reduce might not necessarily eliminate the effects
from violating iid.
(e) The BIDS-WB surveys do not contain data in detail on health infrastructures or
services. And, by using the BIDS-WB survey data, I limit my analysis from
controlling for health infrastructures or services the way I should to capture their
greater availability in rural Bangladesh in the 1990s. Possibly, my analysis suffers
from omitted variable bias.
In future, I will attempt to rectify the limitations I have listed in (a) – (e), and
carry out the following: I will (a) unravel the casual mechanisms mediating the incomemortality curvilinear association with the primary or secondary qualitative evidence, (b)
compare Bangladesh and Pakistan in efforts to track down the historical origins and
structural requisites of onset, sustenance, and success of targeted social transfer
programs, and (c) conduct a quantitative comparative analysis to assess the macrorelationship between country’s gender-sensitive development policy and human
development outcomes. When carried out, (b) and (c) should explain why the
Bangladeshi government should be willing to adopt a gender- and pro-targeted
development policy, and whether Bangladeshi lessons are transferable to elsewhere.
Ultimately, my dissertation reveals that Muslim societies and cultures are more
permeable than the standard portrait allows, even by ineffective governments, albeit not
in precisely the manner expected. It therefore casts doubt upon an existing literature that
portrays Islam as inimical to human development and Muslim societies as deeply
resistant to change. But Muslim societies are neither monolithic nor homogenous, and

164

Pakistan’s experience suggests that structural and policy changes that promote gender
equity and human development are not equally available to all Muslim societies. My
research demonstrates which interventions are likely to yield human development payoffs
even in a Muslim society. In particular, Bangladesh’s gender-targeted redistributive
development policies have contributed to the country’s success in reducing infant and
child mortality. Moreover, gender-targeted redistributive developmental policies can take
off in presumably an inhospitable culture of Islamic culture and patriarchy. While state’s
policy adoption occurs due to (a) internal-local structural condition, (b) isomorphic
external-global forces, or (c) a combination of both, some exogenous shocks (for
example, man-made or natural disasters) play a role to alter the relative importance of (a),
(b) or (c). I suspect that (a) massive female casualties in the country’s 1971 war against
Pakistan and (b) donor support in the aftermath of the war have weakened structural or
cultural constraints and conspired to push Bangladeshi authorities in a more equitable and
gender-sensitive direction. And, in the absence of exogenous shocks, Pakistan has
maintained the human under-developmental course.

165

REFERENCES
Ahmad, Omar, Alan Lopez, and Mie Inoue. 2000. “The Decline in Child Mortality: A
Reappraisal.” Bulletin of the World Health Organization 78(10): 1175—1191.
Ahmed, Akhter and Carlo Del Ninno. 2002. The Food For Education Programme in
Bangladesh: An Evaluation Of Its Impact On Educational Attainment And Food Security.

FCND DP No. 138. International Food Policy Research Institute.
Ahmed, Akhter and Mary Arends-Kuenning. 2006.“Do crowded classrooms crowd out
learning? Evidence from the food for education program in Bangladesh.” World
Development 34(4): 664—684.

Ali, Mohmmad, Michael Emch, Fahmida Tofail, and Abdullah Baqui. 2001.
“Implications of Health Care Provision on Acute Lower Respiratory Infection Mortality
In Bangladeshi Children.” Social Science and Medicine 52: 267—277.
Amin, Ruhul and Yiping Li. 1997. NGO-promoted women's credit program,
immunization coverage, and child mortality in rural Bangladesh. Women & health 25(1):
71—87.
Amin, Ruhul. 1988. Infant and child mortality in Bangladesh. Journal of Biosocial
Science. 20(1):59—65.

Ammar, Hamed. 1954. Growing up in an Egyptian Village: Silwa, Province of Aswan.
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Anand, Sudhir and Martin Ravallion. 1993. “Human Development in Poor Countries: On
the Role of Private Incomes and Public Services.” Journal of Economic Perspectives
7(1): 133 – 150.

166

Anand, Sudhir and Till Barnighausen. 2004. “Human Resources and Human Outcomes:
Cross Country Econometric Study.” The Lancet 364: 1603 –1609.
Arends-Kuenning, M. and Amin. S. 2004. “School Incentive Programs and Children’s
Activities: The Case of Bangladesh.” Comparative Education Review 483: 295-317.
Arthur, Brian and Geoffery McNicoll. 1978. “An Analytical Survey of Population and
Development in Bangladesh.” Population and Development Review 4(1): 23 –80.
Banerjee, Abhijit and Esther Duflo. 2006. “Addressing Absence.” Journal of Economic
Perspectives 20(1): 117—132.

Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics. 1998. Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh, 19th Edition.
Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics.
Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics. 2000. 2000 Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh, 24th
Edition. Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics.

Baqui, A.H., A.A. Sabir, N. Begum, S. E. Arifeen, S. N. Mitra, and R. E. Black. 2001.
“Cause of Childhood Deaths in Bangladesh: Un Update.” Acta Paediatrica 90: 682 –
690.
Baqui, Abdullah H., R.E. Black, S. E. Arifeen, K. Hill, S.N. Mitra, A. Al Sabir. 1998.
“Causes of Childhood Deaths in Bangladesh: Results of a Nationwide Verbal Autopsy
Study.” Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 76(2): 161 – 171.
Baqui, Abdullah, Shams El Arifeen, Gary L. Darmstadt, Saifuddin Ahmed, Emma K.
Williams, Habibur R Seraji, Ishtiaq Mannan, Syed M. Rahman, Rasheuzzaman Shah,
Samir K. Saha, Uzma Syed, Peter J. Winch, Amnesty Lefevre, Mathuram Santosham,
Robert E. Black, for the Projahnmo Study Group. 2008. “Effects of Community-Based
Newborn-Care Intervention Package Implemented Through Two Service-Delivery

167

Strategies in Sylhet District, Bangladesh: A Cluster-Randomized Controlled Trial.” The
Lancet 371: 1936—1944.

Barrera, Albino. 1990. “The Role of Maternal Schooling and its Interaction with Public
Health Programs in Child Health Production,” Journal of Development Economics 32(1):
69 – 91.
Basu, Kaushik, Sanghamitra Das, and Bhaskar Dutta. 2010. “Child labor and household
wealth: Theory and empirical evidence of an inverted-U.” Journal of Development
Economics 9(1): 8 – 14.

Becker, Gary and Nigel Tomes, 1976. “Child Endowments and the Quantity and Quality
of Children.” Journal of Political Economy 842: 143 – 162.
Becker, Gary and Nigel Tomes. 1979. “An Equilibrium Theory of the Distribution of
Income and Intergenerational Mobility.” Journal of Political Economy 876: 1153 – 89.
Becker, Gary and Nigel Tomes. 1984. “Human Capital and the Rise and Fall of
Families.” Journal of Labor Economics 43: 1 – 39.
Becker, Gary. 1981. A Treatise on the Family. Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press.
Bellew, R. and King, E. 1993. Educating Women: Lessons from Experience. In E. King
and M.A. Hill Eds., Women’s Education in Developing Countries: Barriers, Benefits, and
Policies. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

Berhman, Jere, Pilai Sengupta, and Petra E. Todd. 2005. “Progress through PROGRESA:
An Impact Assessment of a School Subsidy Experiment in Mexico.” Economic
Development and Cultural Change 541: 237 – 75.

168

Besley, Timothy and Maitreesh Ghatak, 2007. “Retailing Public Goods: The Economics
of Corporate Social Responsibility.” Journal of Public Economics 91(9): 1645—1663.
Besley, Timothy and Maitreesh Ghatak. 2001. “Government vs. Private Ownership of
Public Goods.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 116(4): 1343—1372.
Besley, Timothy and Ravi Kanbur. 1993. “Principles of Targeting.” In Including the
Poor, Edited by Michael Lipton and Jacques van der Gaag. Washington DC: World

Bank.
Beutel, Ann, and William Axinn. 2002. "Gender, Social Change, and Educational
Attainment." Economic Development and Cultural Change, 511: 109-134.
Bhaduri, Amit. 1973. A Study in Agricultural Backwardness under Semi-Feudalism.
Economic Journal 83: 120-37.

Bhatnagar, Y. 1971. “Bangladesh: Birth of a Nation.” Delhi: Indian School Supply Depot
Publication Division.
Bhuiya, Abbas and Mushtaque Chowdhury. 2002. “Beneficial Effects of a WomanFocused Development Programme on Child Survival: Evidence from Rural Bangladesh.”
Social Science & Medicine 55(9): 1553-1560

Birdsall, Nancy and Juan Luis Londono. 1997. “Asset Inequality Matters: An Assessment
of the World Bank's Approach to Poverty Reduction” American Economic Review 87(2):
32 – 37.
Black, Robert, Saul S. Morris, and Jennifer Boyce. 2003. “Where and Why are 10
Million Children Dying Every Year?” The Lancet 361: 2226—2234.
Blair, Harry. 2005. “Civil Society and Propoor Initiatives in Rural Bangladesh: Finding a
Workable Strategy” World Development 33(6): 921 – 936.

169

Blum, Lauren, Rasheda Khan, Adnan A. Hyder, Sabina Shahan, Shams El Arifeen, and
Abdullah Baqui. 2009. “Children Drowning in Matlab, Bangladesh: An In-Depth
Exploration of Community Perceptions and Practices.” Social Science & Medicine 68:
1720 – 1727.
Bokhari, Farasat S., Yunwei Gai, and Pablo Gottret. 2007. “Government Health
Expenditures and Health Outcomes.” Health Economics 16: 257—273.
Brownmiller, S. 1975. Against Our Will: Men Women and Rape. New York: Simon and
Schuster.
Cain, Mead, Syeda Rokeya Khanam and Shamsun Nahar. 1979. “Class, Patriarchy, and
Women's Work in Bangladesh.” Population and Development Review 5(3): 405-438.
Cain, Mead. 1977. “The Economic Activities of Children in a Village in Bangladesh.”
Population and Development Review 3(3): 201-227

Caldwell, John. 1979. “Education as a Factor in Mortality Decline An Examination of
Nigerian Data.” Population Sutides 33(3): 395-413
Caldwell, John. 1986. “Routes to Low Mortality in Poor Countries.” Population and
Development Review 12(2): 171 – 220.

Caldwell, John. 1993. “Health Transition: The Cultural, Social, and Behavioral
Determinants of Health in the Third World.” Social Science and Medicine 36(2): 125 –
135.
Case, Anne. 2006. The Primacy of Education. In Abhijit Banerjee, Roland Benabou, and
Dilip Mookherjee Eds Understanding Poverty. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Castles, Francis and Deborah Mitchell. 1992. “Identifying Welfare State Regimes: The
Links between Politics, Instruments, and Outcomes.” Governance 5: 1 – 26.

170

Cebu Study Team. 1992. “A child health production function estimated from longitudinal
data.” Journal of Development Economics 38(2):323-51.
Chaudhury, K. 1972. Genocide in Bangladesh. New Delhi: Orient Longman.
Chaudhury, Nazmul, Jeffrey Hammer , Michael Kremer, Karthik Muralidharan, F.
Halsey Rogers. 2006. “Missing in Action: Teacher and Health Worker Absence in
Developing Countries.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 20(1): 91-116.
Chowdhury, Nazmul and Shantayanan Devrajan. 2006. “Human Development and
Service Delivery in Asia.” Development Policy Review 211: 81 0 97.
Clemens, John, Bonita F. Stanton, J. Chakraborty, Shahriar Chowdhury, Malla R. Rao,
Ali Mohammed, Susan Zimicki And Bogdan Wojtyniak. 1988. “Measles Vaccination and
Childhood Mortality in Rural Bangladesh” American Journal of Epidemiology 128(6):
1330-1339
Coady, David, Margaret Grosh, and John Hoddinott. 2004. “Targeting Outcomes Redux.”
The World Bank Research Observer 19(1): 61—85.

Davidson R. Gwatkin, Shea Rutstein, Kiersten Johnson, Eldaw Suliman, Adam Wagstaff,
and Agbessi Amouzou. 2007. Socio-Economic Differences in Health, Nutrition, and
Population in Bangladesh. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

Deaton, Angus. 2002. “Health, Inequality, and Economic Development.” Journal of
Economic Literature 41: 113—158.

Deolalikar, Anil. 1995. “Government Spending in Indonesia: impacts on children in
Different Economic Groups”” in D Van de Walle, K Nead (Eds) Public spending and the
poor: Theory and evidence. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press

171

Deolalikar, Anil. 1998. Primary and Secondary Education in Kenya: Sector Review.
Washington DC: The World Bank.
Deolalikar, Anil. 2005. “Poverty and Child Malnutrition in Bangladesh.” Journal of
Developing Societies 21: 55 – 90.

Desai, Sonalde and Soumia Alva. 1998. “Maternal Education and Child Health: Is There
a Strong Casual. Relationship?” Demography 35: 71-81.
Dollar, David and Aart Kraay. 2002. “Growth is Good for the Poor.” Journal of
Economic Growth 7: 195 – 225.

Dreze, Jean P. 2004. “Bangladesh Shows the Way.” The Hindu.
Dreze, Jean P. and Amartya Sen. 1991. Hunger and Public Action. London: Oxford
University Press.
Duflo, Ester. (2003) Grandmothers and Granddaughters: Old Age Pension and
Intrahousehold Allocation in South Africa. World Bank Economic Review, 17(1), p. 125.
Duflo, Esther. 2001. "Schooling and Labor Market Consequences of School Construction
in Indonesia: Evidence from an Unusual Policy Experiment," American Economic
Review 914: 795-813.

Easterlin, Richard A. 1999. “How Beneficent is the Market? A Look at the Modern
History of Mortality.” European Review of Economic History 3(3): 257 – 294.
Easterlin, Richard A. 2000. “The Worldwide Standard of Living since 1800.” Journal of
Economic Perspectives 14(1): 7 – 26.

Easterly, William. 1999. "Life During Growth." Journal of Economic Growth 4(3): 239275

172

Edmonds, Eric. 2004. "Household composition and the response of child labor supply to
product market integration: evidence from Vietnam," Policy Research Working Paper
Series 3235, The World Bank.

Edmonston, Barry. 1983. Demographic and maternal correlates of infant and child
mortality in Bangladesh. Journal of Biosocial Science 15(2):183-92.
Ensor, Tim, Priti Dave-Sen, Liaquat Ali, Atia Hossain, Shamim Ara Begum, and Hamid
Moral. 2002. “Do Essential Service Packages Benefit the Poor? Preliminary Evidence
from Bangladesh.” Health Policy and Planning 17(3): 247 – 256.
Faaland, J. and R. Parkinson, 1975. Bangladesh: The Test Case of Development.
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
Fedorov, Leonid and David Sahn. 2005. “Socioeconomic Determinants of Children’s
Health in Russia: A Longitudinal Study.” Economic Development and Cultural Change
53:479–500.
Filmer, Deon and Lant Pritchett. 1999. “The Impact of Public Spending on Health: Does
Money Matter?” Social Science & Medicine 49(1): 1309 – 23.
Filmer, Deon and Norbert Schady. 2008. Getting Girls into School: Evidence from a
Scholarship Program in Cambodia. Economic Development and Cultural Change
56:581–617, April 2008
Filmer, Deon, JeFood-for-Educationry S. Hammer, and Lant H. Pritchett. 2000. “Weak
Links in the Chain: A Diagnosis of Health Policy in Poor Countries.” The World Bank
Research Observer 15(2): 199 – 224.

173

Filmer, Deon, Jeffery S. Hammer, and Lant H. Pritchett. 2002. “Weak Links in the Chain
II: A Prescription for Health Policy in Poor Countries.” The World Bank Research
Observers 17(1): 47 – 66.

Frankenberg, Elizabeth. 1995. “The Effects of Access to Health Care on Infant Mortality
in Indonesia: A Fixed-Effects Approach to Evaluating Health Services.” Health
Transition Review 5(2): 143-162.

Fruttero, Anna and Varun Gauri. 2005. “The Strategic Choices of NGOs: Location
Decisions in Rural Bangladesh.” Journal of Development Studies 41(5): 759 – 787.
Galasso, Emanuela & Ravallion, Martin, 2005. "Decentralized Targeting of an
Antipoverty Program" Journal of Public Economics 89(4): 705-727.
Glewwe, Paul. 2002. “Schools and Skills in Developing Countries: Education Policies
and Socioeconomic Outcomes.” Journal of Economic Literature 402: 436 – 82.
Glick, P. and Sahn, D. 2000. “Schooling of Girls and Boys in a West African Country:
The Effects of Parental Education, Income, and Household Structure.” Economics of
Education Review 191: 63 – 87.

Glick, Peter. 2008. “What Policies Will Reduce Gender Schooling Gaps in Developing
Countries: Evidence and Interpretation.” World Development 369: 1623 – 1646.
Glinskaya, Elena. 2005. “Education and Health Expenditures in Bangladesh.” Journal of
Developing Areas 21(1-2): 91-120.

Goodin, Robert and Julian Le Grand. 1987. Not Only the Poor. London: Allen and
Unwin.
Greene, William. 2000. Econometric Analysis. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

174

Gupta, Sanjeev, Marjin Verhoeven, and Erwin R. Tiongson. 2003. Public Spending on
Health Care and the Poor. Health Economics 12: 685—696.
Harrington Meyer, Madonna. 1996. “Making Claims as Workers or Wives: The
Distribution of Social Security Benefits.” American Sociological Review 61: 449—465.
Hartman, Betsy and James Boyce. 1983. A Quiet Violence, View from a Bangladesh
Village. London, UK: Zed Press.

Hashemi, Syed, Sidney Schuler and Ann Riley (1996) “Rural Credit Programs and
Women’s Empowerment in Bangladesh.” World Development 24(4): 635-653.
Haughton, Jonathan and Dominique Haughton. 1997. “Explaining Child Nutrition in
Vietnam.” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 45(3): 541-556.
Heckman, James. 1979. Sample selection bias as a specification error. Econometrica, 47,
153–61.
Hill, Kenneth and Ann Pebley. 1989. “Child Mortality in the Developing World.”
Population and Development Review 15(4): 657 – 87.

Hossain, Mahbub. 1988. “Credit for alleviation of rural poverty: The Grameen Bank in
Bangladesh” International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) Series # 65.
Jacoby, Hanan G and Skoufias, Emmanuel, 1997. "Risk, Financial Markets, and Human
Capital in a Developing Country," Review of Economic Studies 64(3): 311-35
Jalan, Jyotsna and Ravallion, Martin. 2003. "Does piped water reduce diarrhea for
children in rural India?" Journal of Econometrics 112(1): 153-173.
Keefer, Philip and Stuti Khemani. 2004. “Why do the Poor Receive Poor Services?”
Economic and Political Weekly 39(9): 935-43.

175

Khan, Mushtaq. 2005. Markets, States and Democracy: Patron-Client Networks and the
Case for Democracy in Developing Countries, Democratization 12 (5): 705-725.
Khandker, S. Pitt, M. and Fuwa, N. 2003. Subsidy to Promote Girls’ Secondary
Education: The Female Stipend Program in Bangladesh. Washington DC: World Bank.

Khandker, Shahidur. 2005. “Microfinance and Poverty: Evidence Using Panel Data from
Bangladesh.” The World Bank Economic Review 19(2):263-286
Koenig, Michael A. Vincent Fauveau and Bogdan Wojtyniak. 1991. “Mortality
Reductions from Health Interventions: The Case of Immunization in Bangladesh.”
Population and Development Review 17: 87—114.

Kuper, Leo. 1981. “Genocide: Its political use in the twentieth century” in Laban Hinton
Edited Genocide: an anthropological reader. New Haven: Wiley-Blackwell.
LeGrand, Thomas and James F. Phillips. “The Effect of Fertility Reductions on Infant
and Child Mortality: Evidence from Matlab in Rural Bangladesh.” Population Studies 50:
51—68.
Levison, D. and Moe, K. 1998. Household Work as a Deterrent to Schooling: An
Analysis of Adolescent Girls in Peru. The Journal of Developing Areas 323: 339 – 356.
Lewis, M. and Lockheed, M. E. 2006. Inexcusable Absence. Washington: Center for
Global Development.
Lomeli, Enrique Valencia Lomeli. 2008. “Conditional Cash Transfers as Social Policy in
Latin America: An Assessment of their Contributions and Limitations.” Annual Review of
Sociology 34: 475 –599.

Maitra, Pushkar. 2004. “Parental bargaining, health inputs and child mortality in India.”
Journal of Health Economics 23(2): 259-291

176

Majumder, AK, May M, Pant PD. 1997. “Infant and child mortality determinants in
Bangladesh: are they changing?” Journal of Biosocial Science. 1(4):385-99.
Malthus, Thomas. 1798. An essay on the principle of population. London: Macmillan &
Co. Ltd.
Mare, Robert and Vida Maralani. 2006. “The Intergenerational Effects of Changes in
Women’s Educational Attainments.” American Sociological Review 714: 542 – 564.
Marmot, Michael and Richard Wilkinson. 2006. Social Determinants of Health. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Marmot, Michael, Johannes Siegrist, and Tores Theorell. 2006. “Health and Psychosocial
Environment at Work.” In Marmot, Michael and Richard Wilkinson eds. Social
Determinants of Health. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Marmot, Michael. 2004. The Status Syndrome. New York: Henry Holt and Company.
Marmot, Michael. 2005. “Social Determinants of Health Inequalities.” Lancet 365:
1099—1104.
McGuire, James W. “Social Policy and Mortality Decline in East Asia and Latin
America.” World Development 29(10): 1673—1697.
McKeown, Thomas and R. G. Record. 1962. “Reasons for the decline of mortality in
England and Wales during the nineteenth century,” Population Studies 16: 94-122
McKeown, Thomas. 1976. The Modern Rise of Population. New York: Academic Press.
McKeown, Thomas. 1983. “Food, Infection, and Population.” Journal of
Interdisciplinary History 14(2): 227 – 247.

Mercer, Alex, Fariha Haseen, Nafisa Lira Huq, Nowsher Uddin, Mobarak Hossain Khan
and Charles P Larson. 2006. “Risk Factors for Neonatal Mortality in Rural Areas of

177

Bangladesh Served by a Large NGO Programme.” Health Policy and Planning 21(6):
432-443
Mercer, Alex, Mobarak Hossain Khan, Muhammad Daulatuzzaman and Joanna Reid.
2004. “Effectiveness of an NGO Primary Health Care Programme in Rural Bangladesh:
Evidence From the Management Information System.” Health Policy and Planning
21(6): 432-443
Mosely, Paul, John Hudson and Arjan Verschoor. 2002; “Aid, Poverty Reduction, and
‘New Conditionality’.” Economic Journal 114(496): 217—243.
Muhuri, Pradip and Samuel Preston. 1991. “Effects of Family Composition on Mortality
Differentials by Gender Among Children in Matlab, Bangladesh.” Population and
Development Review 17(3): 415—34.

Muhuri, Pradip. 1995. “Health Programs, Maternal Education, and Differential Child
Mortality in Matlab, Bangladesh.” Population and Development Review 21: 813–34
Murgai, Rinku and Salman Zaidi. 2005. “Effectiveness of Food Assistance Programs in
Bangladesh.” Journal of Developing Areas 21(1-2): 121-142
Nargis, Nigar and Mahabub Hossain. 2006. “Income dynamics and pathways out of rural
poverty in Bangladesh, 1988–2004.” Agricultural Economics 35(3): 425 – 435.
O’Connor, Julia. 1993. “Gender, Class, and Citizenship in the Comparative Analysis of
Welfare State Regimes.” British Journal of Sociology 44: 501—18.
O’Donnell, Owen, Eddy van Doorslaer, Ravi P. Rannan-Eliya, Aparnaa Somanathan,
Shiva Raj Adhikari, Baktygul Akkazieva, Deni Harbianto, Charu C. Garg, Piya
Hanvoravongchai, Alejandro N. Herrin, Mohammed N. Huq, Shamsia Ibragimova, Anup
Karan, Soon-man Kwon, Gabriel M. Leung, Jui-fen Rachel Lu, Yasushi Ohkusa, Badri

178

Raj Pande, Rachel Racelis, Keith Tin, Kanjana Tisayaticom, Laksono Trisnantoro, Quan
Wan, Bong-Min Yang and Yuxin Zhao. 2008. “Who Pays for Health in Asia.” Journal of
Health Economics 27(2): 460 – 275.

Orloff, Ann. 1993. “Gender and the Social Rights in Citizenship: The Comparative
Analysis of Gender Relations and Welfare States.” American Sociological Association
58: 303—28.
Patai. Raphael. 1971. Society, Culture and Change in the Middle East, 3rd Ed.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Pitt, M. and Rosenzweig, M. 1990. “Estimating the Intrahousehold Incidence of Illness:
Child Health and Gender Inequality in the Allocation of Time.” International Economic
Review 314: 1139 – 1156.

Pitt, Mark, Shahidur Khandker and Jannifer Catright. 2006. “Empowering Women with
Micro Finance: Evidence from Bangladesh.” Economic Development and Cultural
Change 54: 791-831

Pitt, Mark, Shahidur Khandker, Omar Haider Chowdhury, and Daniel L. Millimet. 2003.
“Credit Programs for the Poor and the Health Status of Children in Rural Bangladesh.”
International

Preston, Samuel. 1975. “The Changing Relation between Mortality and Level of
Economic Development.” Population Studies 29:231–48,
Pritchett, Lant and Larry Summers. 1996. “Wealthier is Healthier.” Journal of Human
Resources 31: 841 – 868.

179

Rahman, Atiur and Abdur Razzaque. 1999. “The Poorest of the Poor and the Social
Programs of the NGOs: Exposing Some Evidence on Exclusion.” Bangladesh
Development Studies 26(1): 1 – 31.

Ranis, Gustav, Frances Stewart and Alejandro Ramirez. 2001. “Economic Growth and
Human Development.” World Development 28(2): 197 – 219.
Ravallion, Martin and Binayak Sen. 1994. “Impacts on Rural Poverty of Land-Based
Targeting Further Results for Bangladesh.” World Development 22(6): 823-838
Ravallion, Martin and Binayak Sen. 1996. “When Method Matters: Monitoring Poverty
in Bangladesh.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 44: 761—792.
Ravallion, Martin and Quentin Wodon. 2000. “Does Child Labour Displace Schooling?
Evidence on Behavioural Responses to an Enrollment Subsidy.” Economic Journal
110(March): 158 – 175.
Ravallion, Martin. 2006. “Transfer and Safety Nets in Poor Countries” in Abhijit
Banerjee, Roland Benabou, and Dilip Mookherjee (eds) Understanding Poverty. Oxford
University Press.
Rosenzweig, Mark and Kenneth Wolpin. 1986. “Evaluating the Effects of Optimally
Distributed Public Programs: Child Health and Family Planning Interventions.” American
Economic Review 76(4): 470—482.

Rosenzweig, Mark and Kenneth Wolpin. 1988. “Migration selectivity and the effects of
public programs” Journal of Public Economics 37(3): 265 – 289.
Rosenzweig, Mark and Paul Schultz. 1982. "Market Opportunities, Genetic Endowments,
and Intrafamily Resource Distribution: Child Survival in Rural India," American
Economic Review 72(4): 803-15.

180

Schultz, P. 1993. Investments in the Schooling and Health of Women and Men:
Quantities and Returns. Journal of Human Resources 284: 694-734.
Schultz, P. 2002. Why Governments Should Invest More to Educate Girls. World
Development 302: 207 – 225.

Sen, Binayak, Mustafa Mujeri and Quazi Shahabuddin. 2006. “Explaining Pro-Poor
Growth in Bangladesh: Puzzles, Evidence and Implications.” In Timothy Besley and
Louise Cord Edited Delivering on the Promise of Pro-Poor Growth: Insights and Lessons
from Country experiences. World Bank Publications.

Sen, Binayak. 2003. “Drivers of Escape and Descent: Changing Household Fortunes in
Rural Bangladesh.” World Development 31(3): 513 – 534.
Shleifer, Andrei. 1998. “State vs. Private Ownership.” Journal of Economic Perspectives
12(4): 133-150.
Simmons, Ruth, Laila Baqee, Michael A. Koenig and James F. Phillips. “Beyond Supply:
The Importance of Female Family Planning Workers in Rural Bangladesh.” Studies in
Family Planning 19(1): 29—38.

Soares, Rodrigo. 2007. “Health and the Evolution of Welfare Across Brazilian
Municipalities.” Journal of Development Economics 84: 590—608.
Squire, Lyn. 1993. “Fighting Poverty.” American Economic Review 83: 377—382.
Stolnitz, George. 1965. “Recent Mortality Trends in Latin America, Asia and Africa:
Review and Re-interpretation.” Population Studies 19: 117—138.
Strauss, John and Duncan Thomas. 1995. “Human Resources: Empirical Modeling of
Household and Family Decisions,” in J.Behrman, T.N. Srinivasan Edited Handbook of
Development Economics, Vol. III. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science.

181

Strauss, John. 1990. “Households, Communities, and Preschool Children's Nutrition
Outcomes: Evidence from Rural Cote d'Ivoire.” Economic Development and Cultural
Change 38(2): 231–6

Suwal, Juhee. 2001. “The Main Determinants of Infant Mortality in Nepal.” Social
Science & Medicine 53(12): 1667—1681.

Thomas, Duncan, Victor Lavy and John Strauss. 1996. Public Policy and Anthropometric
Outcomes in the Cote d'Ivoire. Journal of Public Economics 61(2): 155—192.
Un Nabi, Rashed. 1999. Consultation with the poor. Participatory Poverty Assessment in
Bangladesh. NGO Working Group on the World Bank, Bangladesh.

UNESCO. 2006. EFA Global Monitoring Report: Education for All: Literacy for Life.
UNICEF. 2007. Women and Children: The Double Dividend of Gender Equality. The
State of the World’s Children. UNICEF.
van de Walle, Dominique, 1998. "Targeting Revisited," World Bank Research Observer
13(2): 231-48
Victora, Cesar, Adam Wagstaff, Joanna Armstrong Schellenberg, Davidson Gwatkin,
Mariam Claeson, and Jean-Pierre Habicht. 2003. “Applying an Equity Lens to Child
Health and Mortality: More of the Same is Not Enough.” The Lancet 362: 233—241.
Wagstaff, Adam. 2003. “Child Health On A Dollar A Day: Some Tentative CrossCountry Comparisons.” Social Science and Medicine 57: 1529—1538.
Wagstaff, Adam & Nga Nguyet Nguyen, 2002. "Poverty and survival prospects of
Vietnamese children under Doi Moi," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2832, The
World Bank.

182

Wilensky, Henry. 1975. The Welfare State and Equality. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Wilkinson, Richard. 1996. Unhealthy Societies: The Afflictions of Inequality. London:
Routledge Press.
Wilkinson, Richard. 2005. The Impact of Inequality: How to Make Sick Societies
Healthier. New York: New York Press.

Wilkinson, Richard and Kate Pickett. 2009. The Spirit Level: Why Greater Equality
Makes Societies Stronger. New York: Bloomsbury Press.

Williams, R. 1972. The East Pakistan Tragedy. New York: Drake.
Wodon, Quentin. 2000. “Microdeterminants of Consumption, Poverty, Growth, and
Inequality in Bangladesh.” Applied Economics 32: 1337—1352.
World Bank. 1990. Poverty. New York: Oxford University Press.
World Bank. 1990. World Development Report. New York: Oxford University Press.
World Bank. 1997. The State in a Changing World. New York: Oxford University Press.
World Bank. 2000. Attacking Poverty. New York: Oxford University Press.
World Bank. 2004. Making Services Work for Poor People. New York: Oxford
University Press.
World Health Organization. 2008. Closing the Gap in a Generation: Health Equity
through Action on the Social Determinants of Health. World Health Report 2008.

Geneva: World Health Organization.
WDI. 2004. World Development Indicators Database. Washington, DC: World Bank.

183

Zafar Ullah, A N. James N. Newell, Jalal Uddin Ahmed, M.K.A Hyder and Akramul
Islam. 2006. “Government-NGO Collaboration: The Case of Tuberculosis Control in
Bangladesh.” Health Policy and Planning 21(2):143-155.

184

